基式外交：黎巴嫩战后启示录 @《基式外交研究》2025年第21期

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黎巴嫩战后启示录

大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心

作者：亨利・A・基辛格

译者：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心

来源：《基式外交研究》2025年第21期“经典文献重译”专栏文章

审定：基式外交研究中心学术委员会

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "After Lebanon." The Washington Post, September 13, 2006.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，版权归原作者所有。如有问题请即刻联系，如需转载请注明出处

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一、中文

当前关于黎巴嫩问题的公共讨论中，两种观念占据主导地位。其一认为真主党是游离于法律之外的典型恐怖组织；其二声称停火协议标志着黎巴嫩战争的终结。这两种观点皆与事实相悖。

真主党实为基地组织模式的癌变扩散。它公然以“国中之国”的姿态运作，在黎巴嫩领土上维持着一支远超该国正规军实力的武装力量，公然藐视两项联合国决议。这支由伊朗资助和训练的军事化组织，以建制化部队与强敌展开正面对抗。作为什叶派政党，其成员在黎巴嫩政府中担任部长职务，却自视为不受政府决策约束的特权阶层。这种植根于一国领土的非国家实体，具备国家形态的所有特征，并得到地区大国的背书，实为国际关系史上未曾有过的异质现象。

自成立以来，真主党几乎持续处于战争状态：1983年袭击美军贝鲁特军营致241名海军陆战队员丧生，迫使美国撤出维和部队，开启第一轮战端；2000年通过持续袭扰迫使以色列从黎巴嫩南部撤军，完成第二轮战略目标；今夏越境绑架两名以色列士兵引发以军报复性打击，则标志着第三次大规模冲突的爆发。

我们目睹的绝非零星的恐怖袭击，而是针对主权与领土完整国际准则的精密战略打击。真主党与基地组织的崛起，昭示着跨国效忠正在消解传统国家认同。驱动这一挑战的根源，是圣战主义者坚信现存秩序本身即为非法，其斗争手段具有天然正当性。在他们眼中，战场不应受制于其所拒斥的、基于世界秩序原则划定的国界；被我们视作恐怖的行径，在他们看来正是瓦解非法政权的战争行为。

停火绝非战争的终结，而是开启了更复杂的博弈阶段。激进国家与跨国非国家组织（常以民兵形态存在）的合流，构成对全球秩序的双重冲击。这种威胁在中东尤具破坏性——该地区国界鲜少体现民族传统，且成型不足百年。但其蔓延之势可能波及任何激进伊斯兰势力活跃之地。各国领导人因此陷入两难：既要遵循现行国际秩序原则（其经济命脉所系），又不得不屈从甚至迎合跨国运动（其政治生存所需）。

黎巴嫩危机恰是这一模式的典型案例。依传统国际秩序规则，这场战争理论上发生在黎巴嫩与以色列两个国家之间——实则两国几乎不存在根本利益冲突。联合国停火决议明确指出，危机由真主党挑起，该组织三十年来始终阻止黎巴嫩武装力量进驻毗邻以色列的南部地区。但根据现行国际规则，美国国务卿却不得不与无力执行停火的黎巴嫩政府谈判，而真正具备执行能力的实体从未正式接受协议。

黎巴嫩战争的真实目标具有跨国属性，与黎巴嫩国家利益无涉：以对以色列和美国的共同仇恨弥合逊尼派与什叶派千年裂痕；缓解伊朗核计划面临的外交压力；展示以色列在高压下可能沦为“人质”；确立伊朗在任何谈判中的关键地位；破坏巴勒斯坦和平进程；证明叙利亚（真主党第二大支持者）仍具左右黎巴嫩局势的能力。

评估黎巴嫩战争的得失，须着重考量心理政治维度。尽管真主党遭受重创，但核心心理现实在于：该组织建制完好无损，而以色列既未能（或不愿）遏制对其领土的火箭弹袭击，亦未能将军事优势转化为战后谈判的政治资本。

关于停火执行的讨论，多将传统准则套用于史无前例的局势。战争主要参与者之一（真主党）并非停火缔约方，且拒绝按联合国决议要求解除武装或释放被绑士兵。本应执行协议的国家态度暧昧——顾忌与伊朗的关系，恐惧本土遭恐袭，以及改善与叙利亚关系的考量（虽次之）。

联合国驻黎南部临时部队（UNIFIL）的授权反映了这种迟疑。科菲·安南秘书长声明，UNIFIL任务非解除真主党武装，而是推动"须通过谈判和黎巴嫩国内共识实现的政治进程"。叙利亚宣称视UNIFIL在边境部署为敌对行为，联合国竟予默认。当维和部队被禁止应对最可能出现的挑战时，政治进程何以推进？以什叶派为主、装备陈旧的黎巴嫩军队，既无力解除真主党武装，亦无法管控叙黎边境。

更复杂的是，真主党作为议会政党和内阁成员，可通过协商决策机制对贝鲁特政府的执行行动行使否决权。该组织下一步或通过恐吓手段掌控政府，利用战争积累的声望操弄民主程序。在此情形下，伊朗与叙利亚在塑造停火规则方面，将比可能因袭击伤亡而撤出的联合国部队更具优势。

黎巴嫩战争彻底改变了以色列的战略处境。此前，巴以问题虽激烈，仍囿于国家体系传统原则：以色列合法性、巴勒斯坦建国、边界划分、安全安排与和平共处规则。从拉宾“土地换和平”到沙特和平倡议，再到沙龙单边撤离计划，“和平进程”始终以国际承认的国家间协议为终极目标。

真主党及其他拒斥主义势力正全力阻挠此进程。控制黎南部的真主党、边缘化巴勒斯坦权力机构的哈马斯等圣战组织，对阿以温和派的方案嗤之以鼻。他们否认以色列存在的根本权利，而非反对特定边界划分。

传统和平进程现已支离破碎。在遭受加沙与黎巴嫩非国家圣战者导弹袭击后，以色列难以继续视单边撤军为和平之路，亦无法找到能担保安全的合作伙伴。当前以色列政府更无力实施沙龙计划中从西岸撤离八万定居者的构想。

持续维持现状终非长久之计。黎巴嫩战后亟需新的路线图支撑全面中东政策。应对非国家极端主义与国家强权政治交织的危机，需要美、欧与温和阿拉伯国家共同制定统一战略。唯此方能促使被占领土上出现接受和平共处的领导力量。

所有问题最终指向伊朗的挑战：培植黎巴嫩“国中之国”真主党、资助伊拉克“国中之国”萨德尔武装、推进核武计划（将引发核扩散失控，为系统性破坏区域秩序提供保护伞），当前挑战已超越既有框架内的调整，直指世界秩序存续。

构建由温和阿拉伯国家支持的大西洋共同政策刻不容缓——无论既往合作经验多么令人沮丧。伊拉克战争引发的“美国鲁莽 vs 欧洲逃避”的争论，与当前全球面临的危机相比已微不足道。大西洋两岸必须集思广益，应对核武装中东背景下“更广泛战争演变为文明冲突”的共同威胁，而非纠结于安理会决议的临时磋商。这不能通过安理会决议的临时讨价还价实现，而应让决议产生于共识战略。

许多国家比美国政府对外交前景（尤其对伊朗）更显乐观。我们应倾听这些声音，认真探索化解对抗的路径。但欧洲盟友需明确：此进程不应受国内政治或舆论压力驱使，须设定外交灵活性的底线与时限，防止谈判沦为新一轮袭击的掩护。

黎巴嫩危机中已显现合作曙光：欧洲与美国达成足够共识，美国也充分关注欧洲关切，美欧在安理会达成协调外交，并为黎南部部署重要维和力量。

这种合作能否在新阶段持续，特别是联合国在黎巴嫩的努力能否成为应对危机的手段而非回避决策的工具，在即将到来的伊朗谈判中尤为关键。自苏联解体以来，有识之士始终质疑：缺乏共同威胁认知的大西洋纽带能否维系？如今我们深知：构建新世界秩序已非选择，而是避免全球灾难的必然要求。这非大西洋任何一方可独力完成。共同的危机认知能否重燃使命共识？历史正在等待答案。

二、英文

Two conceptions dominate public discussion on Lebanon. The first is that Hezbollah is a traditional terrorist organization operating covertly outside the law. The second is that the cease-fire marks an end to the war in Lebanon. Neither conception is valid.

Hezbollah is, in fact, a metastasization of the al-Qaeda pattern. It acts openly as a state within a state. It commands an army much stronger and far better equipped than Lebanon's, on Lebanese soil, in defiance of two U.N. resolutions. Financed and trained by Iran, it fights wars with organized units against a major adversary. As a Shiite party, it has ministers in the government of Lebanon who do not consider themselves bound by its decisions. A non-state entity on the soil of a state, with all the attributes of a state and backed by the major regional power, is a new phenomenon in international relations.

Since its creation, Hezbollah has been almost permanently at war. The first of three Hezbollah wars occurred when, in 1983, its attack on U.S. barracks killed 241 Marines and caused America to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Beirut. The second was a campaign of harassment that induced Israeli forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000. The third was inaugurated this year with the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers inside Israel that led to the Israeli retaliatory attack.

We are witnessing a carefully conceived assault, not isolated terrorist attacks, on the international system of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The creation of organizations such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda symbolizes the fact that transnational loyalties are replacing national ones. The driving force behind this challenge is the jihadist conviction that it is the existing order that is illegitimate, not the Hezbollah and jihad method of fighting it. For the jihad's adherents, the battlefield cannot be defined by frontiers based on principles of world order they reject; what we call terror is, to the jihadists, an act of war to undermine illegitimate regimes.

A cease-fire does not end this war; it inaugurates a new phase in it. This twin assault on the global order, by the combination of radical states with transnational non-state groups sometimes organized as militias, is a particular challenge in the Middle East, where frontiers denote few national traditions and are not yet a century old. But it could spread to wherever militant, radical Islamic groups exist. Leaders therefore are torn between following the principles of the existing international order, on which their economies may depend, and yielding to (if not joining) the transnational movements on which their political survival may depend.

The crisis in Lebanon is a classic case of that pattern. By the rules of the old international order, the war technically took place between two states – Lebanon and Israel – that in fact have very few conflicting interests. The U.N. cease-fire resolution affirms that the crisis was provoked by Hezbollah, which had kept the Lebanese armed forces out of the southern part of Lebanon facing Israel for 30 years. Yet, by existing international rules, the U.S. secretary of state was obliged to negotiate on the cease-fire with the Lebanese government, which controlled no forces in a position to implement it, while the only forces capable of doing so have never formally accepted it.

The real goals of the Lebanese war were transnational, not Lebanese: to overcome the millennia-old split between Sunnis and Shiites on the basis of hatred for Israel and America; to relieve diplomatic pressure on Iran's nuclear program; to demonstrate that Israel would be held hostage if pressure became too acute; to establish Iran as a major factor in any negotiation; to scuttle the Palestinian peace process; to show that Syria – the second major sponsor of Hezbollah – remained in a position to pursue its ambitions in Lebanon.

This is why the balance sheet of the war in Lebanon must be assessed in large part in psychological and political terms. No doubt the war inflicted heavy casualties on Hezbollah. The overriding psychological reality, however, is that Hezbollah remained intact and that Israel proved unable (or unwilling) either to suppress the rocket attacks on its territory or to gear its military power to political objectives capable of providing bargaining positions after the cessation of hostilities.

Much of the discussion over observance of the cease-fire applies traditional verities to an unprecedented situation. One of the principals in the war is not a party to the cease-fire and has refused either to disarm or to release the two Israeli prisoners it kidnapped, as called for in the U.N. resolution. The countries needed to enforce the agreement have been ambivalent because of the importance they attach to relations with Iran, their fear of terrorist attacks on their own territory and, to a lesser extent, their interest in improving relations with Syria.

The mandate for the U.N. force in southern Lebanon reflects these hesitations. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has declared that the mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon is not to disarm Hezbollah but to encourage a political process that, in his words, "has to be achieved through negotiation, and an internal Lebanese consensus, a political process, for which the new [force] is not, and cannot be, a substitute." Syria has declared that it would consider the deployment of UNIFIL forces along its borders a hostile act, and the United Nations has acquiesced. How is the political process going to work when the U.N. force is precluded from dealing with the most probable challenges? The Lebanese army – composed largely of Shiites and armed with obsolescent weapons – is in no position to disarm Hezbollah or to control the Syrian border.

To compound these complexities, Hezbollah, as a political party, participates in the Lebanese parliament and, on the ministerial level, in the central government. Both institutions generally make decisions by consensus. Hezbollah thus has at least a blocking veto on those issues on which the cooperation of the Beirut government is needed for enforcement.

Hezbollah's next move is likely to be an attempt to dominate the Beirut government by intimidation and, using the prestige gained in the war, manipulating democratic procedures. In such a situation, Iran and Syria will be in a stronger position to shape the rules of the cease-fire than the U.N. forces, which – as experience shows – are likely to be withdrawn when terrorist attacks inflict casualties. The challenge for American policy and all concerned with world order is to recognize that the cease-fire requires purposeful management. A principal objective must be to prevent rearmament of Hezbollah or its domination of the Lebanese political process. Otherwise, the U.N. force will provide a shield for creating the conditions for another, even more dangerous, explosion.

The war in Lebanon has transformed the position of Israel dramatically. Heretofore the Palestinian issue has, for all its intensity, been about traditional principles of the state system: the legitimacy of Israel; the creation of a Palestinian state; the drawing of borders between these entities; the security arrangement and rules for peaceful coexistence. From Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's "land for peace" formula, to Saudi Arabia's offer of peace and mutual recognition, to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's concept of unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories, the so-called peace process was conceived as culminating in an internationally accepted peace agreement between internationally recognized states.

Hezbollah and other rejectionist groups are determined to prevent precisely this evolution. Hezbollah, which took over southern Lebanon, and Hamas and various jihadist groups, which marginalized the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, disdain the schemes of moderate Arab and Israeli leaders. They reject the very existence of Israel, not any particular set of borders.

One of the consequences is that the traditional peace process is now a shambles. After being attacked with missiles from both Gaza and Lebanon launched by non-state jihadists, Israel will find it difficult to view unilateral withdrawal as a road to peace, nor will it be able under current conditions to find a partner to guarantee security. Finally, in the aftermath of Lebanon, the current Israeli government lacks the authority or public support to withdraw even the 80,000 settlers from the West Bank envisaged in the Sharon plan.

At the same time, an indefinite continuation of the status quo is not sustainable. Some new road map must emerge to underpin the comprehensive Mideast policy that must follow the Lebanon war. To deal with the crisis produced by the combination of non-state fanaticism and state power politics, a joint project among the United States, Europe and the moderate Arab states is needed to work out a common approach. Only in this manner can a leadership accepting peaceful coexistence emerge in the occupied territories.

Everything returns to the challenge of Iran. It trains, finances and equips Hezbollah, the state within a state in Lebanon. It finances and supports Moqtada al-Sadr's militia, the state within a state in Iraq. It works on a nuclear weapons program, which would drive nuclear proliferation out of control and provide a safety net for the systematic destruction of at least the regional order. The challenge is now about world order more than about adjustments within an accepted framework.

A common Atlantic policy backed by moderate Arab states must become a top priority, no matter how pessimistic previous experience with such projects leaves one. The debate sparked by the Iraq war over American rashness versus European escapism is dwarfed by what the world now faces. Both sides of the Atlantic should put their best minds together on how to deal with the common danger of a wider war merging into a war of civilizations against the background of a nuclear-armed Middle East. This cannot be done through ad hoc bargaining over Security Council resolutions; rather, the Security Council resolutions should emerge from an agreed strategy.

Many of the countries in such a grouping have a more optimistic view about the prospects of diplomacy – especially with Iran – than the U.S. administration. We should be open to these concerns and be prepared to join a serious exploration of prospects for turning away from confrontation. But the European allies need to accept the idea that this process should not be driven by domestic politics or media pressure. It has to include a bottom line beyond which diplomatic flexibility cannot go and a time limit to prevent negotiations from turning into a shield for developing new assaults.

In the Lebanon crisis, one can detect the beginning of such a process. Europe shared enough of the American perception and America paid enough attention to European concerns to produce a coordinated diplomacy in the Security Council and to supply a significant peacekeeping force for southern Lebanon.

It remains to be seen whether this cooperation can be sustained in the next phase, specifically whether the U.N. effort in Lebanon can become a means to deal with the dangers outlined here or become a way to avoid the necessary decisions. This is even more true of the impending Iran negotiations. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thoughtful observers have wondered whether the Atlantic ties can be maintained in the absence of a commonly perceived danger. We now know that we face the imperative of building a new world order or potential global catastrophe. It cannot be done alone by either side of the Atlantic. Is that realization sufficient to regenerate a sense of common purpose?

三、译文拾贝

Metastasization of the al-Qaeda pattern

中文解释：基地组织模式的扩散（引申为恐怖主义组织的结构性复制与跨国渗透）

原句语境："Hezbollah is, in fact, a metastasization of the al-Qaeda pattern."

State within a state

中文解释：国中之国（国际法框架下的非国家实体，行使准国家职能）

原句语境："It acts openly as a state within a state."

U.N. resolutions

中文解释：联合国决议（安理会 / 大会通过的具有政治约束力的国际文件）

原句语境："in defiance of two U.N. resolutions."

Transnational non-state groups

中文解释：跨国非国家集团（超越国界的政治军事组织）

原句语境："radical states with transnational non-state groups sometimes organized as militias."

Jihadist conviction

中文解释：圣战主义信念（主张通过暴力建立伊斯兰秩序的宗教政治意识形态）

原句语境："The driving force behind this challenge is the jihadist conviction that it is the existing order that is illegitimate."

Illegitimate regimes

中文解释：非法政权（基于宗教或意识形态标准判定的非正当统治实体）

原句语境："undermine illegitimate regimes."

Principles of world order

中文解释：世界秩序原则（主权、领土完整等构成的国际体系基础）

原句语境："principles of world order they reject."

Cease-fire resolution

中文解释：停火决议（联合国主导的冲突终止协议）

原句语境："The U.N. cease-fire resolution affirms that the crisis was provoked by Hezbollah."

Blocking veto

中文解释：否决权（通过阻碍共识达成的政治博弈手段）

原句语境："Hezbollah thus has at least a blocking veto on those issues."

Transnational loyalties

中文解释：跨国忠诚（超越民族国家认同的意识形态归属）

原句语境："transnational loyalties are replacing national ones."

Militias

中文解释：民兵组织（非国家正规武装力量）

原句语境："organized as militias."

Existing international order

中文解释：现行国际秩序（二战后建立的以主权国家为核心的全球治理体系）

原句语境："principles of the existing international order."

Diplomatic pressure

中文解释：外交压力（通过政治孤立、制裁等手段迫使政策改变）

原句语境："to relieve diplomatic pressure on Iran's nuclear program."

Palestinian peace process

中文解释：巴勒斯坦和平进程（旨在解决巴以冲突的多边谈判框架）

原句语境："to scuttle the Palestinian peace process."

Psychological and political terms

中文解释：心理与政治层面（冲突评估的双重维度）

原句语境："assessed in large part in psychological and political terms."

Disarm

中文解释：解除武装（终止非国家实体的军事能力）

原句语境："refused either to disarm or to release the two Israeli prisoners."

U.N. force

中文解释：联合国部队（国际维和行动的军事力量）

原句语境："the mandate for the U.N. force in southern Lebanon reflects these hesitations."

Syrian border

中文解释：叙利亚边境（黎巴嫩与叙利亚的争议边界）

原句语境："control the Syrian border."

Consensus

中文解释：共识（政治决策中的全体一致原则）

原句语境："Both institutions generally make decisions by consensus."

Intimidation

中文解释：恐吓（通过暴力威胁影响政治进程）

原句语境："dominate the Beirut government by intimidation."

Democratic procedures

中文解释：民主程序（选举、议会辩论等制度性政治机制）

原句语境："manipulating democratic procedures."

Rearmament

中文解释：重新武装（恢复军事能力的过程）

原句语境："prevent rearmament of Hezbollah."

Security arrangement

中文解释：安全安排（保障地区稳定的多边协议）

原句语境："the security arrangement and rules for peaceful coexistence."

Land for peace

中文解释：以土地换和平（通过领土让步换取安全保障的外交策略）

原句语境："Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's 'land for peace' formula."

Unilateral withdrawal

中文解释：单边撤军（单方面改变领土现状的军事行动）

原句语境："Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's concept of unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories."

Rejectionist groups

中文解释：拒绝主义团体（反对现有政治解决方案的激进组织）

原句语境："Hezbollah and other rejectionist groups are determined to prevent precisely this evolution."

Palestinian Authority

中文解释：巴勒斯坦民族权力机构（巴勒斯坦自治政府）

原句语境："marginalized the Palestinian Authority in Gaza."

Status quo

中文解释：现状（维持现有政治军事格局）

原句语境："an indefinite continuation of the status quo is not sustainable."

Road map

中文解释：路线图（分阶段实现政治目标的行动计划）

原句语境："Some new road map must emerge to underpin the comprehensive Mideast policy."

Atlantic ties

中文解释：大西洋联盟关系（欧美跨大西洋伙伴关系）

原句语境："the Atlantic ties can be maintained in the absence of a commonly perceived danger."

Global catastrophe

中文解释：全球灾难（核扩散、大规模战争等威胁人类生存的危机）

原句语境："potential global catastrophe."

Common purpose

中文解释：共同目标（国际社会协调行动的基础）

原句语境："regenerate a sense of common purpose."

Nuclear proliferation

中文解释：核扩散（核武器技术向非核国家传播）

原句语境："drive nuclear proliferation out of control."

Regional order

中文解释：地区秩序（特定地理区域内的权力结构）

原句语境："systematic destruction of at least the regional order."

Ad hoc bargaining

中文解释：临时讨价还价（缺乏战略框架的应急谈判）

原句语境："cannot be done through ad hoc bargaining over Security Council resolutions."

Security Council resolutions

中文解释：安理会决议（联合国最高级别国际决议）

原句语境："Security Council resolutions should emerge from an agreed strategy."

Diplomatic flexibility

中文解释：外交灵活性（谈判中调整立场的策略空间）

原句语境："a bottom line beyond which diplomatic flexibility cannot go."

Time limit

中文解释：时间限制（防止谈判拖延的机制）

原句语境："a time limit to prevent negotiations from turning into a shield."

Peacekeeping force

中文解释：维和部队（联合国监督停火的军事存在）

原句语境："supply a significant peacekeeping force for southern Lebanon."

Iran negotiations

中文解释：伊朗谈判（解决伊朗核问题的多边外交努力）

原句语境："even more true of the impending Iran negotiations."

Coordinated diplomacy

中文解释：协调外交（多国联合制定的外交策略）

原句语境："produce a coordinated diplomacy in the Security Council."

Moderate Arab states

中文解释：温和阿拉伯国家（主张通过对话解决争端的阿拉伯政权）

原句语境："moderate Arab states."

Security net

中文解释：安全屏障（防止危机扩散的保障机制）

原句语境："provide a safety net for the systematic destruction."

Shields for developing new assaults

中文解释：为新袭击提供掩护（利用谈判拖延时间准备军事行动）

原句语境："prevent negotiations from turning into a shield for developing new assaults."

Military power

中文解释：军事力量（国家或组织的武装能力）

原句语境："gear its military power to political objectives."

Bargaining positions

中文解释：谈判地位（影响协议内容的实力基础）

原句语境："providing bargaining positions after the cessation of hostilities."

Hostile act

中文解释：敌对行为（国际法认定的战争行为）

原句语境："Syria has declared that it would consider the deployment a hostile act."

Obsolescent weapons

中文解释：过时武器（技术落后于时代的军事装备）

原句语境："armed with obsolescent weapons."

Internal Lebanese consensus

中文解释：黎巴嫩内部共识（各政治派别达成的基本政治协议）

原句语境："encourage a political process ... through negotiation, and an internal Lebanese consensus."

Transnational jihadists

中文解释：跨国圣战分子（超越国界的宗教极端武装分子）

原句语境："attacked with missiles from both Gaza and Lebanon launched by non-state jihadists."

大外交青年智库（简称“大外交智库”）（Glory Diplomacy Youth Think-tank，Glory Diplomacy或GDYT）是一家创办于2017年的以外交安全为主的综合性战略研究机构、社会/青年智库，总部在中国深圳，是深圳首家非官方外交安全智库、中国首家青年智库，创始人是王盖盖。GDYT一直坚持“只有修炼好内功，才能放心去实战”的发展理念，从2017年创始初期稳扎稳打，于2018年成立青年原创评论组（于2022年改组为《智本青析》编辑部）并创办《智本青析》电子刊至今；2019年在海南开设分支机构即海南大外交学会，同年成立青年发展研究中心，该中心在2019年创办“大外交青年发展与实践启航项目”研修班至今，在2021年创办“世界青年菁英坊《早点知道》讲座项目”至今；2020年成立应试就业研究中心并创办《真题解析》付费专栏；同年7月，成立外交外事涉外安全决策咨询公司，集中研究国家安全与国际安全、海外利益分析与保护、青年外交与青年发展、区域国别与国际组织、跨国公司与全球治理等事务；2021年成立外文编译评议组并创办《大译编参》电子刊至今（该编辑部于2022年创办《每日信报》微电子日刊），同年成立区域国别研究中心（该中心于2022年创办《新国别简报》栏目）；2022年成立世界外交数据中心、全球治理研究中心（该中心于2022年创办《鸿士论天下》栏目）、国家安全研究中心、党的理论创新研究中心，并合并所有专访项目（青坊谈、最有影响力人物访谈、21世纪中国外交天团、学人专访等）整合为《与名人对话》栏目，组建“青年智库特种部队”全职高精尖部门和全球范围内的“大中华菁英圈”，开启“Smallibrary·小书屋”全球青年阅读挑战计划（该计划于2022年创办《智库书屋》栏目），运营新知太学（网络）书院（该书院于2022年创办《线上共读》栏目）；2023年，成立全球创业研究中心、全球湾区研究中心、跨国公司研究中心、海外利益研究中心、数字经济研究中心、海洋治理研究中心、基式外交研究中心，在香港开设分支机构“香港大外交学会（GDYT HK）”，创办“华湾国际创业发展新菁英汇”国际人才交流平台，创办湾区爬山书友俱乐部等。GDYT从2021年以来，多次举办全国（含全球）青年国际问题学术研讨、政策分析与思想交流等活动，如“国际问题研究型青年智库发展模式探索论坛”、“新型国际问题青年智库建设与发展论坛”、“国际关系青年辩论赛”、“国际关系青年辩论赛最佳辩手论坛”、“世界青年菁英坊《早点知道》系列讲座”、“国际问题/区域国别学术研讨会（GDYT·ISAS）”系列活动、“《与名人对话》系列采访活动”、“《鸿士论天下》系列讲座活动”、“新时代中国国际战略高端论坛与菁英论坛”、“华湾国际创业发展新菁英汇”系列活动、“GDYT与国际知名学者对话”等等。自创办以来，GDYT一直致力于“让壹亿中国大外交青年智慧与方案被全球看见”，聚集全球各地有志青年为实现个人、企业、社会、国家和世界和平发展而奋斗，至2021年底，已发展成集专家顾问、研究员（含高级）、特约研究员（含高级）、助理研究员、编译评议员、时政评论员、实习生、志愿者等全方位国际人才体系（200人）的样本标杆青年智库，聚焦中国与全球大外交领域青年的原创方案、发展计划和外交延伸等助力与服务，在“对照全球外交发展、对接世界高端智库、对比新型平台建设”的三原则指导下，为中国的外交与安全发展贡献青年力量和方案，为政府、企业、智库、高校、非政府组织以及个人都有提供过咨询服务，被海内外青年誉为现代智囊的“青年精英大脑集散地”，是全球新型外交青年智库的开创者和代言人！

大外交青年智库

Glory Diplomacy

让中国外交青年智慧被全球看见

为中国青年智库代言