这是选·美的第1026篇文章

本文转载自WelfareDestination（ID：willdot）。本文转载已获福山教授授权。

翻译了福山四篇播客内容，前三篇是关于历史终结论的论述，之前用了三篇文章做了介绍，这是完整的中英文翻译版本，第四篇是福山关于公共政策专业教育重塑的思考。

很多人认为福山对未来的预测错的离谱，但是在听过福山的观点之后会发现他本人并不是这样看待的。在不到一个月之前，福山又做客Ezra Klein Show,，谈了他的新书，对很多东西的看法还是很具有启发性的。而下文中的播客内容，前三篇的内容串联了福山至少五本书的内容，分别是母本《历史的终结及最后之人》，关于科技对历史终结影响的著作《我们的后人类未来：生物科技革命的后果》，关于人类历史的演进对历史终结影响的著作《政治秩序的起源：从前人类时代到法国大革命》《政治秩序与政治衰败·从工业革命到民主全球化》，关于身份政治对历史终结影响的著作《Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment》，在谈到自己的结论时，还提到了亨廷顿的理论对历史终结论的影响，涉及到的三本著作是《变化社会中的政治秩序》《第三波：20世纪后期的民主化浪潮》《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》。一起来听一听福山对自己观点的阐释吧。

翻译并非逐句按照字面意思翻译，存在不通顺和理解错误之处还请指出。翻译以及分享已获得教授许可。

选·美获授权

对于福山的观点，我记得在第一次阅读社会科学出版社收录于《国际学术前沿观察》丛书的时候有这样一段前言：

“作为中国读者，我们希望在阅读该书过程中一定要注意采取批判态度。作为一名西方资产阶级学者，福山的反共立场是十分鲜明的，书中不乏较为露骨的词句（为尊重作者著作权，本书未作删改）。对于其立场及观点，我们是不能接受的。对于其研究方法，我们认为明显偏颇。比如，书中他自始至终未分清共产主义和社会主义的基本概念以致将传统社会主义（指实行中央计划经济体制）与作为人类一种远大理想、实现之日将十分遥远漫长的共产主义混为一谈，甚至还将社会主义、极权主义、法西斯主义相提并论。这些可以清楚地反映出其学术视野的片面与局限，希望读者一定要加以鉴别和批判。”

嗯，一定要批判一下，所以为了批判的方便，文中内容在我听力能力之内未有修改。而对于政治理论和政治实践之间的关系，引用一段我在Facebook收到的反馈，来自莊小渃：

“這些學者的研究都有一定的價值，給人們實踐和依循的參考，但也就僅止於此了，社會改變不是說出來的，只能夠一代代人的實踐。當我們小民落在社會、國家這麼龐大的集體洪流時，首先，要比氣長才能看到改變（這是曾經熱血青年的我私人給的一點建議，當然你可以完全不接受）要活的有力量又不委屈自己（的原則）是很大的考驗！比方，學者作研究的桌子、電腦、屋子、燈光、門簾和偶爾休憩的沙發都有賴社會百工的分工合作；接地氣是很重要的，特別是經濟獨立才能思想獨立（套一句我的老師李敖說的話）。歐美民主選舉政體，今日觀來其實是有些瑕疵的；英日丹麥等國的君主立憲，也有或多或少的問題。我沒有足夠的能力和知識評估中國的未來。但未來不就在每一位諸位身上嗎？只要動手實踐，在自己能力所及的範圍，持續下去，日起有功，一定會改變甚麼的！”

这是一篇汇总文章，大部分内容于之前的三篇笔记中均有提及。至于福山对于政治实践的思考，收录于他关于重塑公共政策教育思考的播客中。由于篇幅的限制，第四篇内容将在下一篇文章中进行呈现。

End of History Revisited Part 1

This is Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law podcast. We are studying why governments fail. We are going to talk about economic and political development at home and around the world.

Today we are listening to Francis Fukuyama, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli institute of Stanford University. Welcome to the CDDRL democracy world.

This is a podcast on the End Of History in retrospect. The single question I’ve been asked most incessantly since 1989 is, “Well, what about the end of history? Doesn’t X invalidate the thesis that you articulated back then?” where X is something that has happened in the newspapers and on television, some big events in international politics. This question is usually asked by somebody that did not understand the original concept of the end of history, and who has not read my book The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992. So the purpose of this podcast is simply to go over that hypothesis and to explain what I meant by it, and to explain the ways which my thinking since then have actually changed. It would actually be strange if the passage of almost thirty years time did not lead to a certain evolution in the way that I thought about the world. But nonetheless it is important to distinguish between reasonable critiques and ones that are silly or based on simple misunderstandings.

Let’s begin with the discussion of the title of my original article “The End Of History? “ that appeared in the journal The National Interest in the summer of 1989. “History” as I was using it was the history with a capital “H”. There are other words that people use to describe the same phenomenon today as more likely to be spoken of as development or perhaps modernization. The End of History was meant more as the goal rather than simply a termination so that the End of History was raising the question: what is the terminal point or what is the goal of the development process or the modernization process.

让我们从讨论最初于1989年夏天发表在《国家利益》期刊上的那篇论文“历史终结了吗？”开始吧。在这里，我把英文History的首字母大写了，所以这里的这个History, 用今天的时髦的词汇表达出来就是“发展”或者“现代化”的意思。所以The End of History这个理论所要探索的是一种目标，而不仅仅是一个终点，也就是说The End of History是提出了这样的一个问题：人类发展或者现代化的目标是什么；哪些现象的出现会证明现代化的终点达到了？

The phase the End of History was not the one originated to me. It was used first by the great German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel was the first historicism philosopher meaning that you could not interpret thought or human institutions without understanding their historical evolution. His mode of thinking was taken over by Karl Marx who in a certain sense had the most famous version of the end of history. Marx argued that human societies evolved. They modernize from primitive feudal ones up through bourgeois societies. And the end of history for Marx was a communist utopia. This was his prediction and his hope. The simple argument I made was that in 1989 it didn’t look like Marx’s version of the end of history was going to work out. We were never going to get that communist utopia. Mikhail Gorbachev was putting Soviet Union through [perestroika and glasnost] accepting the basic principles of modern liberal democracy and therefore if there was to be an end of history, it wasn’t going to be communism. It was going to be some form of liberal democracy connected to market economy.

The End of History这个概念并不是我的原创，它最先是被伟大的德国哲学家黑格尔所使用的。黑格尔是第一位历史主义哲学家，这个学派所倡导的是必须研究与解释人类历史发展，基于这些解释才能认真了解社会与政治。之后，卡马很好的继承了这一学派思想的衣钵，而卡马在某种意义上，提出了我们所知道的最有名的历史终结理论。卡马认为人类社会是不断发展的，它们现代化的路径是从原始的封建社会一路发展到资本主义社会，最终卡马认为人类的历史将会终结于共产主义：这是卡马所预言并且寄予希望的。但是在1989年，我提出的论点是卡马的历史的终结的理论不太可能行得通，人类社会的发展永远都到不了共产主义：当时的现实是，戈正在苏联进行改革开放，并且接受了现代自由民主思想的一些基本原则。所以说如果历史的发展有一个最终目标的话，从那个时候来看，它不会是共产主义，它应该是自由民主和市场经济相结合的一种模式。

The idea of the end of history was taken up again in the 1930s and 1940s by Alexandre Kojève. Kojève was a Russian French philosopher who led perhaps one of the most influential seminars in the mid-twentieth century, a seminar in Paris that included many of the great intellectual lights of the post-war period: Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, Raymond Aron and ric Weil. Kojève argued that Hegel was fundamentally right that history had ended. He asserted moreover that history ended in the year 1806 at the time of the Battle of Jena when the Prussian monarchy was defeated by Napoleon.

黑格尔和卡马之后，The End of History的观念在1930和40年代的时候又被人们重新拿出来讨论，引导这场讨论的就是俄裔法国哲学家亚历山大·科耶夫。当时科耶夫在巴黎组织了一系列围绕黑格尔的研讨会，常来听讲的都是当时法国最重要的知识分子，包括雷蒙·格诺，乔治·巴代伊，莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂，雅各·拉冈，雷蒙·阿隆等人。科耶夫提出的观点认为黑格尔的思路大体上是正确的，并且科耶夫认为历史已经发展到终点了，我们现在所处的就是后历史时代。他更进一步的认为历史的终结发生在1806年耶拿战争之后，当时拿破仑率领的军队打败了普鲁士的君主制。

《亚历山大·科耶夫：哲学，国家与历史的终结》

Now note, this was an assertion that was made right on the eve of the Second World War, in a tumultuous early 20th century that had seen the First World War: the killing of millions of people, the Bolshevik Revolution and was shortly to see the Chinese Revolution and the liberation of much of the what came to be known as the Third World from the colonial domination.

但是注意啦，这个断言所提出的时代，恰恰是第二次世界大战的前夜，在此之前，伏尸百万的第一次世界大战刚刚结束，布尔什维克在俄国取得了革命的胜利，一种新的意识形态出现了，而不久之后，人类又将目睹发生在我国的红色革命以及第三世界国家摆脱殖民统治的独立浪潮。

On the surface this is an absurd statement. But when a brilliant thinker like Alexandre Kojève makes something that sounds like an absurd statement, you need to think a little bit below the surface as to what he really meant. He was being ironic but in a certain sense he was pointing to an important truth, namely that the world had not progressed substantially beyond the principles of the French Revolution, that is to say beyond a political system based on the twin principles of liberty and equality, the principles of modern politics. And for all the storm that occurred in the 20th century or in the years since 1806, fundamentally what we were seeing was simply the spread of these principles from the metropolitan area to the provinces of the world.

从表面上看，这个观点是站不住脚的。但是如果这个连你都觉得可笑的观点被一位公认很有影响的思想家提出来的时候，你就要想一想是不是你的想法才是可笑的了。科耶夫的观点是有点搞，但是他也指出来了一个事实，就是世界发展的大潮流，并没有超出法国大革命所提出来的自由和平等这两个原则。也就是说1806年以后我们所看到的只不过是旧理念的传播，并没有新理念的产生。

What I was arguing in my 1989 article was not all that original. Maybe Kojève and behind him the Hegel were actually right. Maybe the fundamental principles of a modern society had been established 200 years ago and what we were witnessing was simply the implementation of them in different countries around the world. Maybe with reforms going on in the former Soviet Union and at that time in China as well, we would never arrived at socialism, we would never get to that higher stage of human society and that what we saw imperfect as it was was all we were going to get. That was the basic idea.

而我在1989年的论文中提出来的观点也并不全是原创的：也许科耶夫和黑格尔的理论是对的：人类社会发展的基本原则早在200多年前就已经确立了，我们所目睹的仅仅是它们的传播；或者也有可能如果随着前苏联以及那个年代我国改革的进行，人类社会永远都不会进入更高阶的社会主义，而我们所看到的不完美就是我们所能获得的一切。这是基本的观点。（没看懂这里说了个什么）

So one group of the critics would never fundamentally misunderstood my argument were actually the Marxism. There were meetings in Cuba, in the Soviet Union and other communist countries where people understood my argument about the end of history and they understood that it was a fundamental challenge to their own beliefs about the directionality of history.

所以从这一点上来说，卡马主义学者是永远不会从根本上误解我的论点的。这些学者在共产主义国家举行会议，他们不仅明白我关于历史终结的理论阐释了什么，并且他们将此看成是对他们的根本信念的挑战。

At the time that I wrote the article in the winter of 1988 and 1989, I was working as a policy analyst at the think tank the Rand Corporation, studying Soviet domestic politics. Mikhail Gorbachev recently had given a speech which he said, “the essence of socialism was competition.” When I heard this, I called up one of my friends who understood Hegel and said, “If Gorbachev is saying this then we must be at the end of History.”

我在1988年和1989年之间写作这篇文章之时，还是兰德公司专攻苏联内政的一位政策分析师。戈最近做了一次演讲，其中他说到社会主义的本质是竞争。我听到这句话之后一惊，马上就给我一位研究黑格尔的朋友打电话，他的反应是，如果戈真的这样说了，那么我们就已经到达历史的终点了。

The actual provenance of the article was a lecture series that was organized by Allan Bloom, my former teacher at the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago that winter. The overall rubric of the lecture series was the decline of the West. I was asked to give a lecture in it and I said, “Well, I had a lecture that would fit except the theme would not be the decline of the West but rather the triumph of the West.” I gave the lecture and then a couple months later was visited by Owen Harries who was the editor of a new magazine: The National Interest. He was soliciting ideas for articles and I told him about this lecture and he agreed to publish it and the rest so to speak is history.

这篇文章的实际出处是由Allan Bloom所组织的系列讲座，Allan Bloom是我的老师，当年他是芝大社会思想委员会的一名老师。这个系列讲座的主题是西方的衰落，我也被邀请做一次讲座。我当时就说了，讲座没问题，但是主题是关于西方的胜利。我给出了这次讲座，然后又过了几个月，Owen Harries正给新成立的国家利益期刊寻找文章，我就把这个系列讲座推荐给了他，他也同意发表我的文章。

The argument that I made in that 1989 article was not that democracy had suddenly come to characterize the whole world or that it would necessarily spread everywhere, much less that events somehow would stop occurring. The argument was rather that there did not seem to be superior alternatives port which the world appeared to be evolving.

我在1989年的文章中提出的论点并不是说民主突然就成为了全世界的标配了，或者它一定会在全世界范围内传播。何况这种传播将会在不久的将来停止。我在文中提出的观点是，按照当时的世界发展趋势来看，似乎并没有比自由民主和市场经济结合更高级的替代的形式出现。

The theory of History that I put forward in my book The End of History and the Last Man is what I back then describe as a weak version of modernization theory. A strong version of this theory was the dominant paradigm in American Social Science back in the 1950s and 60s. This strong version held that economic, social, political and cultural aspects of modernization were part of a single evolutionary process and they are that they were all mutually supportive as societies became richer, became more open, they became more democratic, this view became untenable in no small measure because of a critique made by Samuel Huntington in his book Political Order in Changing Societies that appeared in 1967. Huntington said that the political and economic dimensions of modernization often acted at cross purposes from one another. If there was too rapid social mobilization that outstrip the rate of political development, the result was not a happy democratic society but rather instability. In later years, Huntington would focus on another issue, culture. And the argument is societies would not converge over time but would remain trapped within preexisting cultural horizons.

而我在1992年的书里的观点可以说是一种弱化了的现代化理论。而强化版的理论是20世界50，60年代美国社会科学界所提出的主导范式理论。这一理论认为现代化的四个方面：经济，社会，政治和文化的现代化是一个单一进程的一部分，随着社会变得越来越富有，开放和民主，它们是会相互促进和支持的。但是根据亨廷顿在其1967年的书中所提出的观点，这种模式发展下去是会变得难以为继的。亨廷顿认为政治的现代化和经济的现代化是会彼此之间存在冲突的：如果社会流动的速度超过了政治发展的速度，结果就不是一个幸福民主的社会。之后亨廷顿又将他的研究转向了文化这个角度，提出的观点是社会并不会随着时间的推移出现趋同化，而是会被困在之前的文化背景中。

The driver of modernization described in my 1992 book was the weak version of this theory, it was weak because it allowed for contingency and human agency. Nothing was inevitable or pre-determined. Nonetheless I argued that modernization was a coherent process that did not look terribly different cross different human cultures. The reason for this was the nature of technology or what I call the “mechanism”. At any given stage of human history, the prevailing forms of technology determined a frontier of production possibilities. The prevailing form of economic organization then had critical effects on social organization and ultimately shaped the nature of politics as well. Thus, for example, the technologies of cold steel in large-scale manufacturing abandon the prior agrarian order and require both urbanization and higher levels of education. By contrast, the early phases of information revolution ended the monopoly on information of various hierarchies like the state and made horizontal mobilization more available, in other words it was more suitable to democratization. Higher levels of income would then produce a middle class that among all things being equal would have preferences for greater participation in political affairs. This explained the relatively strong correlation between countries that were wealthy and countries were democratic around the world.

而我书里面描述的现代化的驱动力就是这个理论的弱化版本。之所以说是弱化的版本是因为其中加入了一些无可避免的偶然因素。尽管如此，我当时还是认为现代化是一个一以贯之的过程：在人类的不同文化之间并没有什么不同。我保持这样的观点，是因为在我看来，在人类社会的任何阶段，技术的形式决定了生产方式，在此基础上的经济组织方式又对社会组织以及政治产生影响。

举一个例子，钢铁大规模生产中的冷轧技术使得人类摆脱了先前的农业秩序，促进了城市化和高等教育的发展。相比之下，信息革命的早期阶段就结束了之前各个层面对信息的垄断，这就使得社会的横向流动更顺畅了。换句话说，信息的开放使得民主化的条件成熟了。更高的收入水平催生了中产阶级，而这个阶级对于政治参与的热情明显提高，这也解释了国家的富裕程度和民主化之间为什么有很强的关联性。

The clearest example of economic development leading to social convergence has been arisen in east Asian. Industrialization has taken root across the region from Japan to Korean to Taiwan to CN. In each case, the social transformations brought about by this process have led to a convergence with western countries that went through it in earlier generations. There has been a massive shift of populations from the countryside to cities, greater investment in education and skills, development of urban middle class and a more complex and interdependent division of labor.

经济发展促进社会趋同的最典型的例子发生在东亚。工业化已经在日本，韩国，台湾，大陆等地区扎根。在这些例子当中，社会转型又导致了与西方国家的趋同，而西方国家在早前也经历了类似的过程。而这中间，又发生了人口的大规模迁移，对教育和技术的投资增加，城市中产阶级的发展，更复杂和相互依存的劳动分工的出现等一系列的现象。

In the cases of Japan, South Korean and Taiwan, there is also a political convergence. Each of these countries became liberal democracies over time, the latter two making the transition during the 1980s, right at the point when they shifted from being predominantly agrarian to predominantly urban industrial societies.

而在前三个地区，还发生了政治上同西方国家的趋同，随着时间的推移，它们都转变为自由民主的政体。而韩国和台湾地区在1980年代的转型恰好处在它们的经济模式从农业转向城镇化和工业化的时候。

This has not been a universal pattern, however. Singapore has a higher per capita income than the United States and yet remains a liberal electoral authoritarian regime. CN has now reached a level of income comparable to that of South Korean and Taiwan in the 1980s and under X has moved in the opposite direction to a more repressive form of dictatorship.

但是注意了，上面提到的这个例子并不是普适的，比如新加坡就是一个特例。新加坡的人均GDP高于美国，但是政治上仍然是一个自由选举的专制政权。而中国大陆现在的收入水平已经达到了韩国和台湾1980年代的水平了，但是在X的领导之下，政治的发展方向却朝着独裁的方向去了。

There were number of qualifications to this picture that I painted back in 1992. Apart from the Chinese exception to which I will return shortly, there are several missing pieces to this picture that I understand much better now than I did in the early 1990s.

这就引起了我的反思。如果把我1992年所勾勒的人类社会发展的蓝图比喻成一幅画的话，很明显这幅画作还没有完成，还有缺失的部分，而我现在对于这些缺失部分的了解要比我在1990年代的理解深入的多。不过对于这些缺失，中国的因素我将单独分析。

The first was the question of how economic growth starts in the first place. Once you get on the up escalator, there are predictable social and political consequences. But many parts of the world seem mired in poverty with no realistic hopes of replicating the growth path charted by Japan, Korean and China. The reasons why such growth has not become more universal has to do with the lack of institutions and particularly a lack of a modern state. My earlier theory had focused on democracy and did not pay enough attention to the prerequisite of a relatively impersonal state that would maintain social order and provide basic public goods. Getting to such a modern state, what I subsequently labeled as “getting to Denmark” is actually a significantly more difficult task of political construction than is getting to some form of electoral democracy. Today there are well over 100 countries that would qualify as the latter: that is the electoral democracies including places like Iraq and Afghanistan. But there are only perhaps a couple dozen countries can boast of having a truly modern state. The reason that countries in East Asia have developed economically so successfully in the past two generations lie in the fact that they have developed the modern states prior to their confrontation with the West. They did not have to create such institutions as part of their modernization projects. But for other parts of the world, like sub-Saharan Africa where modern states often did not exist prior to colonization, the path to economic growth has been far more difficult, because they didn’t have the institutional frameworks for growth to occur. This then raised a question that I completely ignored in the 1992 book, which is the origins of the modern state itself. I have tried to correct this in my two-volume Political Order series which traces the rise, first, of states out of tribal societies and then the transition from patrimonial to modern states. The mechanism here to the extent is one has been military competition. States are more powerful than tribal societies and modern states are more powerful than patrimonial ones, so the relentless quest for security drives societies to adopt meritocracy and impersonal government as organizing principles.

我首先想到的问题就是，经济增长到底是如何开始的。打个比方，如果把经济的增长当做一部上升的扶梯，人们很容易去预测它未来的发展。但是世界上很多地方的发展是陷入贫困之中的，这些地区并没有复制类似日本韩国这样经济腾飞的模式。原因就在于制度保障上的缺乏，特别是现代国家形成条件的缺乏。然而我早期的理论过多的关注在民主的发展上，对于维持社会秩序和提供基本的公共产品的这些客观的先决条件的关注是不足的。要建设这样的一个现代化国家（我把这个过程称为”抵达丹麦“），我现在意识到这是一个更加复杂和艰巨的过程，并不仅仅是实现某种形式的选举民主就可以达到的，我之前大意了。按照我之前的理论，当今世界有资格实行选举民主的国家有100多个，这里面甚至包括阿富汗和伊朗。但是真正意义上的现代国家就凤毛麟角了。而我之前所提到的东亚地区在经济上之所以成功，是因为他们在和西方文明发生冲撞之前已经发展成了现代国家的形式。他们不必要为了达到现代化来创建那些为之提供保障的机构。但是对于世界上其他地区而言，诸如撒哈拉沙漠以南的国家，现代国家的概念在他们被殖民之前根本就是不存在的，这样看下去，经济的发展没有了这些客观条件的保障就要困难的多了。而这引出了我在1992年的书中完全忽视掉的一个问题，就是关于现代国家的起源。我在之后出版了两卷本的《政治秩序的起源》的书籍，希望能够纠正我之前的观点。这两卷本的书籍从描述部落社会中的国家兴起开始，然后呈现了从世袭制到现代国家的过渡过程。而这个过程在一定程度上其实是一场军事的竞争：正式因为世袭国家比部落更加强大，现代国家又比世袭国家更加强大，因此出于对安全的追求激发了社会向着任人唯贤的组织原则转变。

This hypothesis that state makes war and war makes the state has been associated with sociologist Charles Tilly. It’s neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to explain why states exist in any given country. For that we need to consider other factors like climate, geography, religious beliefs and the like. All of which makes for a more complex and a much more messy overall theory.

这种国家构建和战争相互作用的假设是和社会学家Charles Tilly紧密相关的，但是对于解释为什么在任何国家中均存在政府这就既不是充分也不是必要条件了。对于此，我们还需要考虑诸如气候条件，地理成因，宗教信仰等其他的因素，而这使得整体的理论更加的复杂了。

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