不用，才是核武器的最大作用|俄罗斯|北约|核大国|核威胁|核武库

Club提要：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波于《南华早报》发文，从战略威慑与战场现实的双重视角，分析了俄乌冲突中俄罗斯核威慑的效用边界。作者指出，尽管俄罗斯拥有世界最大核武库并多次进行核威胁，但战术核武器在当前冲突中缺乏军事效率与政治可行性，其使用将引发外交孤立、制裁升级及伙伴关系破裂。乌克兰采取“切香肠”式战术，避免触发俄方核红线，同时借助北约预警体系维持战略稳定。

文章进一步比较了美、苏、中三国的核政策演变，强调中国坚持不首先使用核武器的独特立场。最终认为，核武器在大国战略平衡中仍具有核心价值，但其战场效用与威慑可信度正面临现实挑战。

【文/周波，翻译/北京对话肖予乐】

为何乌克兰对俄罗斯的无人机和导弹袭击未能触发莫斯科方面此前威胁要使用的战术核武器？当俄罗斯屡遭攻击时，人们不禁要问，其拥有全球最大核武库究竟有什么作用？

当前乌克兰战事正处于僵持状态。根据美国战略与国际研究中心7月1日发布的报告，尽管俄罗斯控制了东顿巴斯地区约90%的领土，但其地面推进速度已放缓至每日不足100米。

俄罗斯是否会动用战术核武器以扭转战局？答案可能是否定的。从历史来看，核武器在核国家与非核对手之间的冲突中已在很大程度上被证明无效。尽管拥有核武器，美国与苏联在各自的阿富汗战争中均未能取胜。

核武器唯一一次在实战中的使用——即1945年美国对日本投掷原子弹——亦非例外。当时美国本可通过常规手段迫使日本投降；其声称的减少盟军伤亡这一理由部分系托词，一个未明言的核心目标是向崛起的苏联展示压倒性的军事力量。

尽管乌克兰使用无人机袭击莫斯科、多次攻击克里米亚并对俄罗斯主要炼油厂造成破坏，但俄罗斯迄今未跨越核门槛，这有其充分理由。

若在毗邻俄罗斯西部边界的顿巴斯地区实施战术核爆，产生的放射性沉降物可能飘回俄罗斯本土。此外，鉴于莫斯科方面已声称乌克兰东部四州为其领土，对其视为本国主权领土的区域进行轰炸显然不合逻辑。

此外，战场态势本身也削弱了战术核武器的实用性。当前战斗分布广泛，高价值军事目标极少集中，这使得战术核武器在军事上效率低下且性价比极差。

南华早报网页截图

核武器，即便是战术核武器，终究是核武器。任何此类使用都将立即招致西方全面制裁与封锁，迫使多数迄今保持中立的“全球南方”国家降级与俄关系，并严重损害俄罗斯与中国、印度和巴西等关键伙伴的关系——这些国家均反对使用核武器。

乌克兰采取了一种审慎的“切香肠”策略：对俄军持续施压，同时避免触发俄方核反应的“红线”。其目标并非不计后果地直接进攻以收复克里米亚，这个旅游业与经济基础已遭受持久性损害的半岛。

乌克兰总统泽连斯基的核心目标是迫使俄罗斯总统普京回到谈判桌前，这一信息已在其上月致普京的公开信中明确传达。此外，北约负责维护所有早期预警系统，使得该跨大西洋军事联盟能够探测到俄罗斯即将进行核部署的任何迹象。

这场冲突将以大规模导弹和无人机攻击的僵持消耗战形式持续下去。目前双方都已具备无限期大规模生产此类武器的能力。即便俄乌伤亡比能达到五或六比一，俄罗斯仍可依托其1.43亿人口（对比乌克兰的4000万），并拥有大规模动员的选项。

战斗至最后一名乌克兰人的可怕前景，正是基辅方面推动停火的原因。然而，这也恰恰是莫斯科拒绝此类呼吁的缘由。

通常，核武器国家也拥有强大的常规军事力量。然而，俄罗斯的常规军队正在与一支获得西方全面、持续支持的乌克兰军队作战。这并非其在战争初期所预想的情形。不过，俄罗斯的核武器确实实现了一个关键目的：威慑北约直接干预。鉴于战争远未结束，俄罗斯不得不继续其核威胁言论。

7月12日，在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰期间，年轻人走过基辅一个地区的“英雄巷”。法新社

俄罗斯的核武库并非为战场主导而设计，而是与所有其他主要核大国一样，服务于战略威慑和维护大国间力量平衡这一核心职能。在冷战巅峰时期，美苏两国共积聚了超过7万枚核弹头，其驱动力是相互之间对战略劣势的恐惧。随后的军备控制条约削减了库存，但战略平衡依然存在。

常规军事力量与核力量之间存在着明确的关联。1982年，当苏联对北约拥有压倒性常规军事优势时，它承诺实行不首先使用核武器政策。相反，北约因担心苏联在欧洲平原上的大规模坦克集群，则保留了首先发动核打击的权利。苏联解体及俄罗斯常规军事能力急剧下降后，莫斯科于1993年放弃了其不首先使用核武器的承诺。

中国是唯一的例外。中国在常规军事能力有限的背景下发展核武器，主要目的是抵御反复的核胁迫：美国总统杜鲁门和艾森豪威尔在朝鲜战争及随后的台海危机期间曾公开威胁对中国进行核打击。六十多年来，中国始终坚持无条件不首先使用核武器政策，并承诺不对无核国家使用核武器——这是所有核大国中最为一贯的立场。

俄乌冲突是一场笼罩在持续核风险阴影下的常规冲突。它可能演变为又一场“永久战争”，因为持久、全面的解决方案依然难以达成，正式停火亦遥遥无期。

这一结果令人痛心，但并不意外。真正的全球和平实为罕见状态。尽管人类发展和物质文明不断进步，但一个无核武器的世界在短期内仍不会到来。不过，核武器的实际价值趋于降低，这至少令人略感宽慰。

Club Briefing: Zhou Bo, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, writes in the South China Morning Post and examines the limits of Russia’s nuclear deterrence in the Russia-Ukraine conflict from both strategic and operational perspectives. It argues that, despite possessing the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and issuing repeated nuclear threats, Russia finds tactical nuclear weapons militarily inefficient and politically counterproductive in the current conflict. Their use would provoke sweeping sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and damage key partnerships. Ukraine has adopted a calibrated salami-slicing approach to avoid crossing Moscow’s red line, while NATO’s early warning systems help maintain strategic stability. The article also compares the nuclear postures of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, highlighting China’s consistent no-first-use policy. It concludes that while nuclear weapons remain central to great-power strategic balance, their battlefield utility and deterrent credibility are increasingly being called into question.

Why haven’t Ukraine’s drone and missile attacks on Russia triggered Moscow’s use of tactical nuclear weapons, as it has threatened? When Russia is attacked time and again, one wonders what purpose it serves to have the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.

The Ukraine war is at a stalemate. Though roughly 90 per cent of the territory in East Donbas is under Russian control, its ground advances have slowed to less than 100 metres a day, according to a July 1 report by the Centre for Strategic International Studies.

Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons as a game-changer? The answer is probably no. Historically, nuclear weapons have proven largely ineffective in conflicts between a nuclear power and a non-nuclear adversary. Despite having a nuclear arsenal, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union prevailed in their wars in Afghanistan.

The only wartime use of nuclear weapons, by the US against Japan in 1945, is no exception. The US could have secured Japan’s surrender through conventional means; the stated justification of reducing Allied casualties was partly a pretext – a core unstated objective was to signal overwhelming military strength to the rising Soviet Union.

Despite Ukraine’s drone strikes targeting Moscow, repeated attacks across Crimea and damage to major Russian refineries, Russia has so far refrained from crossing the nuclear threshold, and for good reason.

A tactical nuclear detonation in Donbas, which lies on Russia’s western border, would create radioactive fallout that risks drifting back into Russian territory. Also, given that Moscow claims the four eastern Ukrainian oblasts as Russian territory, it makes no sense for it to bomb what it considers sovereign soil.

Moreover, the battlefield itself undermines the utility of tactical nuclear weapons. Fighting is widely dispersed with few concentrated high-value military targets, rendering tactical nukes militarily inefficient and poor value for money.

A nuclear weapon, even a tactical one, remains a nuclear weapon. Any such use would immediately invite sweeping Western sanctions and blockades, force most of the Global South countries that have so far been neutral to downgrade ties with Russia, and severely damage Moscow’s key partnerships with China, India and Brazil – all of which oppose the use of nuclear weapons.

Ukraine has adopted a calibrated, salami-slicing strategy: inflicting sustained pressure on Russian forces while avoiding crossing the red line that would prompt a nuclear response. Its goal is not a reckless direct assault to retake Crimea; the peninsula’s tourism and economic foundations have already suffered lasting damage.

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky’s core objective is to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate, a message clearly conveyed in his open letter to Putin last month. Besides, Nato helps maintain all early warning systems so the transatlantic military alliance can detect any signs of imminent Russian nuclear deployment.

The conflict will continue as a grinding stalemate with mass missile and drone attacks. Both sides are now able to produce these weapons at scale indefinitely. Even with an estimated Russian-Ukrainian casualty ratio of five or six to one, Russia can draw on a population of 143 million – compared with Ukraine’s 40 million – and has the option of large-scale mobilization.

The horrendous prospect of fighting to the last Ukrainian explains Kyiv’s push for a ceasefire. Yet this is precisely why Moscow has rejected such calls.

Normally, a nuclear weapon state also has a strong conventional military force. Yet Russia’s conventional military is fighting a Ukrainian army backed by whole and sustained Western support. This is not something it had envisioned at the beginning of the war. Russia’s nuclear weapons have, however, achieved one critical purpose: deterring direct Nato intervention. With the war far from over, Russia has to continue its nuclear sabre-rattling.

Its nuclear arsenal was not designed for battlefield dominance but, as with all other major nuclear powers, for the core function of strategic deterrence and preserving the balance between great powers. At the peak of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union amassed more than 70,000 nuclear warheads in total, driven by a mutual fear of strategic disadvantage. Subsequent arms control treaties reduced the stockpiles but a strategic equilibrium remains.

There is a clear correlation between conventional military and nuclear strength. In 1982, when the Soviet Union had an overwhelming conventional military superiority over Nato, it pledged a no-first-use nuclear policy. Conversely, Nato, fearing Soviet mass tank formations on European plains, reserved the right to initiate nuclear strikes. After the Soviet collapse and a steep decline of Russian conventional capabilities, Moscow abandoned its no-first-use commitment in 1993.

China stands as the only exception. It developed nuclear weapons amid limited conventional military capacity, primarily to resist repeated nuclear coercion: US presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower publicly threatened nuclear strikes against China during the Korean war and subsequent cross-strait crises.

For more than six decades, China has maintained an unconditional no-first-use policy and pledged never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states – the most consistent posture of all the nuclear powers.

The Ukraine war is a conventional conflict shadowed by a persistent nuclear risk. It could become another “forever war” in that a lasting, comprehensive settlement remains elusive, and a formal ceasefire is nowhere in sight.

This outcome is tragic but not surprising. True global peace is a rare condition. For all of human development and material progress, a nuclear-weapon-free world will not arrive any time soon. Still, there is at least some reassurance that nuclear weapons are losing their perceived value.