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在“排干沼泽”行动中，最起码的互信比什么都重要，这种互信应建立在坦率的沟通和专业的判断基础之上，中美关系固然已“回不到过去”，但仍可在对话、合作与管控方面有新的作为，仍可达致符合双方和国际社会共同利益的某种程度的平衡，“回不到过去”不应成为放弃未来的理由。

本文作者系盘古智库学术委员会副秘书长、高级研究员安刚，文章来源于“中美聚焦”。

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“排干沼泽”，是仍未放弃扭转大选败局的美国总统特朗普的专属政治词汇。四年前他刚上台时向自己的支持者承诺要“排干华盛顿的政治沼泽”，意即清除那里盘根错节的利益集团影响，清除政治腐败，打破建制派构筑的层层政治壁垒。

四年过去了，特朗普没能兑现这一承诺，自己反被“华盛顿政治沼泽”吞没。其谋求连任失败在一定程度上是建制派反扑的结果，同时，特朗普任内各种反常规、反专业、逆全球化的操作，对内加剧政治极化，对外制造大国对立、清退国际责任、破坏全球规则，也将战后国际秩序带入“沼泽”，并对美国的“软实力”造成二战后罕有的反噬。

即将走入拜登时期的美国将以“治愈”、“回调”为今后两年的主题词。拜登政府将从疫情应对、经济、社会、移民、能源等领域以及国际多边议题方面全面清算特朗普的政策，力求实现“弥合美国国内创伤”和“恢复美国全球领导力”的竞选承诺。

然而，美国国内的鸿沟是深刻的。民主党推崇的多元自由主义价值观和高税率、大政府、强监管、高福利治理模式，与共和党主张的盎格鲁-撒克逊基本价值观及低税率、小政府、轻监管治理模式之间，有着难以调和的矛盾，甚至已经可以上升到阶级矛盾的高度。拜登政府不可能用四年时间达到目标，四年之后必遭共和党巨大反扑。

特朗普谋连任的努力在种种不利条件下仍赢得超预期的广泛民众支持，显示美国的保守化趋势已经固化，将主导今后二三十年的社会思潮，并对国家政策和对外关系产生深远影响。拜登政府还未上任，就已镀上了一层“进步主义”色彩，至少经济上是部分民族主义的，外交上是相当机会主义的。而共和党在此次大选中有望保住参院控制权并扩大众院议席，将有能力对拜登施政构成明显制衡，捍卫“没有特朗普的特朗普主义”。

奥巴马中后期开启的美国全球战略收缩，在特朗普任内以激进方式推进，拜登政府将予修正，主要是修复盟友关系，重返国际机制，重振气候变化、清洁能源等全球议程。但拜登政府也将部分顺承“特朗普遗产”：一是全球战略目标向大国竞争的聚拢；二是全球战略部署重心向印太地区的倾斜；三是为应对“中国战略威胁”而进行的作战概念创新和技战术调整、武器装备优化；四是对美日印澳“价值观同盟”的发展和利用。所有这些，与特朗普时期不会有太大区别，将表现出较强延续性，还会吸收奥巴马时期“亚太再平衡”战略的部分思维和成果——包括对美日双边同盟的特别倚重，从而形成拜登政府自己的战略。

特朗普的四年，在“美国优先”旗号下大肆推进攻击性现实主义外交，给中美关系造成巨大损害。由于美方不断升级和扩大挑衅，中方不得不采取对等反制措施，两国关系陷入“行动-反应-再行动”的恶性循环，日益逼近“修昔底德陷阱”。

当战略竞争取代互惠合作成为中美关系的主导面，当主导国和崛起国在现行多边机制内的相互否决与排斥取代建设性协调成为全球体系的一大主要现象，当美国的禁用华为5G、TikTok等事件发出科技、经贸乃至系统性脱钩的恶劣信号，当南海军事对峙常态化，当美国在台湾问题上的“战略模糊”开始转向“战略清晰”，当制度之争、意识形态之争回归乃至“文明之争”都成为中美矛盾的潜台词，中美关系的质变已经完成，“再也回不到过去了”。

比科技、经贸脱钩更危险的，是心理脱钩。经过几年折腾，维系中美长期合作关系的社会基础开始瓦解。面对两国关系的高度不确定性，摆脱对对方供应链的过度依赖，搭建风险备份，在两国国内成为从政界高层到企业界的普遍共识。同一全球体系内相互依存和互利共赢的意识似乎不再是经营中美关系的主流思维。美国应对疫情的失败、族裔冲突的迭起、党派对立的加剧、选举政治的混乱，以及在国际上的不负责任，彻底颠覆了美国长期以来在中国民众当中的道德和制度形象，中国在美国民众心目中的“威胁”形象则反向升至冷战后的最高点，对通过接触交融改变中国的挫败感主导了美国知识阶层的对华判断。也就是说，中美两国的相互认知双双陷入“幻灭”，这种“幻灭”成为影响两国对对方决策的主导性因素之一。

拜登上任后，将优先处理美国国内疫情，对外则是缓和国际关系，重返全球议程。这将为中美关系的趋稳和改善提供一个“时间窗口”。但特朗普时期造成的损害不是短时间内就可以消弭的，因为这背后并非只受美国国内的政治、经济和社会因素驱动，更有强大的跨党派共识基础，这种共识认定美国面临的首要挑战来自中国，要求政府——无论是民主党的还是共和党的——以更加强硬的姿态和有效的手段加以应对，而中美结构性矛盾在过去几年的关键期内已从局部性发展到全领域，白宫和国会各种反华遏华政策措施和法规议案的“杠杆”加得很高，破坏力大为增强，可控性显著减小。

即将进入又一个新阶段的中美关系，挑战仍远大于机会，面临的首要任务是尽可能恢复稳定，进而在业已确定的强国战略竞争格局中，通过理智的互动，找寻一个有目标、有底线、有规则、有边界的共处范式，争取把这场大博弈从激烈摩擦的第一阶段，导入政策协调与勾兑的第二阶段。

拜登执政第一年，不大可能出台系统性的对华政策，但其谋求“竞争与合作并存”的目标是明确的，为过热的中美摩擦降温的需求是真实的，其侧近人士处理涉外敏感事务的专业性和倾听力也是可靠的。更重要的是，民主党人不认为断绝接触、脱离交互、单边施压就可以遏制中国，不认为中美之间存在绝对的单赢，不认为中美不合作就有利于美国，也不认为多边主义和经济全球化在当今世界已经过时、失效。

中国有必要抓住正在打开的“时间窗口”和“政策空间”，优先做两件事。一是与美国通过双边渠道和世界卫生组织（这很可能是拜登就职后首个宣布重返的国际机制）等多边构架务实开展防疫合作，确立与美国新政府的首个有效合作点。二是重建高层直接沟通管道，以此为号令有序重启各层级各领域对话磋商，为拜登时期中美关系设置议程框架，在竞争与合作之间规划“缓冲带”，并管控可能的冲突风险。在此过程中，中美双方最好能就各自战略目标相互做出更清晰的解释，为此后四年的互动提供战略备忘和保证，修补中美关系的可预期性。

当上述两项工作推进到成果可视阶段后，不妨借用一下特朗普的政治词汇，中美双方可能需要开启一场“排干沼泽”的行动，也就是给遭特朗普政府严重毒化的双边关系“清淤”。首先是重新谈判，恢复正常关税水平，建立基于公平、互惠、规则的贸易秩序。其次是“科技冷战”休战，将特朗普时期遗留的“悬案”在合适的政治氛围下交给市场和法律去解决，然后寻求达成避免彻底、全面脱钩的共识，争取把“脱钩”这个伪命题从中美议程清单上清除出去。第三是尽量恢复正常人文交流，特别是智库、民航、留学往来。第四是开展金融政策协调，重建产业对接，确立“双循环”经济战略与美国疫后经济复苏和金融稳定之间的合理关系，重构全球化条件下相互依存的基础。第五是重启战略安全对话，并探讨升级为战略稳定磋商，聚焦核导问题，中方在学习中实践与美国等全球军事强国构建新的战略平衡。

应对全球性挑战合作是中美双方在美国政府换届后为改善彼此关系、重振全球治理、各自发挥引领作用所必然要共同抓住的抓手。在拜登团队开列的上任后四大优先任务中，气候变化位列第四，重返《巴黎协定》是板上钉钉之事，美国地方州和能源企业也从未停止履行减排义务，中方则在“十四五”规划中制定了雄心勃勃的碳中和目标，中美双方有充分的合作动力和空间，想必中国智库在响应王毅国务委员兼外长倡议开列合作、对话与管控三个清单的过程中也做足了政策建议准备。但中美在全球层面的协调毕竟要随国际格局和全球治理结构的变化增添新的内容，双方在恢复务实合作的同时，也要就气变、深洋、外空、网络、人工智能等领域的国际规则演进展开沟通甚至谈判。

热点问题也是拜登上台初期中美双方可以对标的领域。在朝核问题上，不甘寂寞的朝鲜有每当美国新总统上任便采取措施试探美方对朝政策取向的“传统”，这次估计也不会例外。半岛局势可能发生新的波动，但特朗普留下的美朝最高层直接接触的“遗产”也将被历史记住，中方对半岛局势有继续施加管理和影响的责任，更有发挥更大作用的契机。在伊朗核问题上，拜登政府有望重返六方机制，美伊关系将在短暂缓和中酝酿更复杂的较量，中方如何站位需要预先盘算。中东格局在特朗普任内发生重大改变，沙特、阿联酋等国推进“自我开明革命”，并开始同以色列和解，伊朗、土耳其、叙利亚等国影响力在一度扩张后受到抑制，这些都将成为拜登政府欣然接受的“馈赠”，而中国在中东的利益和影响也随此进程及“一带一路”建设的推进而悄然重置，中美围绕中东战略问题展开对话变得必要和可行。

“排干沼泽”行动的本质是过渡期的战略试探，如果双方相互确认诚意，合作可以前行、扩大，中美关系有望用不长的时间找到适应新的实力对比和全球大势的竞合状态。如果双方不能摆脱敌意假设，处理具体事务最终被竞争和压制与反制心理主导，中美关系仍可能重返恶性循环滑向“新冷战”。

不必对“排干沼泽”行动有过度期待，“沼泽”实际上无法排干，但“水位”完全可以显著下降。在“排干沼泽”行动中，最起码的互信比什么都重要，这种互信应建立在坦率的沟通和专业的判断基础之上，同时要求双方有在中国台湾、南海等敏感问题上进入相对“静默”状态的默契。而从中长期看，双方都应保持一个信念：中美关系固然已“回不到过去”，但仍可在对话、合作与管控方面有新的作为，仍可达致符合双方和国际社会共同利益的某种程度的平衡，“回不到过去”不应成为放弃未来的理由。

Drain the China-U.S. Swamp

U.S. President Donald Trump, still refusing to concede the 2020 election as of this writing, has a penchant for the phrase “drain the swamp.” Four years ago, Trump campaigned to drain the swamp in Washington, vowing to eliminate the influence of special interests and lobbyists, fight political corruption and break down barriers the establishment had erected.

Unfortunately, Trump failed to fulfill his promise over the past four years; rather, he was devoured by the swamp in Washington. His failure to win reelection partly resulted from a counterattack of the establishment. At the same time, all unconventional, unprofessional and deglobalizing actions from the Trump administration — highlighting political polarization at home while building up hostility between major powers, dodging international responsibilities and destroying global rules abroad, swamped the postwar international order and dealt a rare blow to American soft power that had grown since World War II.

For President-elect Joseph Biden, “heal” and “rectify” will be the keywords of the next two years. The Biden administration will overhaul Trump’s policies on pandemic response, the economy, society, immigration and energy, as well as on international multilateral issues, in a bid to honor his pledges to heal the nation and “restore American leadership.”

Divisions in the U.S., however, is sharp. With allegiance to pluralism and liberalism, the Democratic Party advocates higher taxes for the wealthy, bigger government, stronger supervision and higher welfare. The Republican Party, committed to Anglo-Saxon values, claims to back low tax rates, small government and moderate supervision. The divergence seems irreconcilable — so much that it may even intensify class conflicts. There is little possibility for the Biden administration to make good on its commitments within only four years, and so the Democrats may be trounced by the Republicans in the next election.

Despite his many disadvantages, Trump garnered stronger support than expected in his reelection bid, a testament to the country’s underlying trend of conservatism, which may well take the lead in the next two or three decades and have far-reaching influence on national policies and diplomacy. The Biden administration has already been painted as progressive — something that will certainly follow modest economic nationalism and considerable diplomatic opportunism. Nevertheless, the GOP is projected to hold onto its Senate majority and gain more House seats when the dust of the 2020 election finally settles. This will be enough to check the Biden administration and thus defend Trumpism without Trump.

Strategic retrenchment during the Barack Obama administration made strides during Trump’s presidency.The Biden administration will reverse these gains by reuniting with allies, returning to the international system and reasserting the U.S. presence in the global agenda, including on climate change and clean energy. It will, however,retain part of Trump’s legacy.First, Biden will reinforce major-power competition in U.S. global strategy; second, he will send more strategic forces toward the Indo-Pacific region; third, the U.S. will revamp its thinking, customizing technology and tactics and optimizing weapons in response to the strategic threat of China; and, fourth, the shared values of the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India alliance will be leveraged.

These moves will not differ much from those of the Trump administration, but they will borrow some thoughts from the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy during Obama’s presidency, including special reliance on U.S. ally Japan. Then the Biden administration’s strategy will take shape.

Trump’s diplomatic realism, with aggressiveness in line with “America first” over the past four years has eviscerated China-U.S. relations. Confronted with escalating provocations from Washington, China was forced to take reciprocal countermeasures. Thus, the two countries were caught in a vicious circle of “act-respond-react,” dragging them ever closer to the Thucydides trap of inevitable war.

Today, strategic competition has gained the upper hand over win-win cooperation in China-U.S. relations. Instead of constructive coordination, leading powers and emerging countries are rejecting and excluding each other in the current multilateral system — cases of which abound throughout the world. The U.S. ban on Huawei in 5G networks and TikTok have sent a worrying signal of technological, economic and even structural decoupling with China. The South China Sea has seen military confrontation normalized, and the U.S. has transitioned from strategic ambiguity toward strategic clarity on the Taiwan question.

Ideological disputes and even a clash of civilizations loom ahead of the two powers.Taken together, all of these aspects of China-U.S. relations have fundamentally changed and cannot return to their previous state.

More dangerous than the tech and economic decoupling is psychological decoupling. After several years of push-pull,the social foundation maintaining long-term cooperation between China and the U.S. has begun to collapse.Given the high uncertainty about relations between the two countries, it has become a broad consensus for senior officials and the business community on both sides that they should reduce excessive reliance on each other’s supply chains and develop their own Plan B.

The idea of interdependence and mutual benefit within the global system seems to be no longer popular in managing China-U.S. relations. Uncle Sam’s disastrous coronavirus response, frequent racial conflicts, growing divide between political parties, presidential election fiascos and irresponsibility on global issues have upended the long-standing moral and institutional picture of the superpower for the Chinese people. At the same time, China has been labeled in the eyes of the American people as the greatest threat since the Cold War.

American intellectuals are generally frustrated at the failure to change China with a strategy of engagement.That is to say, both sides have been disillusioned by the other, and that has become one of the leading factors affecting their decision-making.

When Biden takes office, he will prioritize the fight against the coronavirus in his country and then turn to easing foreign relations and getting back to the global agenda.This may offer a window of opportunity for easing China-U.S. relations.Nonetheless, the damage caused by the Trump administration will not vanish quickly. Washington’s China policy was created not only out of political, economic and social considerations but out of a clear bipartisan consensus that China is a major threat.

The U.S. government, whether controlled by the Democrats or the Republicans, is thus required to take a harder line. The structural disputes between China and the U.S. have already spread to all areas over the past few years — a critical period for both sides. All the polices, executive orders and legislative bills that the White House and Congress have approved to contain China have been destructive and uncontrollable at an unprecedented level.

China-U.S. relations, which are about to step onto a new stage, will find far more challenges than opportunities. The top priority is to restore stability as much as possible.In other words, despite the fully-formed landscape of strategic competition, the two major powers should build up, through rational engagement, a paradigm of coexistence, with goals, bottom lines, rules and boundaries, with a view toward leading this big game from fierce clashes to policy coordination.

In Biden’s first year in the White House, it is unlikely that his administration will unveil any fully developed China policy.Nevertheless, it does have a clear goal for the coexistence of competition and cooperation, real demand for cooling overheated China-U.S. frictions and reliable and professional advisers around Biden who can maintain their composure to cope with thorny foreign affairs.

More important, the Democrats do not think disengagement and coercion can contain China or that there can be an absolute winner between the two powers. They don’t believe that zero cooperation will benefit their country or that multilateralism and economic globalization are outdated and ineffective in today’s world.

It is necessary, then, for China to take advantage of the window of opportunity and policy leeway to work on two things.First is pragmatic cooperation with the U.S. in containing the novel coronavirus through bilateral channels and multilateral frameworks such as the World Health Organization (which will probably be the first international organization to which Biden will announce the USA’s return) and to establish an effective point of cooperation with the new U.S. government.

Second is to rebuild high-level communication, which can help restart dialogues at all levels and in all fields in an orderly manner, thereby setting an agenda for China-U.S. relations during Biden’s presidency.

A buffer zone should be arranged between competition and cooperation to manage potential conflicts. In doing so, they must explain their strategic goals more clearly to each other to provide strategic memos for engagement over the next four years and rebuild predictability in the relationship.

After making progress in these two tasks, China and the U.S. may find it necessary (as Trump’s catchphrase goes) to “drain the swamp”— that is, to detoxify the Trump administration’s actions.

Here, the first step will be to renegotiate tariffs and establish a trade order based on fairness, reciprocity and rules. If possible, it is also advisable to wake up the Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations, which had achieved positive progress near the end of the Obama administration but was abandoned by Trump.

Second will be to seek a truce in the “tech cold war,” leaving unresolved issues from the Trump administration to the market and law for settlement against a favorable political environment. Then China should strive to reach agreement with the U.S. on gradually avoiding comprehensive decoupling, thereby removing this preposterous concept from the countries’ agenda.

Third will be to resume cultural and people-to-people exchanges as much as possible, especially between think tanks, civil aviation and study-abroad projects.

Fourth will be to coordinate financial policies, rebuild industrial alignments and establish a reasonable relationship between China’s “dual circulation” economic strategy and America’s post-pandemic policies for economic recovery and financial stability, thus intensifying their mutual dependence in a globalized world.

Fifth will be to restart the dialogue on strategic security. Specifically, China should turn the discussion into regular strategic consultation, with a focus on nuclear issues, and learn to strike a new strategic balance with the U.S. and other global military powers.

When responding to global challenges, cooperation is undoubtedly the starting point that China and the U.S. must grasp to improve bilateral relations, revitalize global governance and exercise their own leadership after the change in U.S. government.

Of the top four priorities on Biden’s to-do list, climate change is last, but returning to the Paris agreement is a certainty. State governments and energy companies in the U.S. have never turned away from their emission reduction obligations. As for China, the 14th Five-Year Plan has set ambitious carbon neutral goals. China and the U.S. have sufficient motivation and latitude for cooperation. Presumably, Chinese think tanks are well-prepared to advise on policies in response to the initiative of State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi that they provide three to-do-lists — for cooperation, for dialogue and for dispute management. Since coordination between China and the U.S. at the global level can be renewed through changes in the international landscape and global governance structure, apart from pragmatic cooperation they need to communicate and negotiate on the evolution of international rules regarding climate change, deep oceans, space, the internet and artificial intelligence.

There are also hot issues where China and the U.S. can set benchmarks at the beginning of Biden’s presidency.On the North Korea nuclear issue, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — always keen to make its presence felt and test Washington’s resolve whenever a new U.S. president takes office — dis highly likely to repeat certain aggressive actions this year. The situation on the peninsula may see new fluctuations, but the legacy of direct contact between the top leaders of the U.S. and DPRK is marked in history. China has the responsibility to help manage and influence the issue on the peninsula, and it has a chance to play a greater role.

With regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, the Biden administration is expected to return to six-party talks. The U.S.-Iran relationship may harbor more complicated stress points after a brief period of easing, and where China will stand needs to be considered in advance.

The Middle East landscape has undergone major changes during Trump’s presidency. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates promoted liberal-leaning adjustments and began to reconcile with Israel. The influences of Iran, Turkey, and Syria were suppressed after a period of expansion. All these will be a gift that the Biden administration is ready to accept.

China’s interests and influence in the Middle East will be reshaped accordingly, as well as by the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative. It will be necessary and feasible for China and the U.S. to engage in dialogue on strategic issues in the Middle East.

The nature of draining the swamp will present a strategic trial during the transition.If the two sides confirm their sincerity, cooperation can expand. China-U.S. relations are also expected to quickly find their coopetition sweet spot that adapts to the new power balance and global trends. If the two sides cannot get rid of their hostile assumptions and if the handling of specific affairs is ultimately dominated by competition, containment and countermeasures, relations may return to a vicious cycle and slide into a new cold war.

Expectations for “draining the swamp” between Beijing and Washington need not be overly high. The swamp, in fact, cannot be drained, but the water level can drop significantly. In the act of draining, even a small amount of mutual trust is more important than anything else and should be based on candid communication and professional judgment. At the same time, it’s necessary for both parties to reach a tacit agreement on the sensitive questions of Taiwan and the South China Sea.

In the medium and long term, both parties should understand that although the China-U.S. relations cannot return to the past, the two countries can still move forward in dialogue, cooperation and dispute management, and they can achieve a certain degree of balance in their common interest and that of the international community. No way to return does not mean they should give up on the future of the relationship.■

文章来源于“中美聚焦”

图文编辑：徐仟慧

责任编辑：刘菁波