凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）的提名，一度引发市场剧烈波动。Warsh说过什么？以下是他本人言论汇总，由“流动性笔记”整理，供读者参考。
全文约12000余字
沃什，放言变革美联储的人
美国时间周五早盘，白银现货暴跌
一、2006年：入职确认听证会
"I hope that my prior experience on Wall Street, particularly my nearly 7 years at Morgan Stanley, would prove beneficial to the deliberations and communications of the Federal Reserve." （我希望我此前在华尔街的经历，特别是在摩根士丹利近7年的工作，能对美联储的审议和沟通有所裨益。）
二、2007年：危机前夕
2007年3月「Market Liquidity」演讲
"The benefits of greater liquidity are substantial, through higher asset prices and more efficient transfer of funds from savers to borrowers. Historical episodes indicate, however, that markets can become far less liquid due to increases in investor risk aversion and uncertainty." （流动性充裕的好处是实质性的……但历史经验表明，市场可能因投资者风险厌恶和不确定性上升而变得流动性严重不足。）
"While policymakers and market participants know with certainty that these episodes will occur, they must be humble in their ability to predict the timing, scope, and duration of these periods of financial distress." （虽然政策制定者和市场参与者确知这些事件会发生，但他们必须对预测这些金融困境时期的时机、范围和持续时间保持谦卑。）
2007年9月 Albany大学演讲
关于成长背景：
"I learned much of what I need to know about the real economy in my first eighteen years here." （我在这里（纽约州上州）的前十八年学到了理解真实经济所需的大部分知识。）
2007年11月「The End of History?」演讲
"If the end of economic history were at hand, what would it look like? You would almost assuredly find strong, synchronized global economic growth; favorable inflation readings and anchored inflation expectations; low global risk premiums and low term premiums; muted volatility across asset markets..." （如果经济的历史终结即将到来，它会是什么样子？你几乎肯定会发现强劲、同步的全球经济增长；良好的通胀数据和锚定的通胀预期；低全球风险溢价和低期限溢价；各资产市场波动率低迷……）
"In my view, recent financial turmoil should not be considered an accident of history. Rather, it is History's latest reminder to policymakers and market participants alike that we ought to be humble in our convictions and cautious in our deeds." （在我看来，近期的金融动荡不应被视为历史的意外。相反，它是历史对政策制定者和市场参与者的最新提醒——我们应该对自己的信念保持谦卑，对自己的行为保持谨慎。）
"Market confidence ultimately begot complacency." （市场信心最终滋生了自满。）
三、2008年：金融危机
2008年3月18日 FOMC会议（贝尔斯登获救前）
"I think, most fundamentally, that the business model of investment banks has been threatened, and I suspect the existing business model will not endure through this period." （我认为最根本的是，投资银行的商业模式已受到威胁，我怀疑现有的商业模式无法度过这一时期。）
2008年3月 FOMC会议
关于通胀：
"On the inflation front, there is little reason to be confident that inflation will decline." （在通胀方面，几乎没有理由相信通胀会下降。）
2008年5月21日「The Federal Funds Rate in Extraordinary Times」演讲
"This may be the most pronounced time of testing for central banks in a generation." （这可能是一代人以来对央行最严峻的考验时刻。）
"The Fed is not omniscient. Neither are our tools uniquely and perfectly suited to ensure that the ills of yesterday do not recur. Nor can we guarantee that our policy response alone will set the economy on a steady and obvious path to unequalled prosperity. We run serious risks if we overstate our knowledge or overplay our hand." （美联储不是无所不知的。我们的工具也不是独一无二、完美无缺地能确保昨日的弊病不再重演。我们也无法保证仅凭我们的政策回应就能让经济走上通往无与伦比繁荣的稳定明确道路。如果我们夸大自己的知识或过度出手，就会面临严重风险。）
"Look no further than the financial wizards in the financial sector recently who were convinced that risks were manageable and returns exponential. Milton Friedman reminded us long ago, and Edmund Phelps more recently, of the 'consequences of conceit.'" （看看金融业最近那些自以为风险可控、回报呈指数级增长的金融奇才就够了。米尔顿·弗里德曼很久以前就提醒过我们，埃德蒙·费尔普斯最近也提醒过我们"自负的后果"。）
"Even if the economy were to weaken somewhat further, we should be inclined to resist expected, reflexive calls to trot out the hammer again. Policy actions should reinforce the notion with stakeholders that further hammering needs to be done, but it needs to be accomplished by the financial institutions themselves." （即使经济进一步走弱，我们也应倾向于抵制那些预期中的、条件反射式的再次祭出大锤的呼声。政策行动应向利益相关者强化这样一个观念：进一步的锤打工作需要做，但它需要由金融机构自己来完成。）
"In my view, only when private financial agents resume their role as the primary source of liquidity in markets will proper credit market functioning and support for economic growth be restored." （在我看来，只有当私人金融主体恢复其作为市场流动性主要来源的角色时，信贷市场的正常运作和对经济增长的支持才能恢复。）
2008年9月 FOMC会议（雷曼倒闭后）
"I'm still not ready to relinquish my concerns on the inflation front." （我仍然不准备放弃对通胀的担忧。）
Bernanke对此的反应（第二天给Don Kohn的邮件中发泄）：
"I find myself conciliating holders of the unreasonable opinion that we should be tightening even as the economy and financial system are in a precarious position and inflation/commodity pressures appear to be easing." （我发现自己在安抚那些持不合理观点的人——他们认为即使经济和金融体系处于危险境地、通胀/大宗商品压力似乎正在缓解，我们也应该收紧政策。）
2008年11月「The Promise and Peril of the New Financial Architecture」演讲
"During the past several months, this domestic housing-centric diagnosis has also been subjected to a natural experiment. Among U.S. financial institutions, asset quality concerns are no longer confined to the mortgage sector." （在过去几个月里，这种以国内住房为中心的诊断也经受了一场自然实验。在美国金融机构中，资产质量担忧已不再局限于抵押贷款部门。）
四、2009年：危机后
2009年4月6日「The Panic of 2008」演讲
"The encouraging news, I should note, is that panics end." （我应该指出，令人鼓舞的消息是，恐慌会结束。）
"It is difficult for the strong to thrive, let alone survive, when they reside in a neighborhood that is being decimated. And when panic conditions persist and long-held articles of faith lose their following, markets often react indiscriminately." （当强者居住在一个正被摧毁的街区时，他们很难繁荣，更不用说生存了。当恐慌状况持续存在，长期以来的信条失去追随者时，市场往往会不加区分地做出反应。）
2009年6月「Defining Deviancy」演讲
关于"正常"的定义：
标题本身就很有意味——"定义偏差"，暗示危机改变了人们对"正常"的认知。
2009年9月25日「Longer Days, Fewer Weekends」演讲
"If policymakers insist on waiting until the level of real activity has plainly and substantially returned to normal — and the economy has returned to self-sustaining trend growth — they will almost certainly have waited too long." （如果决策者坚持等到实际经济活动水平明显且实质性回归正常……他们几乎肯定会等得太久。）
"There is a risk, of much debated magnitude, that the unusually high level of reserves, along with substantial liquid assets of the banking system, could fuel an unanticipated, excessive surge in lending." （有一个规模尚有争议的风险，即异常高的储备金水平，加上银行体系的大量流动资产，可能会引发意想不到的、过度的贷款激增。）
"The second anniversary of the onset of the financial crisis—and about a year from the darkest days of the Panic of 2008—is no time to declare victory, scarcely the moment to hand out medals." （金融危机爆发两周年——距离2008年恐慌最黑暗的日子约一年——现在不是宣布胜利的时候，也几乎不是颁发奖章的时刻。）
"The final recounting of economic history, I submit, will judge that winning the battle against the Panic of 2008 was a necessary but insufficient condition to win the peace and ensure a strong foundation for economic prosperity." （我认为，经济史的最终记载将会判定，赢得与2008年恐慌的战斗是赢得和平、确保经济繁荣坚实基础的必要但非充分条件。）
"'Whatever it takes' is said by some to be the maxim that marked the battle of the last year. But, it cannot be an asymmetric mantra, trotted out only during times of deep economic and financial distress, and discarded when the cycle turns." （有人说"不惜一切代价"是标志着过去一年战斗的格言。但它不能是一个不对称的咒语——只在深度经济和金融困境时期祭出，而在周期转向时就抛弃。）
五、2010年：QE2辩论
2010年2月3日「Regulation and Its Discontents」演讲
"The Panic of 2008 that exacerbated the recession is the result of a multitude of flawed private and public practices, with regulatory error being only one part." （加剧衰退的2008年恐慌是众多有缺陷的私人和公共实践的结果，监管错误只是其中一部分。）
"Reforms must encourage robust competition. Market entry and market exit can be a more effective means of developing a stronger, more resilient financial system. The too-big-to-fail problem could be mitigated if smaller, dynamic firms seized market share from less nimble incumbents." （改革必须鼓励强有力的竞争。市场进入和市场退出可以成为发展更强大、更有韧性的金融体系的更有效手段。如果规模较小、充满活力的公司从不那么灵活的在位者手中夺取市场份额，"大到不能倒"的问题可能会得到缓解。）
2010年3月26日「An Ode to Independence」演讲
"There is no such thing as being a little bit independent or a little bit credible. So, central bankers must be constantly vigilant, especially during times of fiscal expansion." （不存在'有点独立'或'有点可信'这回事。因此，央行家必须时刻保持警惕，尤其是在财政扩张时期。）
"Even if the central bank can does not mean the central bank should." （即使央行能做到，也不意味着央行应该做。）
"The Panic of 2008 is now prologue. The Fed's actions going forward—especially when economic conditions still appear unsatisfactory—should go a long way to demonstrating its allegiance to mission." （2008年恐慌现在只是序幕。美联储今后的行动——特别是在经济状况仍然不尽人意时——应该大力证明其对使命的忠诚。）
"Central bankers are entrusted with a revocable privilege. So, declarations of independence by Fed policymakers are heartening. But independence is ours to demonstrate, not principally to declare." （央行家被赋予的是一种可撤销的特权。因此，美联储政策制定者对独立性的宣言令人鼓舞。但独立性是我们要证明的，而不主要是要宣示的。）
2010年11月 FOMC会议（QE2表决）
失业率接近10%时对Bernanke说：
"If I were in your chair, I would not be leading the Committee in this direction, and frankly, if I were in the chair of most people around this room, I would dissent." （如果我坐在你的椅子上，我不会带领委员会走这个方向；坦率说，如果我坐在这房间大多数人的位置上，我也会投反对票。）
"I think we are removing much of the burden from those that could actually help reach these objectives, particularly the growth and employment objectives, and we are putting that onus strangely on ourselves rather than letting it rest where it should lie." （我认为我们正在把本应由其他人承担的重担揽到自己身上——特别是增长和就业目标——而不是让它落在本该承担的地方。）
"We are too accepting of dangerous policies from others that have been long in the making, and we should put the burden on them." （我们太容易接受其他人长期以来制定的危险政策了，我们应该把负担放到他们身上。）
2010年11月8日「Rejecting the Requiem」演讲（SIFMA年会）
投票支持QE2后一周：
开场定调：
"They call it 'the new normal.' I call it the new malaise." （他们叫它"新常态"。我叫它新低迷。）
"I reject this view. I consider this emerging ethos to be dangerous and defeatist and debunked by America's own exceptional economic history." （我拒绝这种观点。我认为这种新兴的精神风貌是危险的、失败主义的，并且被美国自身非凡的经济历史所驳斥。）
"The dour economic tale being told is not inevitable. Our citizens are not unwitting victims of some unavoidable fate. The current period of subpar growth and high unemployment is real, but it need not persist. We should not lower our expectations. We should improve our policies." （正在被讲述的悲观经济故事并非不可避免。我们的公民不是某种不可避免命运的无辜受害者。当前低于标准的增长和高失业率是真实的，但它不必持续下去。我们不应该降低期望。我们应该改进政策。）
关于短期主义：
"Chronic short-termism in the conduct of economic policy has done much to bring us to this parlous point." （经济政策执行中的慢性短期主义在很大程度上把我们带到了这个危险的境地。）
关于财政刺激：
"These programs may well have boosted gross domestic product (GDP) for a quarter or two, but that is scarcely a full accounting of their effects. These stimulus programs did little, in my view, to put the economy on a stronger, more sustainable trajectory." （这些计划可能确实在一两个季度内提振了GDP，但这几乎不能完全解释它们的效果。在我看来，这些刺激计划几乎没有让经济走上更强劲、更可持续的轨道。）
"Sound fiscal policy must do more than reacquaint consumers with old, bad habits." （健全的财政政策必须做的不仅仅是让消费者重新养成旧的坏习惯。）
关于供给侧：
"If untreated, the cyclical becomes structural. Persistent weakness in the labor markets, in effect, permanently disqualifies more workers from a place in the labor force." （如果不加治疗，周期性就会变成结构性。劳动力市场的持续疲软实际上会永久性地使更多工人失去在劳动力市场中的位置。）
关于美联储角色：
"The Federal Reserve is not a repair shop for broken fiscal, trade, or regulatory policies." （美联储不是修复破碎的财政、贸易或监管政策的修理店。）
"Given what ails us, additional monetary policy measures are, at best, poor substitutes for more powerful pro-growth policies." （鉴于我们的病因，额外的货币政策措施充其量只是更强有力增长政策的拙劣替代品。）
"The Fed can lose its hard-earned credibility—and monetary policy can lose its considerable sway—if its policies overpromise or underdeliver." （如果政策承诺过多或兑现不足，美联储可能失去来之不易的信誉——货币政策也可能失去其相当大的影响力。）
"We should be leery of drawing inapt lessons from the crisis to the current policy conjuncture. Lender-of-last-resort authority cannot readily be converted into fighter-of-first-resort power." （我们应该警惕从危机中得出不恰当的教训……最后贷款人权力不能轻易转化为首要作战者的力量。）
关于QE2风险：
"Expanding the Fed's balance sheet is not a free option. There are significant risks that bear careful monitoring by the FOMC." （扩大美联储资产负债表不是免费的选择。存在重大风险，需要FOMC仔细监控。）
"The Treasury market is special. It plays a unique role in the global financial system. It is a corollary to the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency. The prices assigned to Treasury securities—the risk-free rate—are the foundation from which the price of virtually every asset in the world is calculated." （国债市场是特殊的。它在全球金融体系中扮演着独特角色。它是美元作为世界储备货币角色的推论。国债证券的价格——无风险利率——是计算世界上几乎所有资产价格的基础。）
"As the Fed's balance sheet expands, it becomes more of a price maker than a price taker in the Treasury market." （随着美联储资产负债表的扩张，它在国债市场上越来越像价格制定者，而非价格接受者。）
"The Fed's expanded participation in the long-term Treasury market also runs the more subtle risk of obfuscating price signals about total U.S. indebtedness." （美联储在长期国债市场扩大参与还存在一个更微妙的风险——模糊关于美国总债务的价格信号。）
"Extraordinary measures tend to beget extraordinary countermeasures. Second-order effects can have first-order consequences." （非常措施往往会招致非常对策。二阶效应可能产生一阶后果。）
六、2011年：辞职
2011年2月10日致奥巴马总统辞职信
未给出具体原因，任期原本到2018年1月31日。
Larry Kudlow评价（CNBC）：
"a hard money hawk"（强硬货币鹰派）
七、离开美联储后（2011-2025）
2014年「Warsh Review」（英国央行评审）
核心论点：
透明度不是越多越好。美联储公开FOMC记录后，"自由流畅讨论被事先准备的罐头演讲取代"。
2015年CNBC采访
关于市场定价失真：
"Financial markets and the Treasury market are telling us almost nothing about the state of the economy because central banks are influencing those prices with every word, with every nuanced speech from every reserve bank president." （金融市场和国债市场几乎没有告诉我们任何关于经济状况的信息，因为央行正在用每一个词、每一位地区联储主席的每一篇细微演讲影响着那些价格。）
"We would be better off if markets were setting prices instead of taking their lead from a bunch of government officials seven years into a U.S. economic recovery." （如果让市场来定价，而不是在美国经济复苏七年后仍由一群政府官员来引导，我们会好得多。）
"This strikes me as quite inconsistent with the original ideas of what QE would be." （这在我看来与QE最初设想的样子相当不一致。）
"Interest rates need to be set in financial markets, and interest rates are not set in financial markets when the Federal Reserve and the world's other central banks are the buyers of first and last resort." （利率需要由金融市场来设定，而当美联储和世界其他央行成为第一和最后买家时，利率就不是由金融市场设定的。）
2015年10月26日《华尔街日报》专栏（与Michael Spence合著）
「The Fed Has Hurt Business Investment – QE is Partly to Blame for Record Share Buybacks and Meager Capital Spending」
"We believe that QE has redirected capital from the real domestic economy to financial assets at home and abroad." （我们认为QE已经将资本从国内实体经济转移到国内外的金融资产。）
"In this environment, it is hard to criticize companies that choose 'shareholder friendly' share buybacks over investment in a new factory. But public policy shouldn't bias investments to paper assets over investments in the real economy." （在这种环境下，很难批评那些选择"股东友好型"股票回购而非投资新工厂的公司。但公共政策不应该偏向纸质资产投资而非实体经济投资。）
"Central banks have been quite successful in stoking risk-taking by investors in financial markets. Clearly, market participants believe central bankers use QE, among other reasons, to put a floor under financial asset prices." （央行在刺激金融市场投资者承担风险方面相当成功。显然，市场参与者相信央行使用QE的原因之一是为金融资产价格设置底线。）
"QE reduces volatility in the financial markets, not the real economy. In fact, much like 2007, actual macroeconomic risk may be highest when market measures of volatility are lowest." （QE降低的是金融市场的波动性，而非实体经济的波动性。事实上，就像2007年一样，当市场波动性指标最低时，实际宏观经济风险可能最高。）
2016年8月24日《华尔街日报》专栏
「The Federal Reserve Needs New Thinking – Its Models are Unreliable, its Policies Erratic and its Guidance Confusing. It is also Politically Vulnerable」
"The conduct of monetary policy in recent years has been deeply flawed… A robust reform agenda requires more rigorous review of recent policy choices and significant changes in the Fed's tools, strategies, communications and governance." （近年来货币政策的执行存在严重缺陷……一个强有力的改革议程需要对近期政策选择进行更严格的审查，以及对美联储的工具、策略、沟通和治理进行重大改变。）
"Two major obstacles must be overcome: groupthink within the academic economics guild, and the reluctance of central bankers to cede their new power." （必须克服两个主要障碍：学术经济学行会内部的群体思维，以及央行家不愿放弃其新权力。）
"The Fed often treats financial markets as a beast to be tamed, a cub to be coddled, or a market to be manipulated. It appears in thrall to financial markets, and financial markets are in thrall to the Fed, but only one will get the last word." （美联储常常把金融市场当作一头需要驯服的野兽、一只需要宠溺的幼崽、或一个需要操纵的市场。它似乎被金融市场所奴役，而金融市场也被美联储所奴役，但只有一方会有最后发言权。）
"A simple, troubling fact: From the beginning of 2008 to the present, more than half of the increase in the value of the S&P 500 occurred on the day of Federal Open Market Committee decisions." （一个简单而令人不安的事实：从2008年初到现在，标普500指数价值增长的一半以上发生在联邦公开市场委员会决策当天。）
"The groupthink gathers adherents even as its successes become harder to find. The guild tightens its grip when it should open its mind to new data sources, new analytics, new economic models, new communication strategies, and a new paradigm for policy." （群体思维不断吸引追随者，即使其成功变得越来越难找。行会在应该向新数据源、新分析方法、新经济模型、新沟通策略和新政策范式敞开心扉时却收紧了控制。）
关于职能蔓延：
"Real reform should reverse the trend that makes the Fed a general purpose agency of government. Many guild members believe that central bankers—nonpartisan, high-minded experts—are particularly well-suited to expand their policy remit." （真正的改革应该扭转使美联储成为政府通用机构的趋势。许多行会成员认为，央行家——无党派、高尚的专家——特别适合扩大其政策职权范围。）
2017年《华尔街日报》专栏
建议将通胀目标从2%降至1%-2%区间：
"When the broader trends begin to turn — for example, in labor markets or output — the Fed should take account of the new prevailing signal." （当更广泛的趋势开始转变——例如劳动力市场或产出——美联储应该考虑新的主导信号。）
提出"趋势依赖"（trend dependence）取代"数据依赖"（data dependence）。
2018年与Bernanke同台回顾QE
"My overriding concern about continued QE, then and now, involves the misallocations of capital in the economy and the misallocation of responsibility in our government." （我对持续QE的首要担忧，过去如此现在亦然，涉及经济中的资本错配和政府中的责任错配。）
"Misallocations seldom operate under their own name. They choose other names to hide behind. They tend to linger for years in plain sight. Until they emerge with force at the most inauspicious of times and do unexpected harm to the economy." （错配很少以自己的名义运作。它们选择其他名称来隐藏。它们往往在众目睽睽之下徘徊多年。直到它们在最不吉利的时刻以力量涌现，对经济造成意想不到的伤害。）
关于Volcker的轶事（Warsh多次复述）
被提名美联储理事前拜访Volcker：
"He said, Kevin, there's something I need to tell you. This job you're signing up for, really is quite simple. It really only requires two things." （他说，Kevin，有件事我需要告诉你。你要签约的这份工作，其实很简单。它真的只需要两件事。）
（Warsh说他当时拿出笔和本子准备记下——但从未透露Volcker具体说了什么。）
八、2025年：重返公众视野
2025年4月25日「Central Banking at a Crossroads」演讲（G30/IMF）
完整演讲稿关键段落：
开场：
"I cannot think of a time of greater economic consequence since 1980…some may believe the biggest threat to our economy comes from outsiders who seek to change the status quo…I don't agree…I believe the predominant risk comes from choices made inside the four walls of our most important economic institutions." （我想不到自1980年以来有比现在更具经济重要性的时刻……有些人可能认为我们经济面临的最大威胁来自那些试图改变现状的外部人士……我不同意……我认为主要风险来自我们最重要经济机构四面墙内做出的选择。）
关于机构信任：
"To be trusted, economic institutions must be trustworthy. To be trustworthy, they must prove themselves competent." （要被信任，经济机构必须值得信任。要值得信任，它们必须证明自己有能力。）
"Economic institutions must also maintain epistemic humility—that is, accepting that knowledge, even great knowledge, has its limits." （经济机构还必须保持认识论上的谦卑——也就是说，承认知识，即使是伟大的知识，也有其局限性。）
关于危机时期：
"Nothing about the period was easy. We made good calls and mistakes, both. Inevitably, the hardest question then—and the most salient now—was the Fed's role and responsibility." （那段时期没有任何事情是容易的。我们做出了正确的决定，也犯了错误。不可避免地，当时最难的问题——也是现在最突出的问题——是美联储的角色和责任。）
引用Volcker的警告：
"After one particularly intense weekend that resulted in extraordinary policy support, former Chairman Paul Volcker commented: The Fed had gone 'to the very edge of its lawful and implied power, transcending certain long embedded central banking principles and practices.' We took that as the equivalent of a brushback pitch—high and tight—from a strong institutional ally to his successors." （在一个特别紧张的周末导致非常规政策支持之后，前主席保罗·沃尔克评论说：美联储已经走到了'其合法和隐含权力的最边缘，超越了某些长期嵌入的央行原则和惯例。'我们把这当作相当于一个强有力的制度盟友对其继任者发出的警告球——又高又紧。）
"But Volcker's warning has gone largely unheeded, even to this day." （但沃尔克的警告在很大程度上被忽视了，甚至直到今天。）
核心批评：
"In my view, forays far afield—for all seasons and all reasons—have led to systematic errors in the conduct of macroeconomic policy." （在我看来，各种场合、各种理由的越界远征——导致了宏观经济政策执行中的系统性错误。）
"The Fed has acted more as a general-purpose agency of government than a narrow central bank. Institutional drift has coincided with the Fed's failure to satisfy an essential part of its statutory remit, price stability. It has also contributed to an explosion of federal spending. And the Fed's outsized role and underperformance have weakened the important and worthy case for monetary policy independence." （美联储更像是政府的通用机构，而非狭义的央行。制度漂移与美联储未能满足其法定职责的核心部分——价格稳定——同时发生。它还导致了联邦支出的爆炸式增长。美联储过大的角色和表现不佳削弱了货币政策独立性这一重要而有价值的论点。）
关于"快餐式"政策：
"Frequent changes to the Fed's metrics—including its professed preferred measures of inflation—are beneath the high standing of the central bank." （美联储指标的频繁变化——包括其声称的首选通胀指标——有损央行的崇高地位。）
"I do not find the current Fed policy of 'data dependence' of much real value. We should care little about two numbers to the right of the decimal point in the latest government release. Breathlessly awaiting trailing data from stale national accounts—subject to significant, subsequent revision—is evidence of false precision and analytic complacency." （我认为美联储当前的"数据依赖"政策没有多少实际价值。我们不应该太在意最新政府发布数据小数点后的两位数字。屏息等待陈旧国民账户的滞后数据——这些数据会经历重大的后续修订——是虚假精确和分析自满的证据。）
"Near-term forecasting is another distracting Fed preoccupation. Economists are not immune to the frailties of human nature. Once policymakers reveal their economic forecast, they can become prisoners of their own words." （近期预测是美联储另一个分心的执念。经济学家也无法免于人性的弱点。一旦政策制定者透露他们的经济预测，他们就可能成为自己言语的囚徒。）
"Forward-guidance—a tool rolled out to great fanfare in the financial crisis—has little role to play in normal times. Moving markets with rolling Fed incantations is tempting, but unhelpful." （前瞻性指引——在金融危机中大张旗鼓推出的工具——在正常时期几乎没有作用。用滚动的美联储咒语来撬动市场是诱人的，但没有帮助。）
"The central bank should find new comfort in working without applause and without the audience at the edge of its seats." （央行应该在没有掌声、没有观众屏息以待的情况下工作，并从中找到新的舒适。）
关于财政主导：
"I struggle to absolve the Fed of the nation's fiscal profligacy. Fed leaders encouraged government spending when times were tough, a few years back. But did not call for fiscal discipline at the time of sustained growth and full employment." （我很难免除美联储对国家财政挥霍的责任。几年前，在困难时期，美联储领导人鼓励政府支出。但在持续增长和充分就业时期却没有呼吁财政纪律。）
"The Fed has been the most important buyer of US treasury debt—and other liabilities backed by the US government—since 2008. The Fed's $7 trillion balance sheet is nearly an order of magnitude larger than the day I joined." （自2008年以来，美联储一直是美国国债——以及其他由美国政府支持的债务——最重要的买家。美联储7万亿美元的资产负债表几乎比我加入时大了一个数量级。）
关于QE：
"I strongly supported this crisis-time innovation, then and now. But when the crisis ended, the Fed never retraced its steps." （我强烈支持这种危机时期的创新，过去如此现在亦然。但当危机结束时，美联储从未收回它的脚步。）
"I worried mightily in the summer and fall of 2010—a time of strong growth and financial stability—that the decision to buy more treasury bonds—would involve the Fed in the messy political business of fiscal policy. QE2 was announced. I disagreed with the decision, and resigned from the Fed soon after." （我在2010年夏秋——一个增长强劲、金融稳定的时期——非常担心购买更多国债的决定会让美联储卷入财政政策的混乱政治事务中。QE2宣布了。我不同意这个决定，不久后便辞去了美联储的职务。）
"QE—with some fits and starts in the 2010s—has become a near permanent feature of central bank power and policy. Fiscal policymakers—that is, elected members of Congress—found it considerably easier appropriating money knowing that the government's financing costs would be subsidized by the central bank." （QE——在2010年代有些起起落落——已经成为央行权力和政策几乎永久的特征。财政政策制定者——即国会当选成员——发现，知道政府的融资成本将由央行补贴，拨款变得容易多了。）
关于货币主导vs财政主导：
"Fiscal dominance—where the nation's debts constrain monetary policymakers—was long thought by economists to be a possible end-state. My view is that monetary dominance—where the central bank becomes the ultimate arbiter of fiscal policy—is the clearer and more present danger."
（财政主导——即国家债务约束货币政策制定者——长期以来被经济学家认为是一种可能的最终状态。我的观点是，货币主导——即央行成为财政政策的最终仲裁者——是更清晰、更现实的危险。）
关于"经济印记"理论：
"I proffer a theory of economic imprinting whereby the policy choices of prior periods make the economy more vulnerable to shocks and less able to adjust organically. Each time the Fed jumps into action, the more it expands its size and scope, encroaching further on other macroeconomic domains. More debt is accumulated…more capital is misallocated…more institutional lines are crossed…risks of future shocks are magnified…and the Fed is compelled to act even more aggressively the next time." （我提出一个"经济印记"理论，即先前时期的政策选择使经济更容易受到冲击，更难以有机调整。每次美联储跳入行动，它扩大规模和范围的程度就越大，进一步侵入其他宏观经济领域。更多债务积累……更多资本错配……更多制度界限被跨越……未来冲击的风险被放大……美联储被迫下次采取更激进的行动。）
"Simply stated, path dependency is driving policy. We need to be careful that it's not driving into a ditch." （简单说，路径依赖正在驱动政策。我们需要小心它不会驶入沟里。）
关于气候和多元化：
"'Climate change' and 'inclusion' are politically-charged issues. People of good conscience have their own views and motivations. Elected officials are tasked with evaluating data, synthesizing views, charting policy, and granting authority, if desired, to executive branch agencies. The Fed, however, has neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make political judgments in these areas. The Fed's remit is not a suggestion. Or a jumping off point." （"气候变化"和"多元化"是政治化的议题。有良知的人有自己的观点和动机。当选官员的任务是评估数据、综合观点、制定政策，并在需要时授权行政部门机构。然而，美联储既没有专业知识也没有特权在这些领域做出政治判断。美联储的职权范围不是建议，也不是跳板。）
引用最高法院判例：
"As Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear, Congress is not in the business of hiding elephants in mouseholes." （正如最高法院判例明确指出的，国会不是在老鼠洞里藏大象的行当。）
关于通胀：
"The intellectual errors that contributed to the Great Inflation include some mix of the following: the central bank came to believe that its price stability objective was largely self-executing…that big, black-box DSGE models were anchored in reality…that monetary policy had nothing to do with money…that the central bank was a bystander to forces outside of its control…that the surge of Putin and the pandemic were blameworthy for inflation rather than the surge of government spending and printing." （导致大通胀的智识错误包括以下某种组合：央行开始相信其价格稳定目标在很大程度上是自我执行的……那些大型黑箱DSGE模型植根于现实……货币政策与货币无关……央行是其控制之外力量的旁观者……普京崛起和疫情应为通胀负责，而非政府支出和印钞的激增。）
"Stable prices were the Fed's plot armor. Like in the movies, it was protection for the protagonist against those who would dare a challenge. The Fed's roving remit and grand ambitions, however, expanded its surface area and exposed its vulnerability even more." （稳定的价格是美联储的主角光环。就像电影里一样，它是对敢于挑战者的主角的保护。然而，美联储游移的职权范围和宏大抱负扩大了其暴露面积，使其更加脆弱。）
关于独立性：
"Central bank independence is more often cited than defined. Independence is not a policy goal unto itself. It's a means of achieving certain important and particular policy outcomes." （央行独立性被引用的次数多于被定义的次数。独立性本身不是政策目标。它是实现某些重要和特定政策结果的手段。）
"'Independence' is reflexively declared when any Fed policy is criticized. Congress has granted important functions to the Fed, for example, in bank regulation and supervision. I do not believe the Fed is owed any particular deference in bank regulatory and supervisory policy." （每当美联储政策受到批评时，"独立性"就会被条件反射式地宣称。国会授予了美联储重要职能，例如银行监管。我不认为在银行监管政策方面美联储应该得到任何特别的尊重。）
"I strongly believe in the operational independence of monetary policy as a wise political economy decision. And I believe that Fed independence is chiefly up to the Fed." （我坚信货币政策的操作独立性是一个明智的政治经济决定。我相信美联储的独立性主要取决于美联储自己。）
"That does not mean central bankers should be treated as pampered princes. When the monetary outcomes are poor, the Fed should be subjected to serious questioning, strong oversight, and, when they err, opprobrium." （这并不意味着央行家应该被当作娇生惯养的王子对待。当货币结果不佳时，美联储应该受到严肃质疑、强有力的监督，当他们犯错时，应该受到谴责。）
关于美联储的历史：
"A narrow central bank has more going for it than mere tradition. Our constitutional republic is accepting of an independent central bank, only if it sticks closely to its congressionally directed duty and successfully performs its tasks. Ours is, after all, our third experiment with a central bank…not because of the success of its predecessors, but their failure." （狭义央行的优势不仅仅是传统。我们的宪政共和国接受独立央行，前提是它紧密坚持国会指定的职责并成功执行其任务。毕竟，我们的央行是第三次实验……不是因为其前任的成功，而是因为它们的失败。）
"We should remember that the revealed preference of the body politic is a deep distaste for inflation—and also, for bailouts and power grabs." （我们应该记住，政治体制的显示偏好是对通胀的深深厌恶——同样也是对救助和权力攫取的厌恶。）
核心治理原则：
"The governance objective is clear: it's to make the central bank safe for democracy, not to make democracy safe for the central bank." （治理目标是明确的：是让央行对民主安全，而不是让民主对央行安全。）
结论：
"The Fed's current wounds are largely self-inflicted, and its plot armor is showing its wear. A strategic reset is necessary to mitigate losses of credibility, changes in standing, and most important—worse economic outcomes for our fellow citizens." （美联储当前的伤口在很大程度上是自己造成的，其主角光环正在显示磨损。有必要进行战略重置，以减轻信誉损失、地位变化，以及最重要的——我们同胞更糟糕的经济结果。）
"Central bankers are trained to be careful with our critiques, lest the daylight reveal the magic. A bigger risk, however, is that of the sorcerer's apprentice: the misuse of magical powers producing trouble." （央行家被训练要谨慎对待我们的批评，以免阳光暴露魔术。然而，更大的风险是巫师学徒的风险：滥用魔法力量制造麻烦。）
"We should be unworried about violating pieties, prepared to endure periodic frowns of disapproval. It's high time we reclaim intellectual freedom and get policy back on track." （我们不应该担心违反虔诚，要准备好忍受周期性的不满皱眉。现在是我们收复知识自由、让政策回归正轨的时候了。）
"Central bank legitimacy demands nothing less." （央行的合法性要求如此，不能少于此。）
2025年5月28日 Hoover Institution Uncommon Knowledge采访
"You keep printing a trillion here and a trillion there. It's gonna catch up to you, Peter." （你在这里印一万亿，在那里印一万亿。这会追上你的，Peter。）
"When the Federal Reserve prints trillions, especially in benign times, it changes everything. And it almost is a signal to the rest of Congress we're doing it and so can you." （当美联储印刷数万亿美元，尤其是在良好时期，它会改变一切。它几乎是在向国会其他部门发出信号：我们在这样做，你也可以。）
关于QE1支持但后续反对：
"I supported it, and I supported it with many colleagues under the view of we're gonna put this very dangerous, risky stuff back behind the covered glass until there's another crisis. We really never did that." （我支持它，我和许多同事一起支持它，基于这样的看法：我们要把这些非常危险、有风险的东西放回玻璃罩后面，直到另一场危机到来。我们从未真正这样做。）
"So the story you are going to tell about the subsequent QEs during a period that I would say was reasonably strong growth, reasonably stable financial markets, reasonable periods of stable prices, we start doing it for all seasons and all reasons, and in so doing we raise the bar for when another crisis hits. Because whatever you were doing couldn't possibly be enough." （所以你要讲的关于后续QE的故事——在我认为是相当强劲增长、相当稳定的金融市场、相当稳定价格的时期——我们开始为各种季节、各种理由这样做，这样做我们提高了下次危机来临时的门槛。因为无论你之前做了什么都不可能足够。）
2025年7月13日 Fox News采访
"The Fed has the policy mix exactly wrong—it has a big balance sheet, like we're in the '08 crisis or the 2020 pandemic, and has rates that are too high." （美联储的政策组合完全错误——它有一个大的资产负债表，就像我们处于08年危机或2020年疫情中一样，而利率又太高。）
"It needs to shrink the Fed balance sheet and cut interest rates. In so doing, Main Street can get a much lower cost of credit." （它需要缩减美联储资产负债表并降低利率。这样，普通大街就能获得更低的信贷成本。）
2025年7月17日 CNBC Squawk Box采访
"We need regime change in the conduct of policy. The credibility deficit lies with the incumbents that are at the Fed, in my view." （我们需要在政策执行中进行政权更迭。在我看来，信誉赤字在于美联储的现任者。）
"Their hesitancy to cut rates, I think, is actually quite a mark against them. The specter of the miss they made on inflation, it has stuck with them." （我认为，他们对降息的犹豫实际上是对他们相当不利的标记。他们在通胀上犯下的错误的幽灵一直缠绕着他们。）
"I think regime change at the Fed will happen in due course." （我认为美联储的政权更迭将在适当时候发生。）
关于Treasury-Fed协议：
"We need a new Treasury-Fed accord, like we did in 1951 after another period where we built up our nation's debt and we were stuck with a central bank that was working at cross purposes with the Treasury. That's the state of things now." （我们需要一个新的财政部-美联储协议，就像我们在1951年所做的那样，当时也是在我们积累了国家债务、央行与财政部目标相悖的时期之后。这就是现在的情况。）
"If we have a new accord, then the Fed chair and the Treasury secretary can describe to markets plainly and with deliberation, 'This is our objective for the size of the Fed's balance sheet.'" （如果我们达成新协议，那么美联储主席和财政部长可以清晰而审慎地向市场描述，"这是我们对美联储资产负债表规模的目标。"）
2025年9月 Hoover Conference
"There are many benefits of a smaller balance sheet, including better economic outcomes. We have two policy instruments, imperfect substitutes for each other, working sometimes at cross purposes, sometimes working together. But if the printing press could be quiet, you can have low policy rates." （较小的资产负债表有许多好处，包括更好的经济结果。我们有两种政策工具，彼此不完美的替代品，有时相互矛盾，有时协同工作。但如果印钞机可以安静下来，你就可以有低政策利率。）
2025年11月《华尔街日报》专栏
「The Federal Reserve's Broken Leadership」
"Inflation is a choice, and the Fed's track record under Chairman Jerome Powell is one of unwise choices." （通胀是一种选择，鲍威尔主席领导下的美联储的记录就是不明智选择的记录。）
"Americans would have higher pay and greater purchasing power if the Fed got its act together." （如果美联储振作起来，美国人会有更高的工资和更大的购买力。）
"AI will be a significant disinflationary force, increasing productivity and bolstering American competitiveness. Productivity improvements should drive significant increases in real take-home wages. A 1-percentage-point increase in annual productivity growth would double standards of living within a single generation." （AI将是一个显著的反通胀力量，提高生产率并增强美国竞争力。生产率提高应该推动实际税后工资的显著增长。年生产率增长提高1个百分点将使一代人内的生活水平翻倍。）
"The Fed should abandon the dogma that inflation is caused when the economy grows too much and workers get paid too much." （美联储应该抛弃通胀是由于经济增长过快、工人工资过高造成的教条。）
"The Fed's bloated balance sheet, designed to support the biggest firms in a bygone crisis era, can be reduced significantly. That largesse can be redeployed in the form of lower interest rates to support households and small and medium-size businesses." （美联储臃肿的资产负债表——旨在支持过去危机时代的最大公司——可以大幅缩减。这种慷慨可以以较低利率的形式重新部署，以支持家庭和中小企业。）
"The cost of curiosity is approaching zero, owing to a new age of American innovation. And the rewards for curiosity are surging, thanks in large part to pro-growth policies championed by President Trump." （由于美国创新的新时代，好奇心的成本正在接近零。而好奇心的回报正在飙升，这在很大程度上要归功于特朗普总统倡导的促增长政策。）*
— THE END —
紫京讲谈
财经领域创作者
3367篇原创
热门跟贴