基式外交：对外交的核考验 @《基式外交研究》2025年第19期

大外交青年智库·深圳

Glory Diplomacy

让中国外交青年智慧被全球看见

为中国青年智库代言

大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心

作者：亨利・A・基辛格

译者：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心

来源：《基式外交研究》2025年第19期“经典文献重译”专栏文章

审定：基式外交研究中心学术委员会

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy." The Washington Post, May 16, 2006.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，版权归原作者所有。如有问题请即刻联系，如需转载请注明出处

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一、摘要

基辛格指出，伊朗总统致信事件需从战略与战术双重维度解读：既可能是规避国际审查的政治操弄，亦或为国内激进势力适应对美对话铺路。当前朝核与伊核谈判面临历史性转折，若外交失败，世界将被迫在武力干预与核秩序崩溃间抉择。朝核六方会谈虽具框架但陷入僵局，朝鲜以拖延战术换取核武库建设时间；伊核问题更严峻，国际社会甚至未就谈判目标达成共识。基辛格强调，美国需直接参与多边机制（而非依赖代理人），整合中俄欧等关键方，构建更具约束力的谈判框架。他警告，放任僵局将引发全球核扩散连锁反应：韩日、中东多国或效仿拥核，激进势力借核威慑扩大全球影响力。针对谈判策略，基辛格主张区分“政权更迭”与“去核化”，效仿冷战遏制政策：不挑战对手政权安全，但坚决抵制其对外扩张，同时以安全经济补偿换取弃核。他呼吁明确谈判时限，弥合情报评估差距，并在穷尽外交手段后保留武力选项。文章警示，当前局势堪比1938年与冷战初期——国际社会的犹疑可能导致灾难，唯有凝聚共识、直面挑战，方能避免核灾难，重现二战后“不战而胜”的智慧。

二、中文

伊朗总统马哈茂德・艾哈迈迪内贾德近期致信布什总统，需从多个层面审视。首先，这封信可被视为旨在阻挠联合国安理会审议伊朗违反《不扩散核武器条约》义务的策略性举动。基于此考量，加之信中充斥的煽动性措辞，国务卿康多莉扎・赖斯对该信件的断然拒绝实属合宜。但值得深思的是，这封时隔25年来伊朗领导人首次直接致函美国总统的信件，或许隐含着超越战术操弄与政治宣传的深层意图——其激进口吻可能是为让伊朗国内激进势力逐步适应与美国的对话机制。面对当今世界最具决定性意义的核扩散挑战，美国亟需确立清晰连贯的战略框架与政策目标。

国际社会正面临一个令人不寒而栗的前景：核武器可能演变为国家常规军备的标配，并最终落入恐怖组织之手。当前围绕朝鲜与伊朗核扩散问题的谈判具有分水岭意义。一旦外交努力失败，国际社会将被迫在两种灾难性选项间抉择：要么诉诸武力干预，要么接受一个核约束机制全面崩溃的世界——那些本应最积极维护核秩序的核大国，却因自身的无能或懈怠，任由违逆国际准则的极端主义者瓦解核不扩散体系。只需试想：若纽约、华盛顿、伦敦、马德里、伊斯坦布尔或巴厘岛遭遇的恐怖袭击中，哪怕仅使用最原始的核装置，其后果都将不堪设想。

在朝鲜与伊朗两大核谈判进程中，由日、韩、中、美、俄及朝方参与的六方会谈机制，较之英法德三国与伊朗的四国对话框架更为成熟。去年九月在北京达成的原则性协议曾显露曙光：朝鲜承诺放弃核计划，以换取各方提供安全保障、后核化时代经济援助，以及替代核能发电的技术支持。但现实困境在于，朝方坚持要求其他缔约方先行履行全部义务，而自身却采取拖延战术——通过拉长各轮会谈间隔期为核武库建设争取时间，致使同步推进的谈判路线图始终未能建立。

伊朗核问题则更为棘手，国际社会迄今尚未就谈判目标达成基本共识。德黑兰始终拒绝接受对其铀浓缩计划的国际监管，而缺失这一前提，任何针对核武器计划的管控措施都将形同虚设。

当前舆论焦点多集中于美国是否应与朝伊展开双边对话。就朝鲜问题而言，这实为次要议题。六方会谈机制已为美朝双边意见交换提供了充分平台。平壤当局的真正意图——也是布什政府明智抵制的关键——在于寻求绕开多边框架的美朝单独谈判，此举将导致其他参与方规避共同责任。若双边谈判取代六方机制，美国的现有合作伙伴可能将打破僵局的责任悉数转嫁华盛顿，使美国陷入外交孤立。

这一逻辑在伊朗问题上体现得更为显著。历史积怨（如人质危机）、伊朗对恐怖组织的支持及其总统的挑衅性言论，始终是多边正式谈判的主要障碍。即便伊朗总统此次致信，亦未真正消除这些结构性矛盾。然而，鉴于核危机对美国安全的直接威胁，华盛顿不应仅通过代理人（即便是亲密盟友）开展谈判。既然美国能在六方框架内与朝鲜磋商核扩散问题，亦能在巴格达就伊拉克安全议题与伊朗对话，完全有能力构建一个容纳美国直接参与的对伊核问题多边谈判机制——特别是考虑到当前局势的极端危险性。

谈判僵局的持续将意味着国际社会对核俱乐部扩员的默许。在亚洲，韩日两国几乎必然跟进拥核；中东地区的土耳其、埃及乃至沙特亦可能效仿。届时，所有重要工业国都将视核武为国家地位的必备象征。而激进势力在全球——特别是伊斯兰世界——的影响力，将因其成功挑战核大国的权威而空前增强。

管理一个核武遍布的世界，其复杂程度远超冷战时期两个超级大国的核威慑平衡。新兴核国家不仅需要与对手建立威慑平衡（这一过程未必遵循现有核国家数十年形成的规范），更可能宣称对各类国际对抗拥有“合法关切”。尤其是伊朗及其潜在追随者，将得以利用核武库为其全球革命活动提供战略保护。

存在一种为核扩散开脱的论调，认为新兴核国家在历史上曾展现克制。但历史经验并不支持这种观点：巴基斯坦通过A·Q·汗项目扩散核技术；朝鲜更是核扩散的活跃推手。此外，新兴核国家的核材料安保体系必然存在更多漏洞，技术水平亦相对落后。

外交进程亟需新动力。首要任务是，美国及其谈判伙伴需就谈判时限达成共识。普遍评估认为，平壤每年可生产供数枚核弹使用的钚材料，尽管对其实战化核武器研发进度存在分歧。对德黑兰首枚核武器问世时间的预测则在2至10年间浮动。鉴于风险与代价的严重性，这种评估差异必须尽快弥合。此外，2008年美俄两国政府更迭可能造成的外交空窗期，亦需纳入谈判节奏的考量。

其次需明确多边谈判与政权更迭战略的本质区别。无可否认，若平壤与德黑兰现政权被负责任的政府取代，将极大促进国际和平与安全。但现有及潜在谈判参与方无一会公开支持以政权更迭为目标的政策。核裁军谈判必然涉及以安全保证与经济补偿换取弃核承诺，这与政权更迭诉求存在根本性矛盾。

将去核化与政权更迭混为一谈只会模糊焦点。无论朝鲜与伊朗由何种政权执政，美国都应坚决反对其拥核行为。

有效的去核化外交策略应效仿冷战时期成功的遏制政策：不对对手的外部安全构成先发制人式的挑战，但坚决抵制其对外扩张企图，同时依靠内部力量促成变革。正是这种精细平衡的战略思维，使得里根总统在将苏联称为“邪恶帝国”数周后，仍向勃列日涅夫发出对话邀请。

解决朝核问题需要就朝鲜半岛及东北亚政治演进达成战略共识。国际社会曾期待中国出于对朝核问题（及由此可能引发的日本核武装）的深度关切，终将对平壤施加必要压力。但这一预期至今未能实现，因中国在半岛问题上的考量兼具军事安全与地缘战略维度：北京将竭力避免朝鲜政权突然崩溃导致的难民潮与边境动荡。因此，对华战略对话必须成为谈判战略的重要组成部分，同时需回应平壤的安全关切。

尽管美国在六方会谈中派出克里斯托弗·希尔这样的杰出外交官，但仍需更高层级的定期介入以把握战略方向。谈判目标应是建立东北亚安全与政治演进框架：在去核化进程中不涉及主权变更，同时为通过谈判或内部演进实现朝鲜统一保留可能性。

相似原则适用于伊朗问题。现行谈判机制存在严重缺陷：英法德三国作为美国代理人开展谈判，中俄仅在北约将问题提交安理会时介入——这种安排使德黑兰得以在核大国间实施离间策略。

更有效的谈判框架应将欧洲三国与美中俄整合，作为受直接影响最深、且最具安理会联合行动能力的核心谈判方。这一机制可在当前安理会决议通过后建立，用于推进俄罗斯提出的“境外铀浓缩”方案——将部分铀浓缩活动转移至俄境内，防止伊朗秘密研发核武器。新机制还可为未来核技术建立国际管控标准，遏制核扩散阴云。

显然，仅靠增设谈判机制无法阻止核扩散。现有谈判进程已暴露出拖延与混淆视听的巨大风险。有效外交必须包含对蓄意阻挠行为实施明确制裁的意志。

唯有在建立必要谈判框架并穷尽所有外交手段后，方可考虑军事选项。但同样重要的是，在尚未明确何种情形需要启动最后手段前，不应在原则上永久排除使用武力的可能。

当前国际社会面临的考验，与1938年及冷战初期的历史抉择惊人相似：能否克服恐惧与犹疑，走上形势所需的艰难道路。1938年的失败引发了灾难性战争；而二战后成功应对挑战则带来了不战而胜的结局。

围绕这些议题的辩论将贯穿美国政府任期尾声。表面看来，这可能加剧党派纷争。但两党有识之士都应意识到，当前决策的后果将由新政府承担。或许，这个足以毁灭人类的核问题，最终能促使美国凝聚共识。这，正是我们共同的希望所在。

三、英文

The recent letter from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to President Bush needs to be considered on several levels. It can be treated as a ploy to obstruct U.N. Security Council deliberations on Iran's disregard of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This consideration, and the demagogic tone of the letter, merited its rejection by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. But the first direct approach by an Iranian leader to a U.S. president in more than 25 years may also have intentions beyond the tactical and propagandistic, and its demagoguery may be a way to get the radical part of the Iranian public used to dialogue with the United States. America's challenge is to define its own strategy and purposes regarding the most fateful issue confronting us today.

The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national armament and wind up in terrorist hands. The negotiations on Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation mark a watershed. A failed diplomacy would leave us with a choice between the use of force or a world where restraint has been eroded by the inability or unwillingness of countries that have the most to lose to restrain defiant fanatics. One need only imagine what would have happened had any of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, London, Madrid, Istanbul or Bali involved even the crudest nuclear weapon.

Of the two negotiations, the one on Korea — a six-party forum of Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and North Korea — seems more advanced than the four-party talk on Iran (among France, Germany, Britain and Iran). Last September an apparent agreement in principle was reached in Beijing that North Korea will give up its nuclear program if the other parties provide adequate assurances of security, economic help in the post-nuclear period and a substitute for the power generation allegedly lost by abandoning the nuclear program. But each side has demanded that the other fulfill all its obligations before it undertakes its own; a serious effort to discuss a concurrent schedule has been prevented by North Korea's tactic of stringing out the period between each session, perhaps to gain time for strengthening its nuclear arsenal.

With respect to Iran, there isn't even a formal agreement on what the objective is. Iran has refused to agree to international control over its uranium enrichment program, in the absence of which no control over a weapons program is meaningful.

The public debate often focuses on whether the United States is prepared to engage in bilateral discussions with North Korea or Iran. With respect to Korea, that is a subsidiary issue. The six-power talks provide adequate opportunity for a bilateral exchange of views. What Pyongyang is attempting to achieve — and what the Bush administration has rightly resisted — is a separate negotiation with Washington outside the six-party framework, which would prevent other parties in the Beijing process from undertaking joint responsibilities. If bilateral talks replaced the six-party forum, some of America's present partners might choose to place the onus for breaking every deadlock on Washington, in effect isolating the United States.

The same considerations apply even more strongly to bilateral negotiations with Iran at this stage. Until now formal negotiations have been prevented by the memory of the hostage crisis, Iranian support of terrorist groups and the aggressive rhetoric of the Iranian president. Nor does the Iranian president's letter remove these inhibitions. Nevertheless, on a matter so directly involving its security, the United States should not negotiate through proxies, however closely allied. If America is prepared to negotiate with North Korea over proliferation in the six-party forum, and with Iran in Baghdad over Iraqi security, it must be possible to devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran that would permit the United States to participate — especially in light of what is at stake.

An indefinite continuation of the stalemate would amount to a de facto acquiescence by the international community in letting new entrants into the nuclear club. In Asia, it would spell the near-certain addition of South Korea and Japan; in the Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia could enter the field. In such a world, all significant industrial countries would consider nuclear weapons an indispensable status symbol. Radical elements throughout the Islamic world and elsewhere would gain strength from the successful defiance of the major nuclear powers.

The management of a nuclear-armed world would be infinitely more complex than maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers. The various nuclear countries would not only have to maintain deterrent balances with their own adversaries, a process that would not necessarily follow the principles and practices evolved over decades among the existing nuclear states. They would also have the ability and incentives to declare themselves as interested parties in general confrontations. Especially Iran, and eventually other countries of similar orientation, would be able to use nuclear arsenals to protect their revolutionary activities around the world.

There is an argument on behalf of acquiescing in proliferation which holds that new nuclear countries have proved responsible in the past. But this is not endorsed by experience. Pakistan proliferated its nuclear technology through the A.Q. Khan project; North Korea has been an active proliferator. In addition, the safeguarding of nuclear material on the territories of emerging nuclear countries is bound to be more porous and less sophisticated.

Diplomacy needs a new impetus. As a first step, the United States and its negotiating partners need to agree on how much time is available for negotiations. There seems to be general agreement that Pyongyang is producing enough plutonium for several weapons a year; there is some disagreement about progress in producing actual operational weapons in the absence of testing. Estimates on how close Tehran is to producing its first nuclear weapon range from two to 10 years. Given the risks and stakes, this gap needs to be narrowed. Any consideration of diplomatic pace must take account of the fact that in 2008 governments in both Russia and the United States will change; this will impose a hiatus on diplomacy while the governments are preoccupied with transition and, in America, restaffing the executive branch.

The next step is to recognize the difference between multiparty negotiations and a preferred strategy of regime change. There are no governments in the world whose replacement by responsible regimes would contribute more to international peace and security than those governing Pyongyang and Tehran. But none of the participants in the existing or foreseeable forums will support a policy explicitly aiming for regime change. Inevitably, a negotiation on nuclear disarmament will involve compensation in security and economic benefits in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons capabilities and is, in that sense, incompatible with regime change.

Focusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue. The United States should oppose nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran regardless of the government that builds them.

The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War: no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary, but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialogue within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union as the evil empire.

On Korea, progress requires agreement regarding the political evolution of the Korean Peninsula and of Northeast Asia. The expectation that China is so reluctant to see nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula — and therefore ultimately in Japan — that it will sooner or later bring the needed pressure on North Korea has so far been disappointed. This is because China has not only military concerns but also strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula. It will try to avoid an outcome in Korea that leads to the sudden collapse of an ally, producing a flood of Korean refugees into China as well as turmoil on its borders. For these reasons, a strategic dialogue with Beijing must be an important component of a negotiating strategy that also addresses Pyongyang's desire for security.

Though America is represented in the six-party forum by an exceptional diplomat in Christopher Hill, periodic engagement at a higher level is needed to give the necessary direction to his efforts. The objective should be an understanding regarding security and political evolution in Northeast Asia that requires no changes in sovereignty as part of the process of denuclearization but leaves open the prospect of Korean unification through negotiations or internal evolution.

Parallel considerations apply to the case of Iran. The current negotiating forum is highly dysfunctional. Three European countries in close coordination with the United States are acting partly as America's surrogate. China and Russia do not participate in the negotiations but are involved when their consequences go before the U.N. Security Council — a procedure enabling Iran to play off the nuclear powers against each other.

A more coherent forum for negotiation would combine the three European nations with the United States, China and Russia as the countries most directly affected and in the best position to act jointly in the Security Council. This could be set up after the passage of the Security Council resolution now under discussion. It would permit elaboration of the one hopeful scheme that has emerged in Iranian diplomacy. Put forward by Russia, it is to move certain enrichment operations out of Iran into Russia, thereby preventing clandestine weaponization. The new, broader forum could be used to establish an international enrichment program applicable to future nuclear technologies to curb the looming specter of unchecked proliferation.

Obviously, nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented simply by multiplying negotiating forums. The experience with existing conferences demonstrates the capacity for procrastination and obfuscation. To be effective, diplomacy must involve a willingness to provide clear penalties for obstruction.

Only after we have created the requisite negotiating framework and explored all aspects of diplomacy should the issue of military measures be addressed. But neither should force be rejected in principle and for all time before we know the circumstances in which this last resort should be considered.

The issue before the nations involved is similar to what the world faced in 1938 and at the beginning of the Cold War: whether to overcome fears and hesitancy about undertaking the difficult path demanded by necessity. The failure of that test in 1938 produced a catastrophic war; the ability to master it in the immediate aftermath of World War II led to victory without war.

The debates surrounding these issues will be conducted in the waning years of an American adm1inistration. On the surface, this may seem to guarantee partisanship. But thoughtful observers in both parties will know that the consequences of the decisions before us will have to be managed in a new administration. The nuclear issue, capable of destroying mankind, may thus, one hopes, bring us together in the end.

四、译文拾贝

U.N. Security Council

中文解释：联合国安理会，负责维护国际和平与安全的核心机构。

原文语境：伊朗试图阻碍安理会审议其违反《不扩散核武器条约》的行为（"obstruct U.N. Security Council deliberations"）。

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

中文解释：《不扩散核武器条约》，限制核武器扩散的国际协定。

原文语境：伊朗无视其根据NPT承担的义务（"Iran's disregard of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty"）。

Nuclear Proliferation

中文解释：核扩散，指核武器技术或材料向非核国家的传播。

原文语境：伊朗和朝鲜的核扩散问题成为国际外交的转折点（"negotiations on Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation mark a watershed"）。

Six-Party Talks

中文解释：六方会谈，涉及朝核问题的多边谈判机制（中、美、俄、日、韩、朝）。

原文语境：六方会谈比伊朗问题四方会谈更成熟（"the one on Korea — a six-party forum... seems more advanced"）。

Four-Party Talk

中文解释：四方会谈，指法、德、英与伊朗就核问题的早期谈判框架。

原文语境：与六方会谈对比，四方会谈未达成正式目标（"there isn't even a formal agreement on what the objective is"）。

Uranium Enrichment Program

中文解释：铀浓缩计划，用于生产核燃料或核武器的关键技术。

原文语境：伊朗拒绝国际社会对其铀浓缩计划的控制（"Iran has refused to agree to international control over its uranium enrichment program"）。

Nuclear Arsenal

中文解释：核武库，指国家拥有的核武器及其运载工具的总称。

原文语境：朝鲜拖延谈判以加强核武库（"North Korea's tactic... to gain time for strengthening its nuclear arsenal"）。

Deterrent Balance

中文解释：威慑平衡，通过核力量维持战略稳定的状态。

原文语境：冷战时期美苏的威慑平衡比多极核世界更简单（"maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers"）。

Regime Change

中文解释：政权更迭，通过外部干预改变某国政权。

原文语境：美国应反对核武器，无论政权如何（"oppose nuclear weapons... regardless of the government that builds them"）。

Containment Policy

中文解释：遏制政策，通过限制对手扩张来维护自身利益（如冷战对苏联）。

原文语境：去核化外交可比拟为遏制政策（"comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War"）。

Security Assurances

中文解释：安全保证，承诺不攻击或保护他国安全的措施。

原文语境：朝鲜要求其他方提供安全保证以弃核（"provide adequate assurances of security"）。

Plutonium Production

中文解释：钚生产，用于制造核武器的关键材料。

原文语境：朝鲜每年生产足够制造多枚核武器的钚（"Pyongyang is producing enough plutonium for several weapons a year"）。

Nuclear Disarmament

中文解释：核裁军，削减或消除核武器的过程。

原文语境：核裁军谈判需以安全经济利益补偿弃核国（"involve compensation... in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons"）。

Bilateral Discussions

中文解释：双边讨论，两国间的直接谈判。

原文语境：美国拒绝朝鲜在六方框架外进行双边谈判（"resist a separate negotiation with Washington outside the six-party framework"）。

Multilateral Negotiations

中文解释：多边谈判，涉及多国的协商机制。

原文语境：美国需设计多边场合与伊朗进行核谈判（"devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran"）。

Terrorist Groups

中文解释：恐怖组织，从事恐怖活动的非国家行为体。

原文语境：伊朗支持恐怖组织阻碍正式谈判（"Iranian support of terrorist groups"）。

Hostage Crisis

中文解释：人质危机，指1979年伊朗扣押美国外交人员事件。

原文语境：人质危机的记忆阻碍美伊谈判（"the memory of the hostage crisis"）。

A.Q. Khan Project

中文解释：A·Q·汗项目，巴基斯坦核科学家主导的核技术扩散网络。

原文语境：巴基斯坦通过此项目扩散核技术（"Pakistan proliferated its nuclear technology through the A.Q. Khan project"）。

Nuclear Club

中文解释：核俱乐部，指拥有核武器的国家群体。

原文语境：国际默许新国家加入核俱乐部将引发连锁反应（"letting new entrants into the nuclear club"）。

Radical Elements

中文解释：激进分子，主张极端主义或暴力变革的群体。

原文语境：激进分子因核大国被挑衅成功而壮大（"radical elements... would gain strength from the successful defiance"）。

Strategic Dialogue

中文解释：战略对话，国家间就长期战略问题进行的沟通。

原文语境：与中国的战略对话是解决朝核问题的关键（"a strategic dialogue with Beijing must be an important component"）。

Political Evolution

中文解释：政治演变，国家政治制度的渐进变革。

原文语境：朝鲜半岛的政治演变需与去核化同步（"an understanding regarding... political evolution in Northeast Asia"）。

Use of Force

中文解释：使用武力，通过军事手段解决问题。

原文语境：外交失败后需在武力与失控世界间选择（"leave us with a choice between the use of force"）。

Denuclearization

中文解释：去核化，彻底消除核武器或相关设施。

原文语境：将政权更迭与去核化混淆是错误（"Focusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue"）。

Cold War Superpowers

中文解释：冷战超级大国，特指美苏两极格局。

原文语境：冷战威慑平衡比多极核世界更易管理（"maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers"）。

Security Council Resolution

中文解释：安理会决议，联合国安理会通过的有约束力决定。

原文语境：新谈判框架可在安理会决议通过后建立（"set up after the passage of the Security Council resolution"）。

Nuclear Material Safeguarding

中文解释：核材料保护，防止核材料被滥用的国际措施。

原文语境：新兴核国家的核材料保护更薄弱（"safeguarding of nuclear material... is bound to be more porous"）。

Preemptive Challenge

中文解释：先发制人的挑战，主动出击以预防威胁。

原文语境：遏制政策不挑战对手的外部安全（"no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary"）。

Status Symbol

中文解释：地位象征，核武器被视为国家实力的标志。

原文语境：工业国将核武器视为必要地位象征（"consider nuclear weapons an indispensable status symbol"）。

Nuclear Deterrent

中文解释：核威慑，通过核武器阻止他国攻击的战略。

原文语境：各国需维持与对手的核威慑平衡（"maintain deterrent balances with their own adversaries"）。

Military Measures

中文解释：军事措施，以武力手段应对威胁的行动。

原文语境：军事手段应在穷尽外交后考虑（"the issue of military measures be addressed... as a last resort"）。

Catastrophic War

中文解释：灾难性战争，指大规模毁灭性冲突（如核战争）。

原文语境：1938年的外交失败导致灾难性战争（"The failure of that test in 1938 produced a catastrophic war"）。

Partisanship

中文解释：党派之争，政策制定中的政党对立。

原文语境：美国政府的末期可能加剧党派分歧（"this may seem to guarantee partisanship"）。

Regime Security

中文解释：政权安全，国家政权维持统治稳定的需求。

原文语境：中国担忧朝鲜政权崩溃影响自身安全（"avoid an outcome... leading to the sudden collapse of an ally"）。

Economic Benefits

中文解释：经济利益，通过协议获得的经济补偿或合作。

原文语境：弃核需以安全经济利益为交换（"compensation in security and economic benefits"）。

Strategic Objectives

中文解释：战略目标，国家长期追求的核心利益。

原文语境：中国在朝鲜半岛有军事和战略目标（"China has not only military concerns but also strategic objectives"）。

Revolutionary Activities

中文解释：革命活动，旨在颠覆现有国际秩序的行动。

原文语境：伊朗可能利用核武库保护其全球革命活动（"use nuclear arsenals to protect their revolutionary activities"）。

International Control

中文解释：国际控制，多边机制对某国行为的监督。

原文语境：铀浓缩计划缺乏国际控制则无意义（"no control over a weapons program is meaningful"）。

Deadlock

中文解释：僵局，谈判中无法推进的停滞状态。

原文语境：双边谈判或使美国承担打破僵局的责任（"place the onus for breaking every deadlock on Washington"）。

Aggressive Rhetoric

中文解释：激进言论，具有挑衅性的政治表态。

原文语境：伊朗总统的激进言论阻碍谈判（"the aggressive rhetoric of the Iranian president"）。

Nuclear Testing

中文解释：核试验，测试核武器性能的爆炸实验。

原文语境：朝鲜未进行核试验，武器化进度存疑（"progress in producing actual operational weapons in the absence of testing"）。

Islamic World

中文解释：伊斯兰世界，以穆斯林为主体的国家或地区。

原文语境：激进势力在伊斯兰世界可能因核扩散壮大（"radical elements throughout the Islamic world... would gain strength"）。

Diplomatic Pace

中文解释：外交节奏，谈判进程的时间安排与紧迫性。

原文语境：需考虑2008年美俄政府更迭对节奏的影响（"Any consideration of diplomatic pace must take account of... 2008"）。

Unchecked Proliferation

中文解释：无限制扩散，缺乏国际约束的核技术传播。

原文语境：需建立国际浓缩计划遏制无限制扩散（"curb the looming specter of unchecked proliferation"）。

Procrastination

中文解释：拖延战术，故意延长谈判时间以获利。

原文语境：现有会议显示拖延与混淆的能力（"demonstrates the capacity for procrastination and obfuscation"）。

Last Resort

中文解释：最后手段，当其他方法失效时采取的措施。

原文语境：军事手段是最后选择，但不排除使用（"this last resort should be considered"）。

Korean Unification

中文解释：朝鲜统一，朝鲜半岛南北合并的政治前景。

原文语境：去核化可能为朝鲜统一留出空间（"leaves open the prospect of Korean unification"）。

Executive Branch Restaffing

中文解释：行政机构人员重组，政府换届后的职位调整。

原文语境：美国政府的过渡期将影响外交连续性（"restaffing the executive branch"）。

Power Projection

中文解释：力量投射，国家向境外施加影响力的能力。

原文语境：遏制政策要求抵制对手的境外力量投射（"resistance to attempts to project its power abroad"）。

Nuanced Policy

中文解释：细致政策，兼顾多重目标的复杂策略。

原文语境：里根对苏联的对话邀请是细致政策的体现（"such a nuanced policy that caused Reagan to invite Brezhnev"）。

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