CGTN｜徐伟钧：伊朗战事，特朗普或将单方面宣布“胜利”|iran|中东地区|以色列|伊朗|唐纳德·特朗普|外汇交易所|徐伟钧|美军

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导语：3月7日，美国和以色列对伊朗的军事打击进入第八天。美国总统特朗普3月6日在社交媒体发文称，他已与美国大型军工企业召开会议，讨论武器生产计划与排期。参会企业同意将“精良级”武器产量翻两番，并以最快速度达到最高产能。同日，伊朗外长阿拉格齐则表示，美军“速战速决计划已失败”。伊朗方面还称，将在未来几天动用“先进且鲜少使用的远程导弹”。种种迹象显示，伊朗战事正逐渐演变为持久战。

3月6日，CGTN刊登IPP副研究员徐伟钧的文章。文章指出，本轮冲突的演进取决于美伊双方弹药库存与产能博弈，若伊朗持续用低成本武器消耗美军拦截弹库存，将迫使美军按威胁等级拦截、收缩防护范围甚至放弃非核心目标。他指出，美国摧毁伊朗核能力、推动政权更迭、提振选情等战略目标均难以通过远程打击实现，维持长期战争的高额代价可能会重塑特朗普政府的对伊打击意愿，推动其转向以"叙事层面的胜利"终止本轮军事行动。

徐伟钧博士

华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）副研究员

自2月28日美国和以色列对伊朗发动高强度军事打击以来，本轮冲突中决定战场态势的关键变量，已逐渐由单轮打击的战术命中精度与毁伤效果，转变为美国在长期高强度对抗中能否承受精确打击弹药与防空反导拦截弹的迅速消耗。

据媒体报道，白宫计划召集主要国防承包商高管要求加快生产，五角大楼也着手准备约500亿美元的补充预算用于补充近期行动造成的装备库存缺口。这些动向表明，美国国防工业体系的弹药产能与库存补充能力，已经成为制约美国继续开展对伊朗军事行动的重要影响因素。

当地时间3月6日，美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯表示，美国在伊朗展开军事行动“弹药储备充足”。图源：Getty Images

美国对伊朗发动军事打击的现实限制

与此同时，美国国内政治层面围绕对伊军事行动的质疑愈演愈烈。国会围绕总统战争权力的拉锯持续升温，尽管参议院程序性否决了限制特朗普政府对伊军事行动权限的决议案，但两党围绕战争授权的分歧已进入白热化阶段。

此外，路透社/益普索民调显示，仅27%的美国人支持政府对伊朗发起军事打击[1]，民众对海外长期战争的抵触情绪显著，这意味着特朗普政府维持大规模、长时段对伊军事行动的国内政治合法性与民意基础较为薄弱。

在上述背景下，美国维持长期战争的高额代价可能会重塑特朗普政府的对伊打击意愿与战略选择，推动其转向以“叙事层面的胜利”结束此轮打击行动，而非继续追求高难度的长期目标。

美国公众对特朗普袭击伊朗的态度总体上为：仅27%支持，43%反对，30%不确定。图源：路透社

虽然美国在短期内可以通过补充预算法案满足对伊军事行动的军费开支需求，但相关武器的库存和产能可能会制约进一步的军事行动。除了向中东地区调遣大量海空军力量之外，美国还在此轮军事行动中大量使用了战斧巡航导弹、“爱国者”导弹、“标准”-3型导弹、“萨德”系统拦截弹、LUCAS无人机等消耗性装备。

根据《华盛顿邮报》的报道，美国正在以惊人速度消耗其精准制导武器和先进防空导弹的库存，这可能迫使美军在数天之内就“不得不按优先级选择拦截目标”。[2]

史汀生中心专家指出，用于拦截伊朗威力最强弹道导弹的末段高空区域防御系统（THAAD）导弹供应尤其短缺。如果美国以去年与伊朗持续12天的冲突期间的强度使用THAAD导弹，其储备可能仅够维持两周左右。图源：美国空军

这些精准制导武器和先进防空反导拦截弹的共同点在于造价高昂、生产速度慢、库存补充周期长。在本轮冲突弹药消耗远超预期的情况下，国防工业的生产能力将很快成为制约美国对伊军事行动可持续性的战略约束。

不可否认，美国依托全球领先的军事力量与规模庞大的战略储备，若执意推进对伊朗的长期高强度打击，可通过跨战区调拨全球部署的弹药库存，在短期内维持战场消耗需求。但这种“拆东墙补西墙”式的库存调配，将直接挤压美军未来在更高烈度情景下的战略储备冗余，对其全球军事布局形成不可逆的战略透支。

尤其值得注意的是，在美国将中国定位为首要战略竞争对手与核心假想敌的顶层战略框架下，美军必须为印太方向可能发生的高烈度大国对抗预留足额的战备弹药与作战资源，无法大规模抽调印太战区的核心战备储备用于中东地区的局部冲突。

图为美国在印太地区的军事存在。信息来源：US Library of Congress 图源：BBC

从进攻端来看，随着美国和以色列迅速掌握伊朗空域的制空权并且压制伊朗的防空能力，美军可以降低对战斧巡航导弹等高成本远程精准打击弹药的依赖，转而大规模使用联合直接攻击弹药（JDAM）等库存规模大、量产补充快、单位成本低的制导炸弹维持对伊朗的打击。这将大幅降低打击伊朗的军火成本，有效提升其军事打击行动的可持续性。

但从防御端来看，对伊朗反击火力的拦截行动将带来拦截弹药的持续大规模消耗。本轮冲突的长期演进态势，将在很大程度上取决于美伊双方弹药库存规模、国防工业量产能力与供应链韧性的博弈。

——如果美军的打击在摧毁伊朗导弹发射平台、导弹及无人机库存以及核心军工生产能力方面取得决定性进展，将从根源上削弱伊朗的反击能力，进而大幅缓解防御端弹药消耗对美军军事行动的约束。

——反之，如果伊朗方面能够维持一定的军工生产和反击能力，持续使用相对成本较低的导弹和廉价无人机消耗美军弹药库存，美军用于防护中东前沿基地和区域盟友要地的拦截弹库存，将会成为制约其对伊军事行动持续性的重要阻碍。

这种短缺可能会迫使美军改变行为模式，包括按照来袭目标的威胁等级划定拦截优先级、更多依赖低成本的反无人机手段，甚至主动收缩防护范围、放弃非核心目标的防御任务。

这种调整的直接后果，是美军中东前沿基地、区域盟友关键设施面临的风险显著上升。这将不仅会导致美国在中东地区安全承诺可信度的受损，更将使特朗普政府面临的政治与军事压力快速累积。

当地时间3月6日晚，伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队宣布启动第23波“真实承诺-4”军事行动，对以色列和该地区美军基地目标发动无人机和导弹联合打击。图源：Getty Images

特朗普可以宣布“胜利”并结束战争

在本轮对伊军事打击发起前，美伊两国之间的外交谈判仍在持续推进。然而，美方开出的价码触及伊朗核心利益红线，始终未获伊方接受。从本轮军事行动的兵力部署与实施特征来看，特朗普政府短期内并无向伊朗境内派遣地面作战部队的明确动向，其更可能的战略意图，是用军事优势强行重设谈判边界，从而迫使伊朗接受更为苛刻的限制性条款。

综合来看，特朗普政府通过此次对伊打击，已经实现的短期战略目标包括：对哈梅内伊和部分伊斯兰革命卫队高层的定点清除、对伊朗海军主力作战力量的实质性瘫痪、对伊朗常规远程打击能力的系统性削弱。

然而，美国试图通过持续军事打击继续推进的战略目标——摧毁伊朗的核能力、推动伊朗的政权更迭以及提振美国国内中期选举选情——仍然难以实现。

只不过，上述美国尚未实现的战略目标都难以通过远程打击的方式实现。

从摧毁伊朗核能力的目标来看，尽管远程打击能够对已知的固定核设施与部分关键研发节点造成实质性毁伤，但是由于伊朗核问题的长期延宕，伊朗已构建起分散化、地下化、隐蔽化的核设施与备份体系。美军仅靠远程打击无法全面清除这些设施，更难以实现对伊朗核能力的永久性摧毁。

从推动伊朗政权更迭的目标来看，要靠远程打击要实现政权更迭，除非伊朗内部本就处于政权合法性崩塌、统治体系濒临崩溃的临界状态。这需要精英阶层出现重大分裂，并伴随大规模的社会动员，同时反对派势力必须掌握足够强有力的武装力量。在美国不派遣地面部队进入伊朗的情况下，单纯的远程打击难以帮助伊朗国内的反对派势力建立与伊斯兰革命卫队相抗衡的军事实力，也就难以实现其推动政权更迭的目标。

2026年3月6日星期五，在伊朗首都德黑兰，伊朗抗议者在伊玛目霍梅尼大清真寺外举行反美以集会，他们手持已故最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊的画像和伊朗国旗。图源：Getty Images

从提振国内选情的目标来看，本轮军事行动的实际政治后果将受到持续时间、美军伤亡、石油价格等因素的影响。当前美国国内已经大量出现对军事行动的质疑声音，甚至在共和党内部以及MAGA群体中，也出现了对特朗普是否过于好战、是否偏离“美国优先”的质疑。[3]

即便美国向伊朗境内派遣地面作战部队全面介入局势，在伊朗国内未出现严重精英分裂与政治动荡的前提下，上述战略目标也很难在短期内实现，反而会使美国彻底陷入特朗普此前反复批判的那种“战争泥潭”。

因此，特朗普政府最具可行性的战略选择，是在维持阶段性打击后，通过单方面宣布“任务完成、取得胜利”的叙事方式终止本轮军事行动。

本轮军事行动已取得的阶段性战场成果，足以支撑特朗普完成符合其“赢学”叙事逻辑的政治成果包装，并将其塑造为执政周期内的标志性外交与军事政绩。同时，终止军事行动也能够及时止损，避免美国综合国力的持续消耗，以及特朗普政府政治与外交资源的进一步透支。

在当前形势下，停战的主动权仍然掌握在美国手中。特朗普随时可以宣布“胜利”并实施停火。如果伊朗在此后继续实施大规模军事反击，它将极易在国际舆论与外交层面成为众矢之的，甚至招致临近的海湾国家以及众多依赖霍尔木兹海峡航道安全的国家的集体反对与外交施压。

文章于2026年3月7日刊登于CGTN官网，点击图片链接阅读原文。图源：CGTN网站截图

*以下为英文译文，供读者对照参考（请上下滑动查看）。

Since the US and Israel launched high-intensity strikes against Iran on February 28, the key variable shaping the battlefield has gradually shifted. The critical factor has shifted from the tactical accuracy and destructive impact of a single strike to whether the US is capable of sustaining the rapid consumption of precision-guided munitions and air and missile defense interceptors during a prolonged, high-intensity confrontation.

Media reports indicate that the White House is planning to convene executives from major defense contractors and urge them to accelerate production, while the Pentagon is also preparing a supplemental budget of approximately $50 billion to address stockpile shortfalls caused by recent operations. These developments suggest that the capacity of the US defense industry, especially its ability to produce munitions and replenish inventories, has already become a major factor constraining further military operations against Iran.

Real-world constraints on US military strikes against Iran

Meanwhile, domestic political skepticism over military action against Iran has intensified in the US. The tug-of-war in Congress concerning the president's war powers has escalated. Despite the Senate's rejection of a resolution that would have restricted President Trump's authority to use force against Iran, the discord between the two parties over war authorization has escalated significantly.

Moreover, a Reuters/Ipsos poll shows that only 27% of Americans support military strikes on Iran, reflecting strong public resistance to grinding conflicts. This suggests that the Trump administration's domestic political legitimacy and popular support for sustaining large-scale, long-duration military operations against Iran are relatively weak. In this context, the high cost of a protracted war may reshape the Trump administration's willingness and strategic choices, pushing it toward ending the current campaign with a "narrative victory" rather than continuing to pursue difficult long-term objectives.

While the US has the capacity to address the funding needs for operations against Iran in the short term by enacting a supplemental appropriations bill, the stockpiles and production capacity of relevant weaponry may constrain further military actions. Beyond deploying considerable naval and air assets to the Middle East, the US has also expended large quantities of precision-guided munitions and advanced air defense and anti-missile interceptors during this campaign, including Tomahawk cruise missiles, Patriot missiles, Standard Missile-3 missiles, THAAD interceptors and LUCAS drones. According to The Washington Post, the US is depleting its stocks of precision weapons and sophisticated air defense missiles at a striking pace, which could force the US military to "prioritize which targets to intercept" within days.

These key weapons share several characteristics: high production costs, slow manufacturing rates and lengthy replenishment cycles for stockpiles. Given the current conflict's ammunition expenditure far exceeding expectations, the defense industry's production capacity will soon become a strategic constraint limiting the sustainability of US military operations against Iran.

It is true that, relying on its globally leading military capabilities and vast strategic reserves, the US could, if determined to pursue a long and high-intensity campaign against Iran, sustain battlefield consumption in the short term by reallocating munitions from stockpiles positioned across different theaters. However, this "robbing Peter to pay Paul" approach to inventory allocation would directly erode the US military's strategic reserves for higher-intensity scenarios, resulting in irreversible strategic depletion of its global military posture.

From the perspective of attacking, as the US and Israel rapidly secure air superiority over Iranian airspace and suppress Iran's air-defense capabilities, US forces can reduce its reliance on high-cost precision strike munitions such as Tomahawk cruise missiles. Instead, it can sustain strikes against Iran through the large-scale use of guided bombs such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which exist in larger stockpiles, can be replenished through mass production more quickly and have a lower unit cost. This would significantly reduce the cost of operations against Iran and materially improve the sustainability of the campaign.

However, from the perspective of defending, intercepting Iranian retaliations will entail continued and large-scale depletion of interceptor munitions. The long-term trajectory of this conflict will largely depend on the competition between the two sides with regard to stockpile size, the defense industry's capacity for mass production and supply-chain resilience. Should US strikes achieve decisive progress in destroying Iran's missile launch platforms, its missile and drone stockpiles and its core military production capabilities, this would fundamentally weaken Iran's counterstrike capacity.

Thus, the constraints imposed on US military operations by ammunition depletion on the defensive front would be substantially alleviated. Conversely, if Iran is able to preserve a degree of military production and retaliatory capacity, and continues to use relatively low-cost missiles and cheap drones to deplete US munitions stocks, the inventory of interceptor missiles deployed to protect forward bases in the Middle East and key sites of regional allies would become a major constraint on the sustainability of its military operations against Iran.

Such shortages may compel the US military to change its operational patterns, including setting interception priorities according to the threat level of incoming targets, increasing reliance on low-cost counter-drone measures and even proactively narrowing protective coverage by foregoing the defense of non-essential assets. The direct consequence of such adjustments would be a significant escalation in risks faced by US forward bases in the Middle East and critical facilities of regional allies. This would not only undermine the credibility of US security commitments in the region, but would also rapidly accumulate political and military pressure on the Trump administration.

Trump could declare a 'win' and end the war

Prior to the start of this round of military strikes against Iran, diplomatic negotiations between the US and Iran were still progressing. Nevertheless, the terms demanded by the US were perceived by Iran as crossing its core red lines and were never accepted by the Iranian side. Judging from the troop deployment and operational characteristics of the current campaign, the Trump administration has not demonstrated clear indication of deploying ground combat forces into Iran in the near future. It appears that its primary strategic intent is to leverage military superiority to forcefully reset the negotiation parameters and thereby compel Iran to accept more stringent restrictive terms.

In summary, the Trump administration has achieved the following short-term strategic objectives through strikes against Iran: the targeted elimination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the substantial crippling of Iran's main naval combat capabilities and the systematic weakening of Iran's conventional long-range strike capabilities. But the broader strategic goals the US seeks to advance through sustained military action – destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities, toppling the Iranian government and gaining domestic support ahead of the US midterm elections – remain elusive.

Such objectives are difficult to accomplish through the medium of long-range strikes alone. When it comes to destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities, long-range strikes can inflict substantial damage on identified fixed nuclear facilities and specific critical research and development nodes. However, the protracted nature of the Iranian nuclear issue has resulted in Iran establishing decentralized, underground and concealed nuclear facilities alongside backup systems. Relying solely on long-range strikes, the US military cannot comprehensively eliminate these facilities, let alone achieve the permanent destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities.

Regarding a change in Iran's leadership, long-range strikes alone would be inadequate to deliver such an outcome unless the Iranian government was already in a state of collapse, with its legitimacy eroded and its governing system close to breakdown. This would require a considerable split among elites and extensive social mobilization on a large scale, coupled with opposition forces possessing armed capabilities strong enough to challenge the IRGC. In the absence of a deployment of US ground forces to Iran, long-range strikes are unlikely to help domestic opposition forces in establishing military capabilities comparable to the IRGC. Consequently, the objective of toppling the Tehran government proves difficult to achieve.

As for domestic support, the actual political consequences of this operation will depend on factors including its duration, the number of US casualties and oil prices. At present, there is already substantial domestic criticism of the campaign. Even within the Republican Party and among MAGA supporters, questions have emerged over whether Trump is becoming overly aggressive and whether he is deviating from the "America First" principle.

Even if the US were to deploy ground combat forces to Iran to fully intervene, these strategic objectives would still be difficult to achieve in the short term, provided that Iran does not undergo a severe elite split and political turmoil. Instead, such a move would risk embroiling the US in the very kind of war quagmire that Trump has repeatedly denounced in the past. Accordingly, the most viable strategic option for the Trump administration would be to sustain a period of limited strikes and then conclude this round of military operations by unilaterally declaring "mission accomplished" and "win."

The strategic objectives achieved in this round of military operations provide sufficient grounds for Trump to package political outcomes aligned with his "winning narrative," allowing him to present the campaign as a signature foreign and military achievement during his term in office. Also, ending the military operations would assist in the prevention of further erosion of US comprehensive national strength and prevent the further exhaustion of the Trump administration's political and diplomatic resources.

Under current conditions, the initiative for a ceasefire still lies with Trump. He could declare victory and implement a ceasefire at any time. Should Iran subsequently proceed with large-scale military retaliation, it would swiftly become the target of international criticism and diplomatic pressure. Such actions could provoke collective opposition and diplomatic pressure from neighboring Gulf countries, as well as many countries that depend on the security of shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz.

参考文献：

Jason Lange, “Just one in four Americans say they back US strikes on Iran, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds,” Reuters, March 1, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/just-one-four-americans-support-us-strikes-iran-reutersipsos-poll-finds-2026-03-01/.

Noah Robertson, et al., “Top defense officials push back on concerns about U.S. munitions shortage,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/04/us-iran-air-defense-missile-burn-rate/.

参见：Nandita Bose, Gram Slattery and Bo Erickson, “Trump presses ahead with Iran war despite warnings of political risk for midterms,” Reuters, March 2, 2026, ; Nathan Layne and Aleksandra Michalska, “Iran crisis tests Trump standing with young men who helped power 2024 win,” Reuters, March 4, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/iran-crisis-tests-trump-standing-with-young-men-who-helped-power-2024-win-2026-03-04/.

徐伟钧华南理工大学公共政策研究院副研究员

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