10小时前Ray全平台发布署名文章《2025》，从他的视角回顾了去年一整年，并对今年会发生什么进行判断。在此整理编译，
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Naturally, as a systematic global macro investor leaving 2025, I reflected on the mechanics of what happened, particularly in the markets. That's what today’s reflection is about.
作为一名在 2025 年离场的系统性全球宏观投资者，我自然而然地反思了发生的机制，特别是在市场中的表现。这就是今天反思的主题。
Though the facts and returns are indisputable, I see things differently from most others. While most people see US stocks and particularly US AI stocks to be the best investments and hence the biggest investment story of 2025, it is indisputably true that the biggest returns (and hence the biggest story) came from 1) what happened to the value of money (most importantly the dollar, other fiat currencies, and gold) and 2) US stocks significantly underperforming both non-US stock markets and gold (which was the best performing major market) principally as a result of fiscal and monetary stimulations, productivity gains, and big shifts in asset allocations away from US markets. In these reflections, I step back and look at how this money/debt/market/economy dynamic worked last year, and I briefly touch on how the other four big forces—politics, geopolitics, acts of nature, and technology—affected the global macro picture in the context of the evolving Big Cycle.
尽管事实和回报无可争辩，但我与大多数人的看法不同。虽然大多数人认为美国股票，尤其是美国人工智能股票，是最好的投资，因此将成为 2025 年最大的投资故事，但有一点毋庸置疑：
最大的回报（因此也是最大的故事）来自于 1）货币价值的变化（最重要的是美元、其他法定货币和黄金）以及 2）美国股票显著不及非美股市和黄金（黄金是表现最好的主要市场），这主要是财政和货币刺激、生产率提高以及大幅资产配置从美国市场转移所致。
在这些反思中，我退一步审视去年这一货币/债务/市场/经济动态的运作方式，并简要触及其他四大力量——政治、地缘政治、自然因素和技术——在不断演变的大周期背景下如何影响全球宏观格局。
Regarding 1) what happened to the value of money: the dollar fell by 0.3% against the yen, 4% against the renminbi, 12% against the euro, 13% against the Swiss franc, and 39% against gold (which is the second largest reserve currency and the only major non-fiat currency). So, all fiat currencies fell, and the biggest story and the biggest market moves of the year were the result of the weakest fiat currencies falling the most, while the strongest/hardest currencies strengthened the most. The best major investment of the year was long gold (returning 65% in dollar terms), which outperformed the S&P index (which returned 18% in dollars) by 47%. Or, said differently, the S&P fell by 28% in gold-money terms. Let's remember some key principles that pertain to what is happening:
关于第一点：货币价值发生了什么变化。
美元对日元下跌了 0.3%，对人民币下跌了 4%，对欧元下跌了 12%，对瑞士法郎下跌了 13%，对黄金下跌了 39%（黄金是第二大储备货币，也是唯一主要的非法定货币）。
因此，所有法定货币都在走弱，而今年最大的故事和最大的市场波动，是由最弱的法定货币跌得最多所导致的，同时最强/最硬的货币则涨得最多。
今年表现最好的主要投资是做多黄金（以美元计回报为 65%），比标普指数（以美元计回报为 18%）超出 47%。换句话说，按黄金计价，标普下跌了 28%。
让我们记住一些与当前情况相关的关键原则：
When one's own currency goes down, it makes it look like the things measured in it went up. In other words, looking at the investment returns through the lens of a weak currency makes them look stronger than they really are. In this case, the S&P returned 18% for a dollar-based investor, 17% for a yen-based investor, 13% for a renminbi-based investor, only 4% for a euro-based investor, only 3% for a Swiss franc-based investor, and, for a gold-based investor, it returned -28%.
当本国货币贬值时，会让以该货币计量的东西看起来上涨了。换句话说，通过疲弱货币的视角来看投资回报，会让它们看起来比实际更强。
在这个例子中，标普对以美元计价的投资者回报为 18%，对以日元计价的投资者为 17%，对以人民币计价的投资者为 13%，对以欧元计价的投资者仅为 4%，对以瑞士法郎计价的投资者仅为 3%，而对以黄金计价的投资者则为-28%。
What happens with the currency matters a lot to shifts in wealth and what happens economically. When one's currency goes down, it reduces one's wealth and one's buying power, it makes one's goods and services cheaper in others' currencies, and it makes others' goods and services more expensive in one's own currency. In these ways, it affects inflation rates and who buys what from whom, though it does so with a lag. Whether or not you are currency hedged matters a lot. What if you don't have, and don't want to take, a view on the currency? What should you do? You should always be hedged to your least-risk currency mix and make tactical moves from there if you think you are capable of making them well. I won't digress now into an explanation of how I do that, though I will later.
货币的变化对财富转移和经济状况有重大影响。当一种货币贬值时，它会减少该货币持有者的财富和购买力，使其在他国货币计价下的商品和服务变得更便宜，同时使他国在该货币计价下的商品和服务变得更昂贵。通过这些途径，货币变动影响通货膨胀率以及谁向谁购买什么，尽管这些影响存在滞后。
是否对冲货币风险非常重要。假如你既没有也不想对货币持有观点，该怎么办？
你应该始终按你风险最小的货币组合来对冲，然后在此基础上如果你认为自己有能力做得好，就进行战术性调整。我现在不会展开说明我是如何做到这一点的，但我以后会说明。
As for bonds—i.e., debt assets—because they are promises to deliver money, when the value of money goes down, their real worth is lowered even as their nominal prices rise. Last year, 10-year US Treasury bonds returned 9% (roughly half from yield and half from price) in dollar terms, 9% in yen terms, 5% In renminbi terms, and -4% in euro terms, -4% in Swiss franc terms, and -34% in gold terms—and cash was an even worse investment. You can see why foreign investors didn't like dollar bonds and cash (unless they were currency hedged). Thus far, the bond supply/demand imbalance has not been a serious problem, but a large amount of debt (nearly $10tn) will need to be rolled going forward. At the same time, it appears likely the Fed will be inclined to ease to push real interest rates down. For these reasons, debt assets look unappealing, especially at the long end of the curve, and a further steepening of the yield curve seems probable, though it seems questionable to me that the Fed’s easing will be as much as is discounted in the current pricing.
至于债券——即债务资产——因为它们是支付金钱的承诺，当货币的价值下降时，即便名义价格上涨，它们的实际价值也会降低。去年，按美元计，10 年期美国国债回报率为 9%（大约一半来自收益率，一半来自价格）；按日元计为 9%；按人民币计为 5%；按欧元计为-4%；按瑞士法郎计为-4%；按黄金计为-34%；而现金则更糟。你可以理解为什么外国投资者不喜欢美元债券和现金（除非他们进行了货币对冲）。
到目前为止，债券的供需失衡还不是一个严重问题，但未来将有大量债务（近 10 万亿美元）需要展期。同时，美联储似乎可能倾向于宽松以压低实际利率。
基于这些原因，债务资产显得缺乏吸引力，尤其是在期限曲线的长期端，收益率曲线进一步陡峭化似乎很可能，尽管我认为美联储的宽松幅度可能并不像当前定价所折算的那么大，这一点值得怀疑。
Regarding2) US stocks significantly underperforming non-US stocks and gold (which was the best performing major market), as previously mentioned, while US stocks were strong in dollar terms, they were much less strong in the currencies that were strong, and they significantly underperformed other countries' equities. Clearly, investors would have much rather been in non-US stocks than in US stocks, just as they would have preferred to be in non-US bonds than in US bonds and US cash. More specifically, European stocks outperformed US stocks by 23%, Chinese stocks outperformed by 21%, UK stocks outperformed by 19%, and Japanese stocks outperformed by 10%. Emerging market stocks as a whole did better, returning 34%, while emerging market dollar debt returned 14% and emerging market local currency debt in dollar terms returned 18% as a whole. In other words, there were big shifts in flows, values, and, in turn, wealth away from the US, and what is happening will probably lead to more rebalancing and diversifying.
关于第二点：美国股票大幅落后于非美国股票和黄金
如前所述，尽管以美元计价美国股票表现强劲，但以那些走强货币计价时并不那么强劲，并且明显落后于其他国家的股票。很明显，投资者更愿意持有非美国股票而不是美国股票，正如他们更愿意持有非美国债券而不是美国债券和美元现金。
更具体地说，欧洲股票比美国股票多跑了 23%，中国股票多跑了 21%，英国股票多跑了 19%，日本股票多跑了 10%。
整体来看，新兴市场股票表现更好，回报为 34%，而新兴市场美元债回报为 14%，以美元计价的新兴市场本币债整体回报为 18%。
换言之，资金流、估值及由此带来的财富都发生了重大转移，远离美国，而正在发生的这一切可能会导致更多的再平衡与多元化。
As for US stocks last year, the strong results were due to both strong earnings growth and a P/E expansion. More specifically, earnings were up 12% in dollar terms, the P/E rose by about 5%, and the dividend yield was about 1%, so the total return of the S&P was about 18% in dollars. The “Magnificent 7” stocks in the S&P 500, which account for about a third of its market cap, had earnings growth of 22% in 2025, and, contrary to popular thinking, the other 493 stocks in the S&P also had strong earnings growth at 9%, so the whole S&P 500 index had earnings growth of 12%. That happened as a result of sales increasing by 7% and margins increasing by 5.3%, so sales were responsible for 57% of the earnings increase and margin improvements were responsible for 43% of it.* It appears that some significant portion of the margin improvements was due to technology efficiencies, but I can't see the numbers to tell for sure. In any case the earnings improvements were largely due to the economic pie (i.e., sales) increasing and companies (hence the capitalists who own them) capturing most the improvement and workers capturing relatively little of it. It will be very important to monitor the margin increases that go to profits going forward because the markets are now discounting that these increases will be large while leftist political forces are trying to capture a greater share of the pie.
至于去年的美国股票，强劲的表现既归因于盈利增长，也归因于市盈率扩张。更具体地说，按美元计，盈利增长了 12%，市盈率上升了约 5%，股息收益率约为 1%，因此标普的美元总回报约为 18%。
标普 500 中占其市值约三分之一的“七大巨头”在 2025 年的盈利增长为 22%，与普遍看法相反，标普的其余 493 只股票也有 9%的强劲盈利增长，所以整个标普 500 指数的盈利增长为 12%。这是由于销售额增长了 7%且利润率提高了 5.3%，因此销售额对盈利增长的贡献约为 57%，利润率改善贡献约为 43%.
看起来利润率改善中有相当一部分是由于技术效率，但我无法看到具体数据来确认。无论如何，盈利改善在很大程度上是由于经济蛋糕（即销售额）的扩大，企业（因此拥有它们的资本家）获得了大部分改善，而工人获得的相对较少。
未来需密切关注流向利润的利润率上升情况，因为市场现在已经在假定这些上升将会很大，而左翼政治力量正试图夺取更大份额。
While it is easier to know the past than the future, we do know something about the present that can help us better anticipate the future if we understand the most important cause/effect relationships. For example, we know that with PE multiples high and credit spreads low, valuations appear to be stretched. If history is a guide, this portends low future equity returns. When I calculate expected returns based on where stock and bond yields are using normal productivity growth and the profits growth that results from it, my long-term equity expected return would be at about 4.7% (a sub-10th percentile reading), which is very low relative to existing bond returns at about 4.9%, so equity risk premiums are low. Also, credit spreads contracted to very low levels in 2025, which was a positive for lower credit and equity assets, but it leaves these spreads less likely to decline and more likely to rise, which is a negative for these assets. All this means that there isn't much more return that can be squeezed out of the equity risk premiums, credit spreads, and liquidity premiums.** It also means that if interest rates rise, which is possible as there are growing supply/demand driven pressures (i.e., supply is increasing while the demand picture is worsening) to have happen because the value of money is declining, all else being equal, it will have a large negative effect on the credit and stock markets.
虽然了解过去比预测未来容易，但如果我们理解最重要的因果关系，就能从对当前状况的认识中更好地预测未来。
例如，我们知道市盈率（PE）高而信用利差低时，估值显得被拉伸。如果以历史为鉴，这预示着未来股票回报将较低。当我根据股票和债券收益率所在水平，结合正常的生产力增长及由此带来的利润增长来计算预期回报时，我的长期股票预期回报约为 4.7%（处于不到第 10 百分位的水平），相对于约 4.9%的现有债券回报而言，这非常低，因此股权风险溢价很低。此外，信用利差在 2025 年收窄至极低水平，这对降低信贷和股票资产风险是一个积极因素，但也使这些利差不太可能进一步下降、反而更可能上升，这对这些资产是不利的。
所有这些意味着，从股权风险溢价、信用利差和流动性溢价中已很难再榨取更多回报。这也意味着，如果利率上升——这是有可能的，因为随着货币价值下降，出现了日益由供需驱动的压力（例如供应增加而需求前景恶化）——在其他条件不变的情况下，这将对信贷和股票市场产生重大负面影响。
Of course, there are big questions about Fed policy and productivity growth ahead. It appears most likely that the newly appointed Fed chair and the FOMC will be biased to push nominal and real interest rates down, which would be supportive to prices and inflate bubbles. As for productivity growth, it will likely improve in 2026, though a) how much it will improve and b) how much of it will be allowed to flow through to benefit company profits, stock prices, and, in turn, capitalist owners versus how much will go to workers and socialists in the form of comp changes and taxes (which is the classic political right/left question) are uncertain.
当然，未来对美联储政策和生产力增长存在重大疑问。
目前看来，新任美联储主席和联邦公开市场委员会很可能倾向于将名义利率和实际利率抬低，这将有利于物价并助长资产泡沫。至于生产力增长，预计会在 2026 年改善，尽管 a) 改善幅度如何，以及 b) 改善带来的收益有多少会被允许流向公司利润、股票价格，进而流向资本所有者，和有多少会以薪酬变动和税收的形式流向工人和社会化安排（这是典型的政治右/左问题）仍不确定。
Consistent with how the machine works, in 2025 the Fed’s cutting interest rates and easing the availability of credit lowered the discount rate, determining the present value of future cash flows and lowering risk premia, which together contributed to the previously described results. These changes supported the prices of assets that do well in reflations, especially those with long-durations, like equities and gold, so now these markets are no longer cheap. Also, notably, these reflationary moves didn't help venture capital, private equity, and real estate—i.e., the illiquid markets—very much. Those markets are having problems. If one believes the stated valuations in VC and PE (which most people don't), liquidity premiums are now very low; I think it's obvious that they are likely to rise a lot as the debt these entities took on has to be financed at higher interest rates and the pressures to raise liquidity build, which would make illiquid investments fall relative to liquid ones.
与该机制的运作一致，2025 年美联储降息并放松信贷供应，降低了贴现率（决定未来现金流的现值）并压低了风险溢价，这些共同促成了前述的结果。
这些变化支撑了在再通胀环境中表现良好的资产价格，尤其是那些久期较长的资产，如股票和黄金，因此这些市场现在不再便宜了。此外，值得注意的是，这些再通胀措施并未对风险投资、私募股权和房地产等非流动性市场带来太大帮助——这些市场正面临问题。如果相信风险投资和私募股权所标示的估值（大多数人不信），流动性溢价现在就很低；
我认为显而易见，随着这些实体所承担的债务必须以更高利率筹资且筹资压力增加，流动性溢价很可能大幅上升，这将使得非流动性投资相对于流动性投资下跌。
In summary, just about everything went up a lot in dollar terms because of the big fiscal and monetary reflationary policies and are now relatively expansive.
总之，由于大规模的财政和货币再通胀政策，几乎所有以美元计价的资产都大幅上涨，现在这些政策相对宽松。
One cannot look at the changes in the markets without looking at the changes in the political order, especially in 2025. Because markets and the economy affect politics and politics affect markets and the economy, politics played a big role in driving markets and economies. More specifically in the US and for the world:
在观察市场变化时，不能不看政治秩序的变化，尤其是在 2025 年。因为市场与经济影响政治，政治又影响市场与经济，所以政治在推动市场和经济方面发挥了重要作用。
更具体地说，在美国以及对世界而言：
a) the Trump administration’s domestic economic policies were and still are a levered bet on the power of capitalism to revitalize American manufacturing and enable American AI technology, which contributed to the market movements I described above,
a) 特朗普政府的国内经济政策曾经并且仍然是对资本主义力量的杠杆式押注，期望通过振兴美国制造业并推动美国人工智能技术发展来实现，这助长了我上文所描述的市场变动，
b) its foreign policy has scared and turned off some foreign investors as fears of sanctions and conflicts supported the sort of portfolio diversification and buying of gold that we saw, and
b) 其外交政策使一些外国投资者感到恐惧并远离，担心制裁和冲突，这支持了我们所见到的那种投资组合多元化和买入黄金的行为
c) its policies increased wealth and income gaps because the “haves” (those in the top 10%), who are capitalists, have more wealth in stocks and because their income gains were bigger.
c) 其政策扩大了财富和收入差距，因为“有产者”（顶层 10%）是资本家，他们在股票中拥有更多财富且收入增长更大。
As a result of c), those capitalists who are in the top 10% now don’t see inflation as a problem, while the majority (those in the bottom 60%) feel overwhelmed by it. The value of money issue, otherwise known as the affordability issue, will probably be the number one political issue next year, contributing to the Republicans losing the House and a very messy 2027 on the way to a very interesting 2028 election in which the clash between the right and the left is shaping up to be a big one.
因此根据 c)，那些处于顶层 10%的资本家现在并不认为通胀是个问题，而大多数人（底层 60%）则被通胀压得喘不过气来。
货币价值问题，也就是可负担性问题，可能将成为明年最重要的政治议题，这将促成共和党失去众议院，并导致一个非常混乱的 2027 年，进而走向一个非常有意思的 2028 年选举——在那里右翼与左翼的冲突正逐渐演变成一次重大对决。
More specifically, 2025 was the first year of the Trump four-year term in which he had control of both houses, which is classically the best year for presidents to push through what they want, so we saw his administration’s all-out aggressive bet on capitalism—i.e., the aggressively stimulative fiscal policy, reducing regulations so that money and capital would be more plentiful, making it easier to produce most things, raising tariffs to both protect domestic producers and to bring in tax revenue, providing proactive supports to key industries' production. Behind these moves, there was a Trump-led shift from free-market capitalism to government-directed capitalism.
更具体地说，2025 年是特朗普在两院都掌控下的第一个四年任期的年份，按常理这是总统推动其意愿最有利的一年，因此我们看到了他的政府对资本主义的全面激进押注——即大规模刺激性财政政策、减少监管以使资金和资本更加充裕、简化生产流程以便更容易生产大多数商品、提高关税以既保护国内生产者又带来税收、为关键产业的生产提供积极支持。
在这些举措的背后，是由特朗普主导的从自由市场资本主义向政府主导资本主义的转变。
Because of how our democracy works, President Trump has a two-year unimpeded mandate that can be weakened greatly in the ‘26 mid-term elections and reversed in the '28 elections. He must feel that this doesn't give him enough time to get done what he believes he needs to get done. Nowadays, it is rare for one party to be able to stay in power for long because it is difficult for them to live up to their promises to satisfy their electorates’ financial and social expectations. In fact, there is reason to question the viability of democratic decision-making when those in office are unable to govern long enough to meet the voters’ expectations. It is becoming a norm in developed countries to see populist politicians from the left or the right who advocate for extreme policies to bring about extreme improvements and then fail to deliver and are thrown out of office. These frequent changes from one extreme to another are destabilizing. It's like it used to be in underdeveloped countries. In any case, it is increasingly apparent that a big fight is brewing between the hard right, now led by President Trump, and the hard left. On Jan 1, we saw the opposition coalescing as Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez united at Mamdani's inauguration behind the anti-billionaire, “Democratic socialist” movement. This will be a fight over wealth and money that will likely affect the markets and economies.
由于我们的民主运作方式，特朗普总统拥有为期两年的不受阻碍的授权，但这可能在 2026 年中期选举中大幅削弱，并在 2028 年选举中被逆转。
他一定会觉得这段时间不足以完成他认为必须完成的事情。如今，一个政党长期执政已成难事，因为要兑现承诺以满足选民在经济和社会方面的期望非常困难。事实上，当掌权者无法执政足够长的时间以满足选民期望时，就有理由质疑民主决策的可行性。
在发达国家，越来越常见的是来自左翼或右翼的民粹主义政治家主张极端政策以带来极大改善，却未能兑现承诺而被罢黜。这种从一个极端频繁转向另一个极端的变化具有破坏性，就像过去在欠发达国家那样。
无论如何，现在越来越明显的是，由特朗普总统领导的极右与极左之间的一场大冲突正在酝酿。 在 1 月 1 日，我们看到反对派开始联合，佐赫兰·曼达尼（Zohran Mamdani）、伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）和亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯（Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez）在曼达尼的就职典礼上团结在反亿万富翁的“民主社会主义者”运动背后。
这将是一场关于财富和金钱的斗争，可能会影响市场和经济。
Regarding how the world order and geopolitics are changing, in 2025 there was a clear shift from multilateralism (in which there is an aspiration to operate by rules overseen by multilateral organizations) to unilateralism (in which power rules and countries operate in their self-interest). That raised and will continue to raise threats of conflict and lead to increased military spending, and borrowing to finance it, in most countries. It also contributed to the increased use of economic threats and sanctions, protectionism, deglobalization, many more investment and business deals, more foreign capital promised to be invested in the United States, strengthening demand for gold, and reduced foreign demand for US debt, dollars, and other assets.
关于世界秩序和地缘政治的变化，2025 年明显从多边主义（即有通过多边组织监督的规则来运作的愿望）转向单边主义（即以实力为主导、各国按自身利益行事）。这加剧并将继续加剧冲突威胁，导致大多数国家增加军事开支，并为此举借款。
这也促成了更多使用经济威胁和制裁、保护主义、去全球化、更多投资和商业交易、更多对美国承诺的外资流入、对黄金需求的增强，以及对美国债务、美元和其他资产的外国需求减少。
Regrading acts of nature, the progression of climate change continued while there was a politically led Trump shift in spending money and encouraging energy production in an attempt to minimize the issue.
关于自然现象，气候变化仍在持续，而在政治上由特朗普主导的转向则通过增加支出和鼓励能源生产来试图将问题降到最低。
Regarding technology, obviously the AI boom that is now in the early stages of a bubble had a big effect on everything. I will soon send out an explanation of what my bubble indicators are showing, so I won't get into that subject now.
关于技术，显然当前处于早期泡沫阶段的人工智能热潮对一切都产生了重大影响。我很快会发出一份关于我的泡沫指标所显示内容的解释，所以现在我不在此详述这个话题。
That’s a lot to think about, and we didn’t cover much about what’s going on outside the US. I have found that having an understanding of the patterns of history and the cause/effect relationships that drove them, having a well back tested and systemized game plan, and using AI and great data is invaluable. That’s how I play the game and what I want to pass along to you.
这是很多需要思考的事情，我们也没有多谈美国以外发生的情况。我发现，理解历史模式及驱动这些模式的因果关系、拥有经充分回测和系统化的行动计划，以及利用人工智能和优质数据，都是非常宝贵的。这就是我玩这场游戏的方式，也是我希望传授给你们的。
In summary, this approach has led me to believe that the debt/money/markets/economy force, the domestic political force, the forces of geopolitics (e.g., increased military spending and borrowing to finance it), the force of nature (climate), and the force of new technologies (e.g., the costs and benefits of AI) will continue to be the major drivers shaping the whole picture, and that these forces will broadly track the Big Cycle template I laid out in my books. As I have already gone on for too long, I won’t go deeper into all this now. If you read my book
How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle
, you know what I think about how the cycle will evolve, and if you want to learn more and haven’t read it, I suggest that you do.
总之，这种方法让我相信，债务/货币/市场/经济力量、国内政治力量、地缘政治力量（例如为增加军费而增加借贷）、自然力量（气候）以及新技术力量（例如人工智能的成本与收益）将继续成为塑造整体局势的主要驱动因素，而且这些力量大致会遵循我在书中提出的大周期模板。鉴于我已经说得太多了，现在就不再深入展开。如果你读过我的《国家如何破产：大周期》，你就知道我对周期如何演变的看法；如果你想了解更多且还没读过，我建议你去读一读。
As for portfolio positioning, while I don’t want to be your investment advisor (meaning I don’t want to tell you what positions to have and have you simply follow my advice), I do want to help you invest well. Though I think you can surmise the types of positions I like and don’t like, the most important thing for you to have is the ability to make your investment decisions yourself, whether to place your own bets on which markets will do well and poorly, or to build a great strategic asset allocation mix that you stick with, or to pick managers who will invest well for you. If you want my advice about how to do these things well to help you be successful at investing, I recommend the
Dalio Market Principles
course which is put out by the Wealth Management Institute of Singapore.
至于投资组合配置，虽然我不想成为你的投资顾问（意思是我不想告诉你应该持有什么仓位然后让你盲目按我的建议去做），但我确实想帮助你做好投资。虽然我想你可能已经能推断出我喜欢和不喜欢的仓位类型，但对你来说最重要的是具备自己做出投资决策的能力：
无论是自己下注哪些市场会表现好或差，还是建立并坚持一个优秀的战略资产配置组合，或是挑选能为你做好投资的经理人。如果你想要我的建议来帮助你做好这些事情并在投资上取得成功，我推荐由新加坡财富管理学院推出的《达利奥市场原则》课程。
* Since we won’t have this info with certainty until Q4 results are reported, these are estimates.
* 由于我们要到第四季度财报公布才能确定这些信息，因此这些都是估计值。
** When these things decline, it exerts upward pressure on stocks.
** 当这些项目下降时，会对股票构成上行压力。
更多内容均在星球专栏。我们在过去的日子里已针对全球资产完成了数百万字的运行逻辑及体系阐述，
订阅入口详见：
https://t.zsxq.com/NR0qH
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