[外转内]美国的立法混乱如何削弱其民主机制

兔主席/tuzhuxi 20250709

（按：此文发在外网的英文版的中文翻译（后附英文）。英文表达根据美国的政治环境做了调整。中文反映英文文风。初始原文为作者7月8日《美国的立法闹剧，以及美国制度的问题》）

2025年7月4日，美国人庆祝独立日时，特朗普总统签署了一项他称为“大而美法案”（One Big Beautiful Bill，简称OBBB的法律。这项内容庞杂的立法，集中体现了困扰美国治理的许多系统性问题。该法案在国会两院都以最微弱的优势通过，这清楚地揭示了美国的立法机制如何从一个审议机构，演变成了党派斗争和利益集团交易的载体。

OBBB正式编号为H.R.1，它在众议院仅以四票之差（218票对214票）获得通过。在参议院，该法案也是勉强过关，依赖副总统JD·万斯(J.D. Vance)投下打破平局的一票。这份近1,000页的综合性法案包罗万象，从减税、边境安全措施，到削减医疗补助和能源政策——批评者认为，这个立法大杂烩集中体现了当代美国立法的一切问题。

1. 功能失调的剖析

法案的结构本身就暴露了其众多制度弊病中的首要问题。OBBB并不代表一个连贯的政策愿景，它更像是立法学者所说的“圣诞树法案”——一个让各种利益集团和政治派系挂上他们偏好项目的框架。其结果是产生了一份缺乏哲学一致性的文件，它既包含主要惠及富人的供给侧减税，也包含吸引特朗普工薪阶层基本盘的民粹姿态（如小费免税）。

这种意识形态上的不一致反映了一个更深层的问题：缺乏政治学家所称的“规划性治理”（programmatic governance）。与议会制国家中执政党通常提出全面施政纲领不同，美国的立法越来越产生于自下而上的利益聚合过程，而非自上而下的政策设计。OBBB包含的条款范围广泛，从增加国防开支到削减医疗补助，从化石燃料补贴，到一项奇特的、专为阿拉斯加原住民捕鲸船长提供的5万美元税收减免——后者纯粹是为了争取阿拉斯加州参议员的支持票。

2. 党派逻辑的胜利

OBBB的通过说明了美国政治如何演变成了学者们所说的“负面党派性”（negative partisanship）——一个反对对方比推进自身议程更加重要的体系。该法案几乎没有获得任何民主党人的支持，并非因为民主党人必然反对其所有条款，而是因为在他们的党内，支持任何共和党的倡议在政治上已变得有害。反过来，对某些具体条款可能有保留意见的共和党人，也感到不得不支持整个法案包，以避免特朗普的怒火并维护党内团结。

这种动态已将国会从一个政策酝酿与协商机构，转变成了类似议会制的模式，但又缺少使议会制有效运作的问责机制。在威斯敏斯特式的西方民主国家，执政党面临定期的信任投票，如果失去立法支持就会被赶下台。相比之下，美国的立法者则不会因为治理不善而面临这种直接后果，这在政治决策中制造了经济学家所说的“道德风险”问题。

该法案依赖“预算协调”程序——在参议院只需简单多数（51票）即可通过，而非通常的60票门槛——进一步说明了该系统的功能失调。虽然预算协调最初是为减少赤字设计的，但它已成为规避参议院审议传统的工具。这就产生了一个矛盾：50%的门槛太低，无法确保广泛的合法性；而60%的门槛在激烈两极分化的时代又太高，以至于无法实现有效治理。

3. 代议制的幻象

也许最令人不安的是OBBB的复杂性如何破坏了民主问责制。这份近1,000页的立法，不仅普通公民无法理解，许多在极短时间内就投票的立法者也难以理解。这体现了政治理论家所称的“民主赤字”——现代治理的复杂性与公民理解和评估其代表决策能力之间的巨大鸿沟。

该法案的支持者辩称，这种复杂性在现代经济中不可避免，但这忽略了一个关键点：复杂性可以是一种刻意策略，用以逃避审查。通过将不同的政策捆绑在一起，立法者可以因受欢迎的条款而邀功，同时为不受欢迎的条款推卸责任。一位代表可能真心支持法案中的基础设施支出，却反对其削减医疗补助，但选民将难以辨别这种细微差别。

这种复杂性也催生了可称为“制度化买票”（institutionalised vote-buying）的行为。OBBB包含了许多服务狭隘、特定群体的条款——从特定农作物的农业补贴到特定行业的税收减免。虽然这类针对性的好处常被辩称为必要的妥协，但它们代表了一种合法的腐败形式，将组织化利益置于更广泛的公共利益之上。

共和党众议员托马斯·马西（Thomas Massie）的案例说明了这种动态。他最初反对该法案，但在特朗普承诺停止公开攻击他之后，最终同意不再阻挠法案通过——这笔交易与法案本身的优劣毫无关系。这种个人交易将治理从政策审议过程，转变成了个人政治生存的交易市场。

4. 问责真空

OBBB的结构制造了学者们所称的“责任分散”（diffusion of responsibility）——一种没有任何单一行为者需要为该立法后果负责的局面。个别立法者可以声称他们只支持某些条款而否认其他条款。特朗普可以因受欢迎的结果而居功，却把不受欢迎的结果归咎于国会。国会领袖们可以拿总统施压作为他们投票的理由。

考虑到法案的财政影响，这种问责真空尤其成问题。国会预算办公室估计，OBBB将在未来十年增加3.4万亿美元的联邦赤字——这个数字会让传统的财政保守派感到震惊。然而，曾自诩为赤字鹰派的共和党立法者现在却支持该措施，这表明党派忠诚早已凌驾于意识形态一致性之上。

该法案的“日落条款”——即条款将在2029年自动失效——进一步体现了短期思维。这些条款的存在并非出于政策原因，而是为了符合参议院的预算规则，制造了一种制度，立法者只需考虑即时的政治利益，而无需考虑长期后果。这严重背离了有效治理所需的那种代际思考。

5. 对立法酝酿与协商（deliberation）的侵蚀

传统的民主理论认为立法辩论具有认知功能——思想碰撞有助于识别最优政策。OBBB的通过表明这个假设不再成立。该法案在5月提出，几周内就获得通过，没有留下足够时间进行有意义的分析或辩论。这种仓促的时间表并非偶然，而是策略性的，旨在阻止可能破坏法案的合理讨论与协商。

这种策略反映了政治学家所说的立法领袖的“议程设定”权力。通过控制辩论的时间和框架，领袖们可以操纵结果，无论其提案的内在价值如何。OBBB的支持者明确承认了这种策略，特朗普要求共和党立法者充当“橡皮图章”，而非独立的参与者、讨论者、审议者。

6. 马斯克的反抗及其影响

对OBBB矛盾最戏剧性的说明来自埃隆·马斯克。他曾向特朗普竞选捐款3亿美元，是共和党最大的金主，结果却成了该法案最著名的批评者。马斯克的反对部分源于财政担忧——他领导的“政府效率部”（DOGE）本计划减少2万亿美元的联邦开支，最终结果只有（可疑的）1,900亿美元。但这些努力被OBBB的赤字支出完全抵消——不只是数字上的碾压，而是政治、政策上的碾压。他的批评提出了深刻的质疑：美国治理是否已经从根本上功能失调。

马斯克宣布组建新的政党“美国党”，这不仅出于个人怨气；它反映了精英阶层对美国两党垄断日益增长的幻灭感。然而，他提出的解决方案——在现有体系内创建第三党——表明他未能解决导致OBBB产生的根本性结构问题——美国的体制问题。在相同制度约束下运作的新政党，基本不可能产生根本不同的结果。

7. 比较治理：来自国外的经验

OBBB混乱的通过过程，与其他地方的治理模式形成鲜明对比，尤其是在东亚。中国处理重大立法的方式成为“全过程民主”，其包含广泛的调查研究、征求意见、协商、试点项目、渐进实施——这一过程优先考虑政策有效性，而非政治表演。西方批评者往往会指出这类体系中的“民主赤字”问题，但他们看不到的是，这样的过程，往往能产生比美国日益失调的民主更加连贯、更可持续，同时也更加反映共识、契合公共利益的政策。

这种比较并非要在各地推行这种文化历史体系，而是要凸显美国的制度设计如何变得不适应当代治理挑战，即使在其自身环境下也是如此。美国开国元勋设计的制衡体系是为政府角色有限、党派分歧不那么激烈的更简单时代设计的。当今复杂、互联的世界需要比18世纪制度所能提供的更复杂的协调机制。

8. 恶性循环

也许最令美国人担忧的是，OBBB的通过会延续其自身所体现的问题。通过证明微弱多数能够在一个分裂的国家强行推行重大变革，该立法将在政治控制权易手时招致报复。民主党人目睹了共和党人利用预算协调程序通过不受欢迎的措施，当他们重新掌权时很可能会以牙还牙，变本加厉的报复。

这制造了博弈论者所称的“竞相堕落”（race to the bottom）——各方对另一方行为的理性反应会让所有人情况更糟。其结果是由交替的极端进行治理，而非可持续的共识构建，各党的胜利最终都是得不偿失的，因为它们只会加剧两极分化和制度衰败。

9. 美国例外主义的神话

OBBB事件揭示了美国政治实践与民主理论相去甚远。该立法的支持者援引民主合法性——毕竟共和党赢得了选举，有权执政。但这混淆了程序民主（遵循选举规则）与实质民主（以反映真正民意并促进长期福祉的方式治理）之间的区别。

美国政治文化不愿进行制度性的自我批评，更是加剧了这些问题。虽然其他西方民主国家也会辩论宪法改革和制度创新，但美国人却将他们18世纪的框架视为神圣的文本。这种宪法原教旨主义严重阻碍了现代挑战所需的那种适应性治理。

美国人对其他国家态度的对比是惊人的。美国人乐于诊断国外的制度失败，却对国内的类似问题视而不见。这种选择性视角即心理学家所称的“动机性推理”（motivated reasoning，让我们继续引用学者概念）——倾向于以证实既有信念而非挑战它们的方式来评估证据。

10. 展望未来：改革还是衰败？

OBBB的通过引发了关于美国民主未来的根本性问题。一个为两百多年前的前工业社会设计的体系，究竟能不能治理21世纪的超级大国吗？建立在妥协基础上的制度，在一个存在根本性党派冲突的时代还能运作吗？当代表优先考虑党派忠诚而非选民福祉时，代议制民主还能生存吗？

随着美国面临日益严峻的挑战——从气候变化和技术颠覆，到地缘政治竞争和人口结构转型——这些问题变得更加紧迫。OBBB那种在危机间摇摆、由短期政治算计驱动的临时解决方案，似乎完全不适合解决如此复杂、长期的问题。

一些观察家，尤其是政治右翼，认为美国需要更威权的治理（譬如皇权）来打破民主僵局。这种诊断对僵局的认识可能是对的，但处方也是危险的。历史表明，民主崩溃很少产生有效治理。

11. 结论：功能失调的代价

“大而美法案”没有宏大的愿景，只代表了政治权宜之计针对政策连贯性及长期主义的胜利，党派利益对国家利益的胜利，以及短期思维对长远规划的胜利。它的通过表明，美国备受推崇的制衡体系已退化为一种逃避问责而非确保善治的机制。

该法案的最终影响，部分取决于立法者无法控制的经济和政治发展。如果它伴随着强劲的经济增长，其支持者将宣称自己正确。如果它导致了财政危机或社会动荡，批评者会说他们早就警告过这种结果。但无论这些偶然情况如何，OBBB被签署为法律已经损害了美国民主，因为它进一步削弱了公众对制度的信任，并加深了党派分裂。

悲剧不在于美国民主不完美——所有政治制度都有缺陷。悲剧在于美国人已经丧失了制度性自我反思和改革的能力，而这种能力曾使他们的体系具有适应性和韧性。除非这种能力得以恢复，否则像OBBB这样的事件可能会变得更加常见，每一次都将进一步削弱民主治理的基础。

开国元勋们设计的美国制度，是为了服务一个由公民代表组成的共和国，这些代表应本着善意审议公共利益。OBBB的通过表明，那个共和国已不复存在，取而代之的是某种保留了民主形式却抛弃了其实质的东西。美国人能否重建他们失去的东西——甚至是否会认识到需要尝试——仍然是一个悬而未决的问题，其影响远超美国国界。

（全文结束）

英文版

How America’s Legislative Chaos Undermines Its Democracy

The "Big and Beautiful Bill" exposes systemic flaws in U.S. governance.

Chairman Rabbit/tuzhuxi July 8, 2025

On July 4th, 2025, as Americans celebrated Independence Day, President Donald Trump signed into law what he called the “One Big Beautiful Bill” (OBBB), a sprawling piece of legislation that encapsulates many of the systemic problems plaguing American governance. The bill’s passage—by the narrowest of margins in both chambers of Congress—offers a revealing case study in how America’s legislative machinery has evolved from a deliberative body into a vehicle for partisan warfare and interest-group bargaining.

The OBBB, formally designated as H.R.1, passed the House of Representatives by just four votes (218-214) and squeaked through the Senate only after Vice President J.D. Vance cast the tie-breaking vote. This near-1,000-page omnibus package encompasses everything from tax cuts and border security measures to healthcare reductions and energy policy—a legislative grab bag that critics argue exemplifies everything wrong with contemporary American lawmaking.

1. The Anatomy of Dysfunction

The bill’s very structure reveals the first of many institutional pathologies. Rather than representing a coherent policy vision, the OBBB functions as what legislative scholars might call a “Christmas tree bill”—a framework onto which various interest groups and political factions have hung their preferred ornaments. The result is a document that lacks philosophical coherence, combining supply-side tax cuts that primarily benefit the wealthy with populist gestures like tip tax exemptions that appeal to Trump’s working-class base.

This ideological incoherence reflects a deeper problem: the absence of what political scientists call “programmatic governance.” Unlike parliamentary systems where governing parties typically present comprehensive manifestos, American legislation increasingly emerges from a bottom-up process of interest aggregation rather than top-down policy design. The OBBB contains provisions ranging from defence spending increases to Medicaid cuts, from fossil fuel subsidies to a peculiar $50,000 tax break for Alaskan indigenous whaling captains—the latter included solely to secure the vote of Alaska’s senator.

2. The Triumph of Partisan Logic

The OBBB’s passage illustrates how American politics has evolved into what scholars term “negative partisanship”—a system where opposing the other side matters more than advancing one’s own agenda. The bill garnered virtually no Democratic support, not because Democrats necessarily oppose all its provisions, but because supporting any Republican initiative has become politically toxic within their party. Conversely, Republicans who might have reservations about specific elements felt compelled to support the package to avoid Trump’s wrath and maintain party unity.

This dynamic has transformed Congress from a deliberative body into what resembles a parliamentary system without the accountability mechanisms that make such systems functional. In Westminster-style democracies, governing parties face regular confidence votes and can be removed if they lose legislative support. American legislators, by contrast, face no such immediate consequences for poor governance, creating what economists call a “moral hazard” problem in political decision-making.

The bill’s reliance on budget reconciliation procedures—which require only a simple majority in the Senate rather than the usual 60-vote threshold—further illustrates the system’s dysfunction. While reconciliation was originally designed for deficit reduction, it has become a tool for circumventing the Senate’s deliberative traditions. This creates a paradox: the 50% threshold is too low to ensure broad legitimacy, while the 60% threshold has become too high to enable governance in an era of intense polarisation.

3. The Illusion of Representation

Perhaps most troubling is how the OBBB’s complexity undermines democratic accountability. At nearly 1,000 pages, the legislation is incomprehensible not only to ordinary citizens but to many of the legislators who voted on it in an incredibly short time frame. This represents what political theorists call the “democratic deficit”—the gap between the complexity of modern governance and citizens’ capacity to understand and evaluate their representatives’ decisions.

The bill’s supporters argue that such complexity is inevitable in a modern economy, but this misses a crucial point: complexity can be a deliberate strategy to avoid scrutiny. By bundling disparate policies together, legislators can claim credit for popular provisions while deflecting responsibility for unpopular ones. A representative might genuinely support the bill’s infrastructure spending while opposing its healthcare cuts, but voters will struggle to parse such nuances.

This complexity also enables what might be termed “institutionalised vote-buying.” The OBBB contains numerous provisions that serve narrow constituencies—from agricultural subsidies for specific crops to tax breaks for particular industries. While such targeted benefits are often defended as necessary compromises, they represent a form of legal corruption that prioritises organised interests over broader public welfare.

The case of Representative Thomas Massie illustrates this dynamic. Initially opposed to the bill, Massie ultimately agreed not to block its passage after Trump promised to cease public attacks on him—a transaction that had nothing to do with the legislation’s merits. Such personal deal-making transforms governance from a process of policy deliberation into a marketplace for individual political survival.

4. The Accountability Vacuum

The OBBB’s structure creates what scholars call “diffusion of responsibility”—a situation where no single actor can be held accountable for the legislation’s consequences. Individual legislators can claim they supported only certain provisions while disavowing others. Trump can take credit for popular outcomes while blaming Congress for unpopular ones. Congressional leaders can point to presidential pressure as justification for their votes.

This accountability vacuum is particularly problematic given the bill’s fiscal implications. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the OBBB will add $3.4 trillion to the federal deficit over the next decade—a figure that would have horrified traditional fiscal conservatives. Yet Republican legislators who once positioned themselves as deficit hawks now support the measure, illustrating how partisan loyalty has superseded ideological consistency.

The bill’s “sunset clauses”—provisions that automatically expire in 2029—further exemplify short-term thinking. These clauses exist not for policy reasons but to comply with Senate budget rules, creating a system where legislators need only consider immediate political benefits rather than long-term consequences. This represents a fundamental departure from the kind of inter-generational thinking that effective governance requires.

5. The Erosion of Deliberation

Traditional democratic theory assumes that legislative debate serves an epistemic function—that the clash of ideas helps identify optimal policies. The OBBB’s passage suggests this assumption no longer holds. The bill was introduced in May and passed within weeks, leaving insufficient time for meaningful analysis or debate. This rushed timeline was not accidental but strategic, designed to prevent the kind of scrutiny that might have derailed the legislation.

Such tactics reflect what political scientists call the “agenda-setting” power of legislative leaders. By controlling the timing and framing of debates, leaders can manipulate outcomes regardless of the underlying merits of their proposals. The OBBB’s supporters explicitly acknowledged this strategy, with Trump demanding that Republican legislators act as “rubber stamps” rather than independent deliberators.

6. The Musk Rebellion and Its Implications

The most dramatic illustration of the OBBB’s contradictions came from Elon Musk, who had donated $300 million to Trump’s campaign but emerged as the bill’s most prominent critic. Musk’s opposition stemmed partly from fiscal concerns—his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) had aimed to reduce federal spending by $2 trillion, only to see those efforts negated by the OBBB’s deficit spending. But his critique went deeper, questioning whether American governance had become fundamentally dysfunctional.

Musk’s announcement that he would form a new political party represents more than personal pique; it reflects growing elite disillusionment with America’s two-party duopoly. Yet his proposed solution—creating a third party within the existing system—suggests a failure to grapple with the structural problems that produced the OBBB in the first place. New parties operating under the same institutional constraints are unlikely to produce fundamentally different outcomes.

7. Comparative Governance: Lessons from Abroad

The OBBB’s chaotic passage stands in stark contrast to governance models elsewhere, particularly in East Asia. China’s approach to major legislation involves extensive consultation, pilot programmes, and gradual implementation—a process that prioritises policy effectiveness over political theatre. While Western critics may point to “democratic deficits” in such systems, they often deliver more coherent and sustainable policies and reflect public consensus and long term interests as compared with America’s increasingly dysfunctional democracy.

This comparison is not meant to propose this cultural-historical system eveywhere, but to highlight how America’s institutional design has become poorly suited to contemporary governance challenges, even under its own circumstances. The Founders’ system of checks and balances was designed for a simpler era when government’s role was limited and partisan divisions less intense. Today’s complex, interconnected world requires more sophisticated coordination mechanisms than 18th-century institutions can provide.

8. The Vicious Cycle

Perhaps most concerning is how the OBBB’s passage perpetuates the very problems it exemplifies. By demonstrating that narrow majorities can impose sweeping changes on a divided nation, the legislation invites retaliation when political control shifts. Democrats, having watched Republicans use reconciliation to pass unpopular measures, will likely respond in kind when they regain power.

This creates what game theorists call a “race to the bottom”—a dynamic where each side’s rational response to the other’s behaviour makes everyone worse off. The result is governance by alternating extremes rather than sustainable consensus-building, with each party’s victories proving pyrrhic as they fuel greater polarisation and institutional decay.

9. The Myth of American Exceptionalism

The OBBB saga reveals how far American political practice has diverged from democratic theory. The legislation’s supporters invoke democratic legitimacy—after all, Republicans won elections and have the right to govern. But this misses the distinction between procedural democracy (following electoral rules) and substantive democracy (governing in ways that reflect genuine popular will and promote long-term welfare).

American political culture’s reluctance to engage in institutional self-criticism compounds these problems. While other democracies regularly debate constitutional reform and institutional innovation, Americans treat their 18th-century framework as sacred text. This constitutional fundamentalism prevents the kind of adaptive governance that modern challenges require.

The contrast with American attitudes toward other countries is striking. Americans readily diagnose institutional failures abroad while remaining blind to similar problems at home. This selective vision reflects what psychologists call “motivated reasoning”—the tendency to evaluate evidence in ways that confirm pre-existing beliefs rather than challenge them.

10. Looking Forward: Reform or Decay?

The OBBB’s passage raises fundamental questions about American democracy’s future. Can a system designed for a pre-industrial society govern a 21st-century superpower? Can institutions built on compromise function in an era of existential partisan conflict? Can representative democracy survive when representatives prioritise party loyalty over constituent welfare?

These questions become more urgent as America faces mounting challenges—from climate change and technological disruption to geopolitical competition and demographic transformation. The OBBB’s approach—lurching from crisis to crisis with ad hoc solutions driven by short-term political calculations—seems poorly suited to address such complex, long-term problems.

Some observers, particularly on the political right, argue that America needs more authoritarian governance to break through democratic gridlock. This diagnosis may be correct about the gridlock, but the prescription is dangerous. History suggests that democratic breakdown rarely produces effective governance; more often, it leads to corruption, incompetence, and eventual collapse. Weimar Germany in the 1930s gave the world Adolf Hitler. Let America not repeat the same tragic mistake, lest grave consequences from democratic collapse emerge once more beneath its foundations.

11. Conclusion: The Price of Dysfunction

The “One Big Beautiful Bill” is neither big in vision nor beautiful in execution. It represents instead the triumph of political expedience over policy coherence and long-termism, of partisan advantage over national interest, of short-term thinking over long-term planning. Its passage demonstrates how America’s vaunted system of checks and balances has devolved into a mechanism for avoiding accountability rather than ensuring good governance.

The bill’s ultimate impact will depend partly on economic and political developments beyond legislators’ control. If it coincides with strong economic growth, its supporters will claim vindication. If it contributes to fiscal crisis or social unrest, its critics will say they warned of such outcomes. But regardless of these contingencies, the OBBB’s passage has already inflicted damage on American democracy by further eroding public trust in institutions and deepening partisan divisions.

The tragedy is not that American democracy is imperfect—all political systems have flaws. The tragedy is that Americans have lost the capacity for institutional self-reflection and reform that once made their system adaptive and resilient. Until that capacity is restored, episodes like the OBBB will likely become more common, each one further weakening the foundations of democratic governance.

The founders designed American institutions for a republic of citizen-legislators who would deliberate in good faith about the common good. The OBBB’s passage suggests that republic no longer exists, replaced by something that retains democracy’s forms while abandoning its substance. Whether Americans can rebuild what they have lost—or will even recognise the need to try—remains an open question with implications far beyond America’s borders.

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